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The purpose of this study is to conduct a descriptive analysis of
the Freedom Incorporated Organization (Fl) and the rise of black poli
tical empowerment in Kansas City, Missouri. The study will attempt to
analyze and examine the impact that Freedom Incorporated had in alter
ing the social and economic status of the black electorate in Kansas
City, Missouri. This study will also examine the political activity
of Freedom Incorporated during its early years and the role of the
organization in the City Council race of 1979 to elect a black as
mayor and member of the city council in Kansas City, Missouri. To
measure the political effectiveness of black elected officials and
black organizations in improving economic, political and social
conditions of blacks, the following indicators are to be utilized in
this research study: (a) the ability of Freedom Incorporated to end
discrimination in the public and private sector; (b) the ability of
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Freedom Incorporated to improve the number of blacks on city council,
city boards, office of the mayor, county commission, Missouri Senate
and House seats and the United State Congress; Cc) ability of Freedom
Incorporated to obtain employment and economic development projects
for the black community; Cd) the ability of Freedom Incorparted to
improve housing, street lights, crime and health care; and (e) ability
of Freedom Incorporated to improve the distribution of goods and
services to the black community.
Data presented in this study are designed to focus specifically
upon several objectives. First, the data should allow us to empiri
cally assess economic and social conditions of the black electorate
and the relationship of these environmental factors to political
activity and organizational development. Secondly, a critique, such
as we have begun will help us to trace, ponder and examine black
political activity in the Midwest during the pre and post Civil
Rights Era. Finally, the data presented in this study seeks to
explore for the first time a systematic and comprehensive analysis of
the black electorate and black political activity in Kansas City,
Missouri. It is hoped that this study, will contribute to the growth
of scholarly research about the black political experience in Kansas
City, Missouri. The findings of this research study nevertheless,
demonstrate that voting and the election of blacks to public office
has contributed to only a few gradual and remedial changes in the
social and economic conditions of blacks in Kansas City, Missouri.
—2—
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INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM
The Enigma
The following observation was made by Marguerite Ross Barnett
on the nature of Blacks and the American Political System in 1982:
Part of the difficulty in understanding black
politics stems from flawed views of the larger econo
mic and political systems in which black political
actors operate. A common political analogy likens
blacks to white ethnic groups and is followed by ar
guments that even if blacks are not like white ethnic
groups their usages of group power can produce simi
lar results. Blacks, therefore, are encouraged to
follow the white ethnic group example, including the
supposed use of the political system to achieve sta
tus and economic power for the group . . . .~ The
greatest political gains won by the black community
were on the heels of the demonstration and rebellions
of the late l950’s and during the 1960’s. Further
more, many blacks raised political issues defined as
illegitimate in the American political system—ques
tions of separation and black nationalism and cur
rent constitutional questions relating to the nature
and organizations of the political system.2
The above statement conceptualizes how blacks in Kansas City,
Missouri, utilize political organizations in their relentless
1-Marguerite R. Burnett, “The Congressional Black Caucus: Illu
sions and Realities of Power” in Michael B. Preston, Lenneal J. Hen
derson, Jr., and Paul Pieyeon, The New Black Politics: The Search for
Political Power (New York: Longman, Inc., 1982), 48.
2lbid., 49.
2
struggle to acquire access to the franchise. The quest by blacks
to utilize Freedom Incorporated to acquire fundamental rights and
privileges as spoken about in the Constitution has taken place
within the confines of the two major parties. Access to the fran
chise to end political and economic discrimination signalled the
beginning movement on the part of blacks to build Freedom Incorpo
rated, a black political organization at the precinct and ward
levels for improving the quality of housing, employment, better
schools and access to the franchise to elect their decisionmakers.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 provided the black electorate
in Kansas City, Missouri, with the opportunity to participate in
the political system as decision—makers. Before the development of
Freedom Incorporated and the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act,
there were no blacks elected to public office. For example, Kansas
City, Missouri, a city with 22.1 percent of the population black in
1970 could not elect a black as mayor or to the city council.3
To further our examination of Kansas City, Missouri, this
research study will attempt to describe and examine the effect
the Freedom Incorporated had in improving the political, economic
and social status of blacks in Kansas City, Missouri. The most
important characteristic of the study is that the struggle by the
black electorate to gain access to the franchise in Kansas City,
3u. S. Bureau of Census, County and Data Book (Washington,
D.C.: Department of Commerce, 1977), 696.
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Missouri, is based on the general premise that fundamental changes
in their social, political and economic status can be achieved by
providing them with equal access to formal political and governmental
authority.
As in the case of Kansas City, Missouri, this movement for
social change was very instrumental in the development of the Freedom
Incorporated Organization. The Freedom Incorporated Organization in
Kansas City, Missouri, was organized by Leon Jordan, Bruce Watkins,
Leon S. Hughes, Jr., Howard Maupin, Fred Curls, Dr. Charles Moor and
Marion Foote in Maupin’s Barber Shop on May 6, 1962. This group of
Kansas City blacks formed the Freedom Incorporated Organization in
response to the political, social and economic problems that had been
defined as legitimate concerns for black community residents, namely;
(a) to build an effective precinct organization to elect candidates
at the national, state and local levels capable of improving the
conditions of blacks in Kansas City, Missouri, and Jackson County;
(b) to improve neighborhoods in the black community and (c) to sponsor
bills and neighborhood economic development related projects through
its candidates, in an attempt to exercise political influence within
the state legislature and the city council in Kansas City, Missouri.
Even though within the past five years a variety of research
studies have been written detailing the election of blacks to public
office throughout the United States, there is very little information
about the history, development and political activity of blacks in
4
Kansas City, Missouri. The absence of such scholarly research about
black political life in the Midwest is due in part to the lack of
interest, understanding and information about blacks living in the
Midwest. This study is intended to fill the void in the hope that
such research can be further stimulated.
In order to examine and describe black political activity and
employ an investigation of movements and occurrences contributing
to the development of black empowerment, this writer has decided to
conduct research on Kansas City, Missouri. It was chosen because
of Freedom Incorporated’s involvement in improving the quality of
black life and also because of its efforts to establish the view that
a relationship between electoral changes in Kansas City’s political
system and social and economic problems in the area where Freedom
Incorporated received its support does in fact exist. In the past,
such causal relationships have been measured and examined in order to
show how blacks during electoral contests have impacted on political
processes. William R. Keech has suggested in his research on black
electoral activity that when group cohesion is exhibited in voting,
the greatest impacts are made on public issues related to the distri
bution of public services, when blacks constitute a majority of the
voting population or when they are only small minorities within the
voting population.4 A subsequent review of the literature in the
4Robert T. Perry, Black Legislators (San Francisco, California:
R and E Research Associates, 1976), 3.
• ~flhI~~t
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field of black politics has also shown that the attitudes held by
blacks toward participating in the political system of Kansas City,
Missouri are invariably affected by and linked to their social and
economic conditions: education, poverty, unemployment, single family
headed homes, crime and income.5 It is hoped by this writer that by
carefully examining efforts by the electorate of the black community
to build Freedom Incorporated in order to provide black with access
to formal governmental bodies and to improve the quality of jobs,
education, housing and income, we then can determine the extent to
which these changes contributed to the development of black political
empowerment.
Historically, Kansas City during the early l960’s produced
Freedom Incorporated as a strong black political organization at
the ward and precinct levels agitating for social, political and
economic justice. An understanding of the influence of this black
political organization and its political behavior can be achieved
by focusing upon socioeconomic conditions of the black electorate,
which serve as a basis, in some instances, for its political behav
ior. Such a critique would provide us with a sufficient understand
ing of the factors contributing to community empowerment and politi
cal activity in Kansas City, Missouri. For example, if our research
study showed that black political organizations served a limited
5lbid., 2.
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purpose in controlling the local political process and institutions
in communities where black people live, how then can black political
empowerment be achieved? Moreover, if the study shows that the black
electorate can only actualize political gains in the elections of
candidates to state, national and local offices to improve the social
and economic status of blacks through their association with white
political organizations, then is black empowerment relevant? After
reviewing, describing and examining the ideological structure of the
Freedom Incorporated Organization, our research showed that its
leaders simply refused to concern themselves with the questions which
black political philosophy is concerned with. Then are black polit
ical empowerment and black organizations relevant to reordering
social and economic changes? Moreover, if this research study showed
that in the post and pre—Civil Rights Era activism of the black
electorate in Kansas City, Missouri was grounded in and directed by
black elites and intellectuals, then is it safe to assume that such a
movement will lack ideological clarity and uniform goals of direction?
In addition, if our research showed that the socioeconomic con
ditions of black electorates in Kansas City improved after the elec
tion of candidates backed by Freedom Incorporated, then can it be
said that finally black political empowerment has occurred? If our
research showed that during the post Civil Rights Era black activism
was guided by a social and political elite which was more concerned
with managing authentic opposition to its programs, elections of its
• dl .1 L d~dfiL Ailraaajt.l Ill .]lld~•d
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endorsed and recommended candidates for public office, then the
question should be asked: Does black empowerment allow Freedom Incor
porated to present itself as a viable choice to the existing programs
of white political elites? Efforts to garner answers to these ques
tions will further our understanding of Freedom Incorporated and its
role in improving quality of life for blacks in Kansas City, Missouri.
In order to continue, it would be necessary for us to devise a
scheme for assessing the effectiveness of black political leaders
and their organizations in attempting to improve socio—economic
conditions of the black electorate in Kansas City, Missouri. A
framework which will help us to develop such an analysis has already
been developed by Mack Jones. In his article, “Black Office
holders in Local Government,” he identified these officeholders as
official representatives of the black community in the halls of
government. In this capacity, they are:•
charged with synthesizing the various ideological
perspectives extant in their constituencies, as
sessing them in light of their own normative predi
lections, reducing them to policy alternatives to be
presented to their respective bodies, and trying to
get them adopted as authoritative policy. It must
also be noted here that not only must the black
elected official perform the foregoing tasks within
the constraints of antithetical conditions imposed
by the white majority, but he also has to cope with
a constituency which often has a sizeable white per
centage. 6
6Mack Jones, “Black Officeholders in Local Governments of the
South: An Overview”, Unpublished manuscript prepared for delivery at
the 66th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
I, Lb IL ii uJ~bI LdaJi~ ~ãLllLIli I
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In this assessment of the impact of Black elected officeholders
in the delivery of goods and services to the black community, Profes
sor Jones posited the notion that:
Black officeholders in local governments in the South
have not had significant success in re—ordering the
priorities of the bodies on which they serve and they
have enjoyed only limited success in increasing the
black community’s share of benefits and services
within the constraints of present priorities. Given
their acute minority status this may be understand
able . . . .~ since most officeholders try to culti
vate an image, as a noncontroversial public servant
working quietly with his colleagues to bring about
desired changes. However, since the most crucial
issues facing the black community are in fact highly
controversial the price for membership in the frater
nity of noncontroversials is abdicated on those
issues especially important to their black constitu
ents. A dilemma indeed for black officeholders.8
He further states that this dilemma raises a:
fundamental question, viz., can the political
problems facing black southerners be dealt with
through participation in electoral politics? To
answer that question it may be useful to conceptualize
representation in terms of two categories —— fair
representation and sufficient representation.9 The
former involves questions of procedure while the
latter involves matters of substance. Fair represen
tation would be that which resulted from following
equitable electorate rules enacted through democratic
methods and impartially administered. Sufficient re
presentation would occur in situations in which repre
sentatives of a particular group have adequate voting
power to insure that policy matters deemed especially
important to their survival or liberation as a people





The above comments allow us to develop the following set of criteria
for evaluating the effectiveness of black officers: (1) ability of
Freedom Incorporated to end discrimination in public and private
sectors; (2) ability of Freedom Incorporated to improve the number of
blacks on the city council, city boards, in the office of the mayor,
county commission, in Missouri Senate and House seats and in the
United States House of Representatives; (3) ability of Freedom Incor
porated to obtain employment and economic development projects for
the black community; (4) ability of Freedom Incorporated to improve
housing, street lights, crime control and health care; and (5) ability
of Freedom Incorporated to improve the distribution of goods and
services to the black community. These indicators were chosen because
in Kansas City, Missouri, they were considered by Freedom Incorporated
and the electorate to impact the most on their daily lives. In
Chapter IV, this research study will attempt to describe and examine
how Freedom Incorporated after the election of its candidates to city
council introduced a public accommodations ordinance to end discrim
ination in public and private sectors of Kansas City. It will also
describe how Freedom Incorporated worked to elect candidates to
public office by entering into alliances with its competitors in
order to improve the number of blacks on city councils, city boards
and commissioners, in state legislative races. The black electorate
supported the election of liberal whites to the United States Senate
who were sympathetic to improving their socioeconomic conditions.
Finally, chapter V, will examine black political empowerment during
the mayoral and city council election of 1979. Chapter VI will
ii J.U~ Uh.A~ ~fl~il
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attempt to address why Freedom Incorporated was able to generate
black electorate support for Bruce Watkins during the Kansas City,
Missouri, mayoral and city council race of 1979. The summary and
conclusion will depict efforts by Freedom Incorporated to provide
health care and housing and community development for the black
community.
Frame of Reference
The history of black politics in the United State has histori
cally been concerned mainly with securing those fundamental rights
and privileges as written about in the Constitution. The level of
black political activity, which has never approached anything approx
imating full participation, has been characterized by peaks and
troughs as blacks have achieved new levels of participation only to
be followed by greater white resistance and concomitant decline in
participation.” In the past and especially in the evolution of
black politics during the 1960’s through Duboisian, Pan—Africanism
or Marxism—Leninism, black political scientists have discovered that
a tendency has emerged among political activists to select some,
“already defined ideology and stipulate the black theoretical task
“Mack Jones, “Black Politics from Civil Rights to Benign Neg
lect” in Harry Johnson, ed., Negotiating the Mainstream (Washington,
D.C.: American Language Academy, 1978), 164—165.
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as one of taking it to the people as a tool to be used in their
liberation struggle,”2 to build black political empowerment.
Thus, a community which has achieved empowerment would be one
which exhibits sufficient ideological clarity and organizational
discipline and efficiency to develop a consensus on the fundamental
issues facing the community and to mobilize its resources to persuade
appropriate decisionmakers to support the community’s problems. The
presence of such ideological clarity and a disciplined organization
are especially important for a subordinate people who do not posses
sufficeint economic muscle to exploit the vulnerabilities of their
adversaries. 13
Consequently, the pattern, level and movement for black politi
cal empowerment in Kansas City, Missouri, has historically emphasized:
escalating demands to improve the level and quality of city officials
and services in black neighborhoods; to intensify the black political
struggle to capture a large share of the supply of jobs in city
government;’4 to improve black skills through education, litigation,
court cases and lobbying the Congress and state officials for legis—
lations to remedy the plight of blacks.’5
‘2Alex Willingham, “Ideology and Politics: Their Status in Afro—
American Social Theory” in Endarch Journal of Theory, No. 2 (Spring,
(1975), 11.
‘3Jones, 97—98.
14William K. Tabb and Larry Sowers, Marxism and the Metropolis
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 226.
‘5David Cdlby, “Black Power and State Welfare Policy” in Review
of Black Political Economy (Summer 1982), 65.
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The pattern of social and economic change which has emerged for
blacks in Kansas City, Missouri, in the 1970’s has varied. Advances
have been made in education, health and in the election of blacks to
public office, due in part, to political and electoral organizational
activity.16 The movement for black political empowerment has heigh
tened the debate among black activists over the concomitant goal of
securing political and constitutional rights. The utility of this
debate has been forthrightly addressed by a number of political
scientists. Among the more notable is Professor Mack Jones, who
offers additional arguments as to the relationship of social science
inquiry as a reliable frame of reference for facillitating our under
standing of the nature of black politics in the United States:
Every significant researchable problem occurs within
a web of thought or network growing out of a people’s
anticipation and control needs. This web includes,
first of all a people’s world view which, among other
things, answers the question: who are we? Where did
we come from? How did we get here? Where do we wish
go? What alternative strategies have been tried and
what results were obtained and why? Who are our
friends and enemies? Closely connected with the
world view is the second part of the web, a set of
normative assumptions which summarizes a people’s
perception of the nature of the good life and the
political, economic and cultural forms necessary for
its realization. Academic disciplines develop within
the contest of these two.’7
16 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Social and Economic Status of Black
Population in U.S. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, 1974), 1.
17Mack Jones, “Scientific Method as a Tool for Improving the
Quality of Value Judgements with Particular Concern for the Black
Predictment in the United States”, Endarch Journal of Political
Theory (Winter 1976): 42—14,
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While the scientific method is only one of several important phases
in systematic inquiry, it is the crucial phase which facilitates the
maximization of certainty in our efforts to deal with problems of
growing out of the the black experience.’8 The pattern of social,
political and economic advances in the status of blacks, conditioned
by the goals and priorities of black political activity, has varied.
The stronger the trend toward organizing blacks to improve social and
economic conditions became, the more the strategy changed to accommo
date their goals, namely, free politically the vast majority of
blacks that remain at the bottom of the social and economic stracture
of American society.19
The utility of electoral politics has been written about by a
number of political scientists. These studies have argued that
politics is a valuable tool for changing the economic and political
status of blacks at the local level. According to these studies,
whenever the black electorate is successful in the election of its
representatives to public office, they fail in their efforts at
reordering the priorities on the bodies on which they serve. As a
result of their failure, “they enjoy only limited success in increas—
18Mack Jones, “Scientific Method as a Tool for Improving the
Quality of Value Judgements with Particular Concerns for the Black
Predictment in the U.S.” Review of Black Political Economy (Summer
1977): 7.
‘9Thomas R. Dye, The Politics of Equality (New York: The Bobbs—
Merrill Company,1971), 19.
14
ing the black community’s share of the benefits and services.”20
Much of the scholarly literature on black political activity in
the United States in general and Kansas City in particular fail to
examine systematically the black political experience as a key factor
in devising conceptual schemes for interpreting and understanding
black politics. According to Mack Jones in his essay, “A Frame of
Reference for Black Politics” in 1972, the frame of reference most
commonly used by researchers for interpreting the black political
experience:
is likely to be the inappropriate melting pot theory
of American pluralism. Attempts have been made in
recent years to utilize the modernizing traditional
systems model in the field of comparative politics
for analyzing and interpreting the black political
experience. In both instances, the researcher looks
not to the black political experience for guidance in
developing his frame of reference, but rather to the
political experience of other people.~
Conversely, Jones posits the view that in developing a frame of
reference or conceptual scheme, the researcher should not proceed
with superficial comparison of blacks and the political experiences
of other ethnic minorities in this country or elsewhere. He should
begin by searching for those factors which are unique to the black
political experience, for this is the information which will
20Mack Jones, “Black Officeholders and Political Development in
the Rural South” , Review of the Black Political Economy (Novmeber
1976): 404—405.
2’[~Iack Jones, “A Frame of Reference for Black Politics,” in
Black Political Life in the United States, Lenneal J. Henderson,
Jr., ed. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1972), 7—8.
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facilitate our understanding of blacks in the Ameri
can political system. Such approaches posit a level
of isomorphism between the black political experience
by other groups which is denied by even a cursory ex
aminations. 22
For this study, the writer argues that black political activity
in the Midwest (Missouri) has historically provided blacks the oppor
tunity to agitate against exploitation and white racism which has
become a basic part of the American political economy. The movement
on the part of blacks to obtain political power in Missouri through
the electoral process pioneered the way for them to articulate their
interest on a larger scale within the political process. Changes in
the political status of blacks have been reflected in the shifting
goals, struggle, priorities and the leadership of the black political
experience, but they are to be regarded nevertheless as part of the
recurring black political struggle within the American social order.23
Operationalization of Major Concepts
Before proceeding, it may be necessary to describe the major
concepts employed in this study. For the most part, contemporary
discussions about the nature of the struggle for black political
empowerment in the United States by social scientists have failed,
forthrightly, to include in their analysis, research about the evolu—
22Ibid




tion of black politics and black political organizations in Kansas
City, Missouri.
Until recently, there has been an inclination on the part of
some black political scientists to develop systematic approaches to
the study of black political life in the United States. Contributions
by black social scientists to formulate a framework for examining the
study of black political empowerment and the relevance of it in achiev
ing status and economic power for blacks have been utilized in one
scheme of analysis, e.g., Mack Jones’, “Black Political Empowerment
in Atlanta: Myth and Realities”.24 Mack Jones’ essay provides us with
a conceptual scheme for explaining the meaning of black political em
powerment utilized in this research study. Jones posited the view
that:
the realization of the potential power inherent
in b:Lack electoral strength is dependent, first of
all upon black voter registration and the use of
those votes to elect persons who will work toward the
realization of the black agenda item. In some cases,
perhaps most, operationalization will be dependent
upon the ability to form functional coalitions. How
ever, it should be kept in mind that voting is not
black power simply because it makes possible the
election of ‘the better of two evils ‘ or because in
it settles an in house struggle between competing
white factions. Only if the victorious faction
relates positively to the black agenda do we have ope
rational black political power. 25
For the most part, Mack Jones set the tone for the development
of a model for exploring the occurrences in the struggle by blacks to
24 Mack Jones, “Black Political Empowerment in Atlanta: Myth and




obtain access to the franchise. Subsequent questions that have
arisen addressing most possible way for building black politcal
power in Kansas City, Missouri, stem from the plantation boss model
for understanding black politics in the United States. Consequently,
cursory discussions employed by John W. Blassingame in his book, The
Slave Community: Plantation Life, attempt to examine and discuss
comprehensively, the political battle between whites and blacks in
their struggle for political, psychological and physical power on the
plantation. To some extent, Blassingame goes to great length to
abstract from the history of plantation life the evolution of events
which parallel the struggle for black political power in Kansas City
today. He states that the plantation was
a battlefield where slaves fought masters for physi
cal and psychological power. Although unlettered, un
armed and outnumbered, slaves fought in various ways
to preserve their manhood. Several factors exerted
a powerful influence on this political struggle. The
slave’s parents, relatives, religion and the size of
his master’s plantation —— all played some role in
the formation of his character and affected behavior
in the quarters.
In analyzing slave behavior, it is possible to
utilize several psychological theories. The most
useful of them, however, is Peter Blair’s “coercive
theory.” Blair argued that coercive force which can
hardly be resistance is important as a last resort
exercising power over individuals who cannot other
wise be made to yield. If an individual has much
power over others, which means that they are obligat
ed to and dependent on him for greatly needed bene
fits, they will be eager to do his bidding and anti
cipate his wishes in order to maintain his good will,
particularly if there ar e still others who compete
for benefits he supplies them. If an individual has
little power over others, however, they will be less
concerned with pleasing him, and he may even have to
remind them that they owe it to him to follow his re
quest. Such reminders demostrate to them that on the
J
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such reminders. The extent of submissiveness often
depends on the structure of the group to which the
the person belongs. The unique norms or subculture of
the group, its size, the spatial arrangements, fre—
quency of interaction, and the superordinate’s abili
ty to observe his subordinates all affect the degree
of submission. Studies of industrial organizations
have shown that members of s all groups tend to inter
nalize more the expectations of those in power and to
comply more fully with their demands than member of
larger ones. Behavior in these organizations varied
from friendly to aggressive dominance and from hos
tile submissiveness to docility.26
Consequently, the use of the above models allow us to schemati
cize references to logical considerations about the struggle by blacks
for political empowerment. The plantation boss and black political
empowerment approaches by Jones and Blassingame which advance the
cause and effect thesis about black political life in the United
States, to some degree, mirror traditional patterns of analysis.
Thus, we find ourselves utilizing them to conceptualize the nature of
the struggle for power and social justice in Kansas City, Missouri.
Methodology
This study research will utilize the case study approach to
examine and describe the impact that Freedom Incorporated has had in
improving the quality of black life in Kansas City, Missouri. An
attempt will be made to examine the social, political and economic
status of blacks prior to the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act
26John W. Blassingame, The Slave Community: Plantation Life in
in the South (Oxford: Oxford University Press,l979), 86—287.
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and the development of Freedom Incorporated. An examination of the
election of blacks to public office will also be made in order to
show that the black electorate in Kansas City prior to the passage of
the 1965 Voting Rights Act, was excluded from choosing its leaders as
decision—makers. Research conducted by Mack Jones is utilized in this
study to measure the effectiveness of black elected officials and
black organizations, in reordering the social and economic conditions
of blacks.27 As mentioned earlier, this study will utilize the
following indicators for assessing the effectiveness of black politi
cal leaders and their organizations in attempt to improve socioecono
mic conditions of the black electorate in Kansas City, Missouri: (1)
distribution of governmental services to the black community; (2)
health care; (3) election of black to public office; (4) employment
and economic development projects for the black community; and (5)
housing.
In this case study, an attempt has been made to focus upon the
theoretical and research issues contributing to the development of
Freedom Incorporated and the rise of black political employment.
An examination of the reaction by white political organizations and
their leaders to its development and activities will allow us to
examine and describe its impact on the political process in Kansas
City, Missouri.
27Jones, “Black Officeholders in Local Governments of the
South,” 70.
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Data presented in this study were collected by monitoring
Kansas City Star and Kansas City Times, major morning and evening
white owned newspapers and Kansas City Call and Missouri Black
Leadership, major weekly and monthly blackowned newspapers. Research
reports from the State of Missouri and the city government of Kansas
City, Missouri were used to describe economic and development projects
along with population and socioeconomic problems of blacks living in
Kansas City, Missouri. Moreover, an examination of books, journals,
articles from magazines and newspapers, review of campaign literature,
examination of reports, memorandums and minutes from the files of
Freedom Incorporated were used. Finally, this writer has sent survey
questions to State representatives Orchid Jordan, Phil Curls, Con
gressman Allen Wheat and others requesting information about Freedom
Incorporated. They refused to respond to the survey or telephone
request from me about the data or provide a valid reason for noncom—
pliancewith the requests. The only response to my request came from
State Representative James Tindall, a close friend and member of the
Freedom Incorporated Organization. Therefore, interviews from the
past presidents of Freedom Incorporated and its elected officials
will not be utilized.
An attempt will be made in this study to establish a frame of
reference for assessing black politics in Kansas City, Missouri, and
the effectiveness of black elected officeholders and organizations in
II [ I U I !IL!fl~ £
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improving social, political and economic conditions of blacks. In
order to conduct our research effort, we should first begin by examin
ing the social and economic demographics of Kansas City, Missouri.
Procedure of Inquiry
This research study is organized into five chapters. In Chapter
I, we attempt to develop a frame of reference for assessing black
political activity and blacks struggle to gain access to the fran
chise. Chapter II focuses upon the political and social setting: an
examination of the social and economic demographics of Kansas City,
Missouri. Chapter III attempts to analyze the black electorate and
Pendergast machine in Kansas City, Missouri. In Chapter IV, we
attempt to analyze those factors which contributed to the development
of Freedom Incorporated. Chapter V is a descriptive analysis of
black political empowerment during the mayoral and city council
election of 1979. Chapter VI consists of the summary and conclusion.
Review of the Literature
The function of political parties and organizations has histori
cally been fourfold; (1) to control and manage the conflict between
white and black communities; (2) to perform the role of facilitator;
in this sense, they allow the election of candidates to address the
problems of political and economic discrimination; (3) to provide a
~.A,,II.E~LL~b.L
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channel through which the electorate could be brought into negotia
tions with the political system; and (4), to nominate candidates and
to recruit of blacks by political organizations and parties to
address the issues of health, safety, and living conditions of the
black electorate in Kansas City, Missouri.
In their analysis of black politics in Kansas City, Missouri, A.
Theodore Brown and Lyles W. Dorsett concluded that the black vote was
used to “elect candidates friendly to the recognition and representa
tion of black people in public office in the ratio of their numerical
strength and qualifications.” 28
Kenneth E. Gray in his examination of politics in Kansas City,
Missouri, concluded that Kansas City presents an example of one kind
of factional politics. Politics there is a struggle within and
between two competing political groups. One which may be called
“regular democrats” consists of several personal followings and
machines. Henry McKessick established his political organization in
the black community, while Tom Pendergast and Presta had their machine
organized in both the black and Italian comnunities. The inability
of these political organizations to mutually work with each other has
even led to political fights and killings during election time. The
inability of these white political organizations to work together has
contributed to the Citizen Association electing its candidates to
28Theodore Brown and Lyle W. Dorsett, Kansas City: A History of
Kansas Missouri (Boulder, Colorado: Pruett Publishing Co., 1978), 96.
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public office. The Citizen Association consisted of “independent
(anti—machine) Democrats, an AFL—CIO interest grouping, a Negro
editor with a following, the Republican party organization, and the
Republican Kansas City Star newspaper.”29 Everett C. Ladd, Jr., in his
empirical analysis of black politics in Kansas City concluded that
the vote is considered to be the Negro’s most important weapon in his
struggle for full citizenship. Traditionally, the black vote sup
ported those candidates responsive to the interests of blacks.
Richard Boiling, the liberal Missouri Congressman, was opposed in his
1964 Democratic primary in Kansas City, Missouri, by an anti—Bolling
faction. An estimated 17.4 per cent of the black electorate supported
him in his re—election bid and other democratic candidates when they
failed to see a decisive difference on racial grounds.3°
Henry Lee Moon31 and Oliver Cromwell32 contend in their
research on black politics that the black vote in Missouri, Penn
sylvania, Maryland and New Jersey provided a key margin of victory
for the late President Franklin Roosevelt. These states contributed
29Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New
York: Vantage Books, 1963), 134—135.
30Everett C. Ladd, Jr., “Negro Politics in the South: An Over
view” in Harry A. Bailey, Jr., Negro Politics in America (Columbus,
Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Pub. Co., 1967), 248, 251, 164.
31Henry Lee Moon, Balance of Power (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1948), 10.
32Oliver Cromwell, “Black Impact on the 1976 Election”, Focus,
(November 1976), 5.
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168 electoral votes to Roosevelt’s victory. Subsequently, during the
1976 presidential election between Carter and Ford, Carter defeated
Ford with the support he received from the black electorates. At
least every southern state of the old Confederacy except Virginia
where Ford won with a 23,906 vote margin voted for Carter.
Tracy Thomas and Walt Bodine conclude in their study of black
politics in Kansas City rthat black political participation had a
serious impact on urban politics in Kansas City, Missouri. As a
lesson in roughness, it represents the most striking political con
flict in Kansas City, Missouri, between factions competing for polit
ical advancement. The 1975 city council races pitted two black women
against each another. Zealous supporters of one candidate distributed
flyers headlined “the great white hope,” charging her opponent with
tokenism and an “Uncle Tom” background. The great white hope candi
date lashed back before election day charging that her female opponent
was not a member of the black race.33 Similarly, Edward C. Banfield
and James 0. Wilson concluded that the black vote forced politicians
in Kansas City, Missouri, to find ways of improving city government
and black community relations when the governmental structure changed.
For example, when the ward system changed, at least half the older
men were elected at—large.34
33Tracy Thomas and Walt Bodine, A History of K.C. (New York:
Banton Bks., 1976), 53.
34Banfield and Wilson, 52.
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Black scholarship’s approach to the study of black politics as
developed by Mack Jones, Hanes Walton and William Boone has been very
instrumental in devising a framework for the study of black politics
in Missouri. Mack Jones and Alex Willingham suggest that black
politics has assume the mode of a struggle by blacks to rid themselves
of domination by a hostile white society bent on maintaining its
position of dominance. These social scientists assume that since
the political system is the arena in which societal conflicts are
resolved, black politics should be thought of as the manifestation of
the power struggle between blacks and whites.35
William Boone argues that as far as the election of blacks to
office is concerned, they are still left in a position of being
brokers exerting electoral power when there is a split in the white
community.36 Likewise, Hanes Walton suggests that black politics has
assumed the mode of a power struggle between the principles of politi
cal thought and blacks seeking to end social, political and economic
domination. He asserts that:
As a body of propositions, intuitive judgements, and
sentiments, Southern political philosophy —— as a dis
tinctive system of values —— whatever its association
with feudalism, aristocracy, state’s right, agarian—
ism, sentimental regionalism, and romantic nationalism
is dominated and tyrannized by racism in the form of
35Mack Jones and Alex Willingham, “The White Custodians of the
Black Experience,” Social Science Quarterly (June 1970), 9.
36William Boone, “An Exploratory Study of the Black Political
Environment in Two Southern States,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Atlanta
University, Atlanta, Georgia, 1976), 60.
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slavery; its legacy is caste, segregation, and discri
mination. Against the mainstream of the American lib
eral tradition, Southern political thought because of
the tyranny of racism, has emphasized inequality,
privilege, conservatism, social stratification, and
the solidarity of white people——at least those whites
who share the illusion of the subhumanity of black
people
Edward Clayton declared that the black vote in Kansas City
aligned itself with the corrupt Pendergrast machinesin a successful
effort to retire from public life of a congressman who sought to
deny them equality of job opportunity, their paramount demand today.38
Gunnar Myrdal has argued that blacks in Missouri have had the right
to vote at least since Reconstruction, and there is evidence that the
Negro registration and turnout rates in the state have not differed
generally during the last few decades from those of whites at similar
socio—economic levels.39 In 1975, Larry Moss, Professor of Urban
Politics at Atlanta University, argued that the black voting age
population was the most important political resource being marshalled
by the black leadership to elect blacks to public office.4°
Likewise, Ira Katznelson concurred in the view that attempts to
widen the scope of black political activity by constructing produc—
37Hanes Walton, Political Philosophy of Martin Luther King, Jr.
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publication Corporation, 1971), XVI.
38Edward T. Clayton, The Negro Politician (Chicago: Johnson Pub—
lishing Co., mc, 1964), 167—168.
39Gunnar Mydal, An American Dilemma, The Negro Problem and Modern
Democracy (London: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1944), 495—496.
40Larry Moss, “Police—Community Relations In a Black Controlled
City: The Case of Atlanta”. The Journal of Political Repression,
(June 1975), 50.
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tive, structured national political relationships assumed three
dominant modes: an attempt to secure patronage for individuals in
exchange for mass support; an attempt to put an end to the reflexive
black support for Republican candidates in order to make the black
vote a bargaining resource, and an attempt to secure protective
legislation from the Congress.4’
On the other hand, there has been an inclination on the part of
some social scientists to caution us about the limitation of the vote.
These observers agree that the black political activity does not
significantly alter the socio—economic conditions of blacks. For
example, Chandler Davis asserts that, even if the ballot allowed the
black electorate to take some local municipal government, they still
would have little if any, “influence over the economic institutions
which affect their chances of obtaining a just share of social
reward” 42
In 1969, Chuck Stone, a black journalist, stated that, ‘the black
vote as a balance of power with the one or two exceptions never
became a serious threat to white unity and its attendant ethic of white
411ra Katznelso, Blackmen, White Cities, Race, Politics and Mi
gration in the U.S., 1900—1930, and Britain 1948—68 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1973), 466.
42Chandler Davidson, Bi—racial Politics Conflict and Coa1i~tion
in Metropolitan South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1972), 5.
28
supremacy’.43 Donald Matthews declares that, “the vote alone without
other sources of power, without education or wealth or status, and
without armed support is not a sufficient support resource for effec—
tive citizenship”.44 Likewise, Blame Brownell and David R. Gold—
field employed a similar view by inferring that the, “legirnitate
entry of blacks into the electoral process undeniably constitues an
important shift in regional politics, but it did not resolve the
problems that the flight to the surburbs created.”45
An empirical analysis of the limitation of the vote can be seen
in William Keech’s study of black politics in Durham, North Carolina.
He concluded that in the public sector blacks had realized some
important benefits as a result of political participation.46 A more
skeptical analysis of the capacity of the black vote to produce mean
ingful social and economic benefits was offered by Hanes Walton, Jr.
He conceptualized that the black vote in the economically depressed
areas in the United States where the black electorate lives has
43Chuck Stone, Black Political Power in America (New York: Delta
Book, 1970), p. 43.
44Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, Negroes and the New
Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1966),
5.
45Blaine Brownell and David R. Goldfield, The City in Southern
History: The Growth of Urban Civilization in the South (Port Washing
ton, N.Y.: National University Publication, 1977), 185.
46William R. Keech, The Impact of Negro Voting: The Role of the




been used by black elected officials to provide them with allocated
resources to improve their economic and political status.47 Similar
ly, C. Vann Woodward echoed Walton’s concern on this subject matter.
Woodward felt that, “much of the discussion about the Negro’s politi
cal significance, [and] his civil rights can be shortened and simpli
fied by a clear understanding of the economic status assigned to
him”.48 In addition to research employed by Woodward, H. Douglas
Price, using a multiple correlation and regression scheme, examined
the direct correlation between the level of black political activity
and socioeconomic status in the U.S. and concluded that the, “social
and economic attributes of individual blacks are strongly related to
the extent of participation in norms and virtues of the larger
society.”49
Professor Mack Jones in conjuction with this view, though pessi
mistic about the overall capacity of black political participation
altering the economic and social status of blacks, concluded in his
essay, Black Politics Benign to Neglect, that the black vote has not
equalized black political representation:
In no state are blacks represented in proportion to
their numbers, nor is black officeholding significant
in any particular category. Further, in those areas
where blacks constitute sizeable portions of the elec—
47llanes Walton, Jr., Black Politics: A Theoretical and Struc
tural Analysis (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1973), 200.
48C. Vann Woodward, The Origins of the New South (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1951), p. 205.
49H. Douglas Price, The Negro and Southern Politics (New York:
University Press, 1957), p. 41.
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torate they have not been able to convert their numbers
into political power. . . . Even though blacks consti—
tuted 40 percent or more of the population in 205 of
1105 southern counties, a majority of the population
in 102 counties, and a majority of registered voters
in at least 21, black citizens served in the governing
boards of only 80 counties. In 45 of the 80, there
was only one black on the governing body . . . . In
those counties where black control is numerically pos
sible, whites have made determined efforts, both legal
and extra—legal, to diminish black participation.5°
Professor Jones’ examination of the advances made by
blacks in the area of education and health and in the election to
public bodies, helps us to understand why these advances have been
insignificant in improving patterns of social and economic change for
blacks in the Unites States, in general, and in Missouri, in particu—
lar. Those studies which do examine and reconsider the idea of polit
ical, mobilized, black electorate facilitating an end to the oppres
sion of blacks fail to show a direct correlation between the impact
of black politics and the social and economic positions of blacks in
the Midwest. At best, these studies, according to C. G. Pickvance,
“as research tools are completely incapable of accounting for the
essential characteristics of the problem posed by social practice.”5’
As a result, most of these studies fail to bring together, forthright
ly, relevant data portraying an accurate account of politics in
the Midwest and its interrelationship with the diverse changes in the
economic, demographic and social characteristics of the region.
50Mack Jones, “Black Politics From Civil Rights to Benign
Neglect,” in Harry John, ed., Negiotiating the Mainstream (Washing
ton, D.C.: American Language Academy, 1978), 181—183.
51C. G. Pickvane, Urban Sociology: Critical Essays (New York:
St. Martin Press, 1976), 47.
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Conversely, economic development in regional terms has contri
buted to the canonical form of economic and democratic shifts in the
population in the Midwest and Northeast. These regional and national
economic shifts have contributed to not only the migration of people,
but industry as well at an alarming rate. Juxtaposing the contribu
tions of the Sun Belt to the changing regional growth patterns, we
then can arrive at the notion that the economic and development
shifts in the Midwest can be traced to the “structural problems which
decree a greater relative load of obsolescent industries, a hertiage
of larger past commitment to expensive social services, a large
concentration of poor in the central cities reflecting a prior north
to south population flow over a protracted period.”52 According to
Alfred J. Watkins and David C. Perry in their book, The Rise of The
Sun Belt Cities.
If we consider the marginal impact of~ federal dis
bursement and ignore both the regional balance of
payments figures and per capital levels of federal
disbursements, then a strong case can be made for a
reconsideration of regional spending priorities. As
we have tried to demonstrate, past federal policies
have been instrumental in luring new dynamic indus—
dutries to the Sunbelt. The impact of these policies
is probably the single most significant factor con
tributing to the sudden ascent of these cities. At
the same time, federal spending, irrespective of its
absolute magnitude, has been relatively less success
ful in improving the industrial vitality of the North—
central cities. In other words, the marginal impact
has been grossly uneven between regions.5~
52David C. Perry and Alfred J. Watkins, The Rise of the Sun Belt
Citie(Beverly Hills, California: Saga Pub., 1977), 191—192.
53Perry and Watkins, 43.
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Although Watkins and Perry fail to see the significant value of
interrelationship between federal spending and improvement of the
regions economic vitality, their view point is not shared universally.
According to the National Journal’s “Special Report on Social and
Economic patterns in the Sunbelt,” federal taxes and spending policies
of the national government have been instrumental in transfer of
wealth from the Midwest and Northeast to the Southern and Western
regions of the nation.”54 Watkins and Perry, on the other hand,
in their examination of the recent trend of regional development
differ with the Journal’s notion that an interregional shift in
the economic balance of power took place when the rise of the sun
belt in some respect, contributed to the decline of the Northeastern
cities. In their view, the decline of the Northeast region was
brought about as, “a result in which industrial activity diffused
throughout the various regions of the country.”55 Specifically,
an industrialized area can expand its economic base by any combina
tions of three devices—physical relocation branch plants, or the
attraction of new leading edge activities.56
William J. Kahley’s study on the patterns of economic develop—
in the United States argues that until the present epoch, indus
tries began to migrate to the Midwest and Northeast as the United
54”where the Funds Flow,” National Journal (June 26, 1976),
878.




States began to emerge as the top manufacturing and producing nation
in the world. At the present time. “both people and industry are
gravitating to the South because of push factors, high taxes and
labor unionization elsewhere —— as well as pull factors, the avial—
abilty of lower cost resources here.”57 Likewise, the counties
that lost population generally can be characterized as having low
incomes, low educational levels, high public assistance payments,
large numbers of children, low bank deposits, and low per capita
retail sales.58 Similarly, those counties which experienced high
growth patterns could be characterized by their degree of education
levels, high incomes, retail trading and banking and the low level of
black population growth. ~
The broad structural changes that give rise to the general
decline of both people and industrial outmigration from the Midwest
and Northeast to the South and West affected “their export—trade,
service and government and manufacturing industries”. 60 Nothwith—
standing this enigma, the path of economic development and the
transfer of income will not to a large degree, improve significantly,
the socio—economic conditions of blacks in the state of Missouri.
57William J. Kahley, “Migration: Changing Faces of the South
have caused the Migration Turn Around,” Economic Review (Atlanta,





Data from the U.S. Bureau of Census study suggests that the South’s
metropolitan areas are experiencing the same kind of suburban sprawl
that characterized earlier urban growth in Missouri and the Northeast.
The problems of crime, decaying sewer systems, bad housing, problems
of securing financial resources, police and community problems, will
ultimately force the South and the Midwest to face up to these peculi
arities as a result of more poor people moving into the region.6’
An examination of these social and economic demographics in Kansas
City, Missouri, will help us to facilitate an understanding of the





THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SETTING: AN EXAMINATION OF THE SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC DEMOGRAPHICS OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, DURING
DEVELOPMENT OF FREEDOM INCORPORATED AND THE RISE OF
BLACK POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT
For years now, students trained in the field of history and
political science, have posited the notion that, “demographic charac
teristics are closely associated with electoral participation.”
Until recently, this discussion had become such a primary issue for
those observers and community activists self—conscious about challeng
ing the politics of the Midwest (Missouri) where efforts have been
made to formulate an end to the systematic campaign to disenfranchise
the political rights of black people. This chapter will attempt to
examine the Midwest, specifically, Kansas City, Missouri, the recent
social and economic demographic trends which occurred during the
development of Freedom Incorporated and its attempt to improve the
quality of education, labor force participation, median income, hous
ing and population distribution. In a similar view, Professor Mack
Jones has declared that in order for researchers to forthrightly
facilitate our understanding of the nature of black power he or she
should first include some discussion about these types of social,
economic and political demographic problems facing the community
‘Ronald R. Matthews and James W. Prothero, Negroes and the New




for this is the formation which will facilitate our understanding
of blacks in American political system.2 This chapter will also
touch upon other significant and relevant factors, such as an
examination of black political participation in the electoral process
and the development of black political empowerment along with an exam
ination of the allocation of goods and services to the black community.
According to the 1970 U.S. Census, there were 4,676,501 people
living in the state of Missouri. Out of this total population, blacks
constituted 497,746 or 22.7 percent.3 In Missouri, the proportion of
the black population living in urban areas was estimated at 478,815,~
compared with 22,831 living in the rural areas.5 At least 29.4 per
cent of the population in Missouri is rural and 70.1 percent is urban.6
There are 114 counties in the state of Missouri. Of that total,
Jackson County, where Kansas City, Missouri, is located, the black
population is estimated at 1128522 or 34.3 percent and the white
population is 539,023.~
2Mack Jones, “A Frame of Reference for Black Politics”, in
Black Political Life in the U.S., ed. Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr.
(San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1972), 8.
3U.S. Bureau of Census, County and City Data Book (Washington,
D.C.: Department of Commerce, l972),270.
4lbid., 242.
5james Sweet and Larry Bumpass, “Differentials Instability of
the Black Population: The Rural Population Outside the South”,
Phylon (September 1977): 321.




Kansas City, Missouri, “on its western border where the water
of the Kansas and Missouri Rivers meet, is the second city in size
and commercial importance in the state”.8 Originally, the settlements
grew on both sides of the Missouri and Kansas Rivers which became part
of the state line, creating a Kansas City in each of the two states—--
one in the state of Missouri and the other in Kansas.9 Kansas City,
Missouri, was named for the town of Kansas (or Kaw) Indians who lived
on the land when European adventurers began to explore the Missouri
River in 1889. In 1821, French fur traders, led by Francois Chouteau,
an employee of the American Fur Company, established the area as a
riverside trading post for western overland expeditions. In 1833,
John Calvin McCoy founded the town of Westport and sold tracks of
land to immigrants migrating to the area,” to establish settlements
and fur trading businesses in the territory.’2 The settlement at
Chouteau’s Post, called Westport Landing, prospered as a river port
for the Santa Fe and Oregon trails. Wagon trains moved out from
Westport towards Santa Fe and California and Northwest to the Oregon
8Walter Williams, The State of Missouri (Columbia, Missouri:
E. W. Stephens Publishers, 1904), 264.
9Encyclopedia Americana, 1980 ed., s.v., “Kansas City.”
10Ibid.
“Irvin Dillard, Missouri (New York: Missouri State Highway
Department, 1941), 245.
12Champers Encyclopaedia, 1873 ed., s.v., “Missouri.”
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territory.13 Westport was chartered in 1850 as the Town of Kansas
(named for the river) and reincorporated in 1853 as the city of
Kansas, a name it was to keep until 1889, when the official name was
changed to Kansas City, Missouri. It was able to transform itself
into a railroad and transportation center with the building of the
Hannibal Bridge in 1869, which allowed for the expansion of the
railroad across the Missouri and Kansas Rivers. The development
of the railroad, was very instrumental in attracting industry, people
and commerce to the area. With the growth, “of small farmers,
tradesmen, river and railroad workers along with the professional men
to provide for the legal, educational and medical care of a diverse
population on both the Kansas and Missouri side of the river, this
region took on the character of the Midwest rather than the South”.’4
Perhaps the most unusual feature about Kansas City, Missouri,
is that, it is located in parts of three counties. This is a relative—
ly recent development traceable to 1940 when Kansas City, Missouri,
started its annexation north of the Missouri River. A major annexa
tion effort, “resulted in inclusion of parts of Clay and Platte
Counties within Kansas City, which now has a total land area of 316
square miles (780 sq. km.),”15 stretching south and north from the
‘3The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1988 ed., s.v., “Missouri.
14Neil R. Peirce, The Great Plains States of America (New York:
W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1973), p. 164.
15momas P. Murphy, “Intergovernmental Management of Urban
Problems,” in F. Gerald Brown and Thomas P. Murphy, Emerging Patterns
in Urban Administration (Lexingon, Mass.: Heath Lexington Books,
1970), 249.
CHART I
GENERAL SOCiAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTIC OF MISSOURI
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Census, Census of Construction Industries
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banks of the Missouri River (see map for location of counties).
A large part of Kansas City, Missouri, to the south of Missouri
stands on a plateau that extends to the bluffs that overlook the
river.’6 Moreover, Kansas City, Missouri, is often referred to
as the “Heart of America” because of its geographic centrality,”ll
and location, “within 250 miles of both the population and geographic
centers of the United States.”8 Kansas City, Missouri, along with
Kansas City, Kansas, Independence, Missouri, to the east and several
other cities in both states are part of the greater Kansas City
Metropolitan Area, which has a population that exceeds one million.’9
Jackson, Clay and Platte County residents reluctantly became
part of the Kansas City, Missouri, area when Mayor Rae Bartle
in the 1950’s began to campaign to raise municipal revenues by annex
ing the land in these counties. The annexation program resulted in,
“several Missouri cities being surrounded on three or all sides by
Kansas City which are not part of Kansas City, Missouri.”20 The
residents of Jackson, Clay and Platte feared that once they voted
16Encyclopedia Americana, 1980 ed., s.v., “Kansas City.”
17Kansas City, Missouri Greater Chamber of Commerce Economic
Files: Essential Economic, Demographic and Cultural Information on
Kansas City Metropolitan Area (Kansas City, Missouri: Business Infor
mation Department, 1980), 1.
18Kansas City, Missouri Greater Chamber of Commerce, Profile
of Greater Kansas City, Missouri (Kansas City Area Economic Develop
ment Council, 1980), 1.
19Encyclopedia Americana.
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to approve Bartle’s annexation program they would receive different
levels of municipal tax rates. Annexation of Clay, Platte and
Jackson counties by the ex—mayor contributed this point:
fifty—two per cent of the land area and eighty
four per cent of Kansas City’s population being
located in Jackson County, Missouri. Looked at in
relation to Jackson County, alone, Kansas CitX com
prises sixty per cent of the county popuiation.d
As a result of large—scale annexation of land in Jackson,
Platte and Clay Counties, other cities in the region embarked on
annexation programs. As a result of annexation during the 1950’s
and 1960’s, the Kansas City area continued to grow in size and
population, reaching a high of 507,000 in 1970.22
By 1970, the population in Jackson County was 112,852, of
which 34.3 percent was black. In Platte County, the population
was 32,081, of which 495 were black. And lastly, in Clay County
the population in 1970 was 123,322 of which 20.5 percent was
black (see Table I on page 42). Between 1950 and 1980, Kansas
City, Missouri, was spared a decline in its population as a result
of large scale annexation of land in Jackson, Clay and Platte
counties. Nevertheless, between 1970 and 1980, Kansas City in fact,
did experience a decline in population so common to older and larger
central cities in the northern and eastern parts of the United
States. It lost an estimated 59,000 residents. By 1982, another
21G. Ross Stephens, “Politics in Kansas City, Missouri” in
Richard J. Hardy and Richard R. Dohm, Missouri Government and
Politics (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985), 216.
22Ibjd
TABLE I
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF BLACKS IN KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI METROPOLITAN AREAS
Per Capita
Income for Percentaqe of
Medium Statistical Number of Percent Black Families all Families
Total Percentage Per Square School Whites and Blacks Foreign Below Poverty Below Poverty Medium
Counties Population Change Mile Years in Population Born Level Level - Family Income
1960 1970 Whites Blacks White Black
Jackson 622,732 654,588 5.1 1,085 12.2 539,023 112,852 17.7 $5,593 9.1 $10,619 $7,227
Platte 223,350 32,081 37.4 75.1 12.4 31,768 495 14.4 $8,687 4.5 $10,860 $ 766
Johnson 28,891 217,662 17.9 41.4 12.8 36,466 1,986 16.6 $3,736 21.2 $ 7,315 $5,609
Clay 87,474 123,322 41.4 300 12.3 122,014 871 16.5 $7,055 6.0 $11,000 $6,398
Cass 29,709 39,448 32.8 57 12.2 38,865 446 17.2 $7,187 15.4 $ 8,723 ~7,800
Gladstone 14,502 23,422 61.6 70.2 (8.2) 12.5 24,492 126 1.10 2.0 ~**~‘ ****
****Unreported income for black families
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, City and County Da~ta Book (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, 1972), pp. 274-276.
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11,000 had left.23 During the previous 1960 to 1970 period, net
out migration patterns of blacks in the Missouri counties of Platte
and Clay were at their highest; more blacks migrated from these
counties rather that to them. Peter A. Morrison24 and others have
suggested that since net outmigration of blacks from the Missouri
counties of Platte and Clay usually draws away more highly qualified
members of the labor force from counties and cities —— the young, the
educated, and the skilled —— the labor force left behind tends to be
overaged, underskilled and undereducated. This effect often is
further accentuated by immigration of persons similar to those who
have remained behind. As the labor force declines in quality, dis
tressed areas become less attractive to new industries that require
a supply of skilled workers. Prolonged and heavy outmigration, then,
left behind those persons employed in the labor force and who lived
in the urban and rural area who were least able to cope with the un
favorable conditions that led others to depart in the first place.25
Black family composition, fertility levels, the work experience
patterns of family members, and the lack of mobility in the labor force
were affected by the incmie levels in Missouri counties of Jackson,
Platte and Clay, especially in determining service needs.26 By the
23Ibid., p. 216.
24Peter A. Morrison, Migration from Distressed Areas: Its Mean
ing for Regional Policy (Santa Monica, California: Rand Foundation,
1973), p. 18.
____ p. 18.
26The U.S. Bureau of the Census, The Social and Economic Status
of the Black Population in the U.S. (Washington, D.C.: United States
Dept. of Commerce, 1970), p. 3.
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1970 was estimated at 6.0 percent.27 Net migration loss for blacks
was 1 percent28 while the net migration gain for whites was esti
mated at 2.5 percent.29 The Bureau of Census estimated that the
net migration increase in the proportionate black population change
during 1960—1970 period was estimated at +31 in Kansas City and
over +41 in St. Louis, Missouri.30
Geographically, Clay and Platte Counties, as part of the Kansas
City area reflect similar to distinct emerging net outmigration
patterns exempified nationally. According to William Alonso, in
his essay, “Metropolitan Without Growth: The New Sectionalism in
1978”,:
At least 40% of all metropolitans ~n 1960 had more
people leaving rather than arriving. By 1974, 44 per
cent of metropolitan area had net out migration.
Statistically, 2,477,000 people left metropolitan
areas for non—metropolitan destinations, and that
2,080,000 went in the opposite direction, for a net
balance of 396,000 in favor of non—metropolitan
areas. 31
Economically, Jackson, Clay and Platte counties in which
Kansas City, Missouri, is located, are basically poor areas. By
27County and City Data Book, 1977, 270. 270.
28U.S. bureau of Census, The Social and Economic Status of
Black Population in the U.S., 48.
29County and City Data, 1977, 270.
30U.S. Bureau of Census, Social and Economic Status, 1970, 18.
31William Alonso, “Metropolitan Without Growth: The New
Sectionalism”, Public Interest (Fall 1978), 64, 73—75.
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1970, the percentage of all families living at or below the
poverty level was estimated at 9.1 percent in Jackson, 4.5 percent
in Platte and 6.0 percent in Clay county. The yearly income for
white families was estimated at $10,619 in Jackson, $10,860 in
Platte and $11,000 in Clay County (See Table II). According to
the 1970 Census, black family median income dollars for all black
families in Jackson, Clay and Platte counties, in which Kansas
City is located, was estimated at $7,227; $6,398 and $766. The
percent of black median income in Clay county at the poverty level
was 3.9 percent. Conversely, the percent of median income dollars
for black families in Jackson and Platte was estimate at 7.9 and
9,1 percent. However, by 1974, the median income for black families
was estimated at $9,846 and $14,017 for white families in Jackson
County.32 Moreover, the 1974 census also revealed that median
income levels of both black and white families in the Missouri and
its counties were affected most pronouncedly by the recession.
After taking into account the changes in the standard of living,
the relative rate of black family income in 1974 declined by about
3 percent over and above income levels in 1973, which was, by the
way, not significantly different from the percentage for white
families. During the four year period from 1970 to 1974, the
relative income of black families in Kansas City, Missouri, failed
to move upward. Proportionately, twenty—nine percent of the black
families in 1970 made less than $14,000; eleven percent made less




PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL WITH INCOME
LESS THAN $10,000
Percent Below Poverty Line
County Black White 1970 1980
Clay, MO 871 122,014 6.0 5.3
Platte, MO 495 31,768 9.1 5.3
Jackson, MO 112,852 539,023 11.3 11.0
City
Kansas City, MO 111,980 392,904 20.5 13.2
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Census, County and City Data Book (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1972 and 1983), 270, 273, 282,
320, 334, 714 and 746.
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between $15,000 and $24,999. Moreover, the 1970 medium income for
black families showed that 4.3 percent made $25,000 or more.33
The economy of the Kansas City area was basically service
related. During the 1970’s, employment in manufacturing dropped
from one fourth to less than one—fifth of the labor force, while
service activities took up much of the slack. Services were less
tied to a central location and were able to locate on the fringe
of the Kansas City, Missouri, area and employ labor from the city.
Kansas City was often called the Gateway to the Southwest because
it ranked 25th among other cities in size and population in the
U.S. It is also one of the largest regional transportation, dis
tribution, manufacturing and home—office centers in the United
States. In addition, it is the regional headquarters for many
federal offices which employ at least 23,000 people. Ford, TWA,
Western Electric, Hallmark, GK and Armco Steel are the largest
employers. All the major components of American industry except
ship building and tobacco processing are represented.34 The economy
of Kansas City “is balanced and diversified not unlike that of the
rest of the nation. There is a bit more emphasis on agribusiness,
transportation, wholesale trade, and government than in the rest of
the country, and there is a somewhat lower emphasis on manufacturing
and construction.”35 The agricultural, manufacturing, transportation
33County and City Data Book, 717.
34Neal R. Pierce, The Great Plains State of America (w.w. Norton
and Company, Inc., 1973), 75.
35Ibid., 76—78.
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and distribution economies of Jackson, Clay, and Platte counties,
which make up the Kansas City area, are controlled by the large
business elite, organized into civic associations commonly called the
Kansas City Association of Trusts and Foundation (KCAT). Within the
past twenty years, KCAT has received numerous request from private
organizations to support health care and urban economic development
projects in Kansas City, Missouri. The Greater Kansas City Mental
Health Foundation, Kansas City General Hospital and Medical Center,
and the Institute for Community Studies designed to provide social
and economic research are among projects sponsored by KCAT to enhance
both the foundation’s influence and image.36
SOCIAL SERVICES
The municipal government of Kansas City provided very little and
social services to the black community. The distribution of health
and medical service for blacks was very poor. Blacks in Kansas City,
Missouri, attended the General Hospital, the University of Kansas Med
ical Center and the University of Missouri Kansas City School of Denis—
try to get medical attention. Blacks who went to these hospitals for
dental or medical care and did not have the money to pay for it were
told that they would have to do without services.37 The rejection by
administrators at General Hospital indicates that blacks were denied
____ 77—78.
37Kathleen patterson, “Emergence of Health Center a Modern
Miracle”, Kansas City Star (June 1976), 71.
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access to health care and that they lacked the political power to
improve the distribution of health care services. Blacks who refused
to go to General Hospital went to the black Wheatley—Provident Hospi—
tal in Kansas City, Missouri. The Wheatley—Provident Hospital, the
first black private hospital, was founded in 1910 in Kansas City,
Missouri,38 to provide health care to blacks when denied service by
doctors and administrators at General Hospital. This facility became
the major, if not the only alternative source of hospital care for
blacks and for the training of black physicians.39
With the passage of the 1964 Equal Opportunity Act, Mayor Illus
W. Davis, Charles E. Curry, Presiding Judge of the Jackson County
Court, and others established the Human Resource Corporation. It
was designed, “to receive war on poverty money and to develop
health care and other job related programs to eliminate poverty
among blacks and low income whites living in Kansas City,. Jackson,
Platte and Clay Counties.”4°
To improve the quality of health care in the black community,
the Human Resource Corporation created the Wayne Minor Neighborhood
Health Center to provide health care to low income blacks and whites
denied medical and dental care in Kansas City, Missouri. According
38Lorenzo Greene, Antonio Holland and Gary Kremer, “The Role of
the Negro in Missouri History 1719—1970”, in James C. Kirkpatrick
and Thelma Goodwin, Official Manual Missouri, 1973—74 (Jefferson
City, Missouri: The Von Hoffman Press, Inc., 1973), 20.
39”Hospitals of the Black Community”, Urban Health (March 1984),
49.
40Kathleen Patterson, “Poverty Gains Elusive Here”, Kansas City
Star (June 1976), 26.
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to Dr. Samuel Rogers, Center Director, for the Wayne Minor Health
Care Center:
The city government refused to support the building
of Wayne Minor Mental Health Center because it
feared that blacks would stop going to General
Hospital and that the city government would lose
control over hiring of personnel and operations at
Wayne Minor. There was an atomsphere of total dis
trust. They (the city) wanted a copy of every bill
we had . . . . The city showed a basic distrust
of poor people . . . . Poor people were trying to
get something done. But the city gave us two weeks
of funding at times. They thought that way we
couldn’t steal any more.41
Blacks in Kansas City decided to support the idea of building
and having the Wayne Minor Neighborhood Health facility located in
their community because of poor service and medical care that they
received at General Hospital. Whenever blacks went to the hospital,
“it was always dirty and if they had an appointment to see a doctor,
they were treated disrespectfully. At the hospital, blacks sat by
hundreds with numbers waiting on medical treatment and if they had
an appointment, it didn’t make a difference.”42 The white community
and the city’s medical community resisted supporting the creation
and ultimate development and construction of Wayne Minor Neighbor
hood Health Center because they believed that the center was trying
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Economics and racism not only prevented blacks from receiving
health and dental care, but it prevented them from receiving legal
service from the government in Kansas City. Blacks were being
denied access to attorneys for counseling and advice whenever they
faced criminal charges in the Jackson County Courts. Freedom
Incorporated and black attorney Harold “Doc” Holliday criticized
the quality and kind of counseling and advice that the Legal Aid
and Defender Society of Greater Kansas City provided blacks. The
Legal Aid and Defender Society of Greater Kansas City was esta—
bushed by the Kansas City Bar Association with the support of
the city government. Freedom Incorporated and Holliday charged
that higher income, not lower income blacks were actually receiving
legal assistance. Blacks, the unemployed and public assistance
recipients were underrepresented among the clients. In addition,
Freedom Incorporated further stated that “the legal aid’s criminal
division entered far too many guilty pleas, lacked an understanding
of the poor and systematically excluded blacks from their staff”.44
Besides seeking legal assistance, blacks in Kansas City sought
access to city facilities which only whites had enjoyed. Segrega
tion prevented young blacks from going to city—owned swimming pools
in the white neighborhoods of Swope Park.45 Blacks were denied the
44Kathleen Patterson, “New Image, Same Tasks for Legal Aid”,
Kansas City Star (June 1976), 38.
45Theodore Brown and Lyle W. Dorsett, Kansas City: A History
of Kansas City Missouri (Boulder, Coloraso: Pruett Publishing Co.,
1978), 258.
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right to use recreational facilities owned by the municipal govern
ment of Kansas City even though they worked and paid local property
taxes. In the white community, swimming pools, softball and base
ball parks, tennis courts and gymnasiums were provided for whites.
In 1956, when the municipal government of Kansas City was ordered
by the federal court to desegregate the Swope Park swimming facil
ities, the city fathers closed them for two years before they would
allow a black to utilize these facilities.46
Segregation of public parks, schools and playgrounds, legally
sanctioned the forced separation of the races in Kansas City, Mis
souri. When the Kansas City Board of Education was ordered by the
federal courts to integrate its public schools, whites objected to
their children attending schools with blacks and chose to withdraw
their children and enroll them in private schools or a school that
was not located in or near the black community.47
Prior to 1955, Kansas City School District operated a dual
school system with separate schools for blacks and whites as required
by the state constitution of Missouri. The United State Supreme
Court’s decree in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka48 in 1954
rendered inoperative the Missouri constitutional educational provi—
46Ibid., 185.
47Alvjn V. Adair, Desegregation: The Illusion of Black Progress
(New York: University Press of America, 1984), 102.
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sions, and the district was no longer required to operate a separate
black school system. Brown v. Board of Education mandated the Kansas
City Missouri School District to assign black children to local
schools on the basis of neighborhood residential zones. The assign
ment process spurred the integration of junior colleges, vocational
schools, faculty and administrators. Desegregation of the Kansas
City public school system has at best, contributed to the reassign
ment of teachers, staff and students as a precourse for altering
numerically the composition of blacks attending elementary, junior
and senior high schools, and to close all black schools once this
process was completed. Changing these predominantly black schools to
magnet schools or even closing them disproportionately, did not place
them on an equal footing with their white counterparts. As a result
of this process, white schools in Kansas City were allowed to increase
their enrollment.
HOUSING
Housing is still “a special problem for blacks living in Kansas
City, Missouri, as well as education, legal aid and lack of health
care assistance”.49 The migration of blacks to Kansas City in the
early to mid—l9th and 20th centuries produced a neighborhood along
side an expanded slum known as “the Bowery” located between Troost,
48347 U.S. 483 (1954)
49Greene, Holland and Kremer, 28.
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Woodland, Seventeenth, and Twenty—fifth streets. According to A.
Theodore Brown and Lyle L. Dawson in 1978 black neighborhoods pre
sented this description:
the highest density of population in the city
the highest death rate in the city. . . [It was]
the home of the Swill Center, and the flyblown food,
of cellar homes and leaking plumbing, of fire traps
and tenement homes.
In the face of bitter and violent resistance the
line of black housing pushed gradually southward.
When it reached the 1900 block a wave of bombings
held it up, but only temporarily. The pressure for
expansion came not only from sheer numbers but also
from the slowly growing middle class which wanted
the comfortable houses and yards that other substan
tial citizens could have. 50
In Kansas City, where adequate housing was made available to
white persons, both in terms of quantity and quality, the black
electorate had virtually no share in the new housing being built.
In fact, during an eighteen year period (1950—1968), there were less
than 200 building permits issued for new single family housing for
blacks.51 Very few blacks in Kansas City have been able to secure
a decent home because of segregation and the policy of redlining by
real estate agents, white community councils, and banks to prevent
blacks from buying or renting property in the white community.
Ninety—seven percent of all black residents live in a racially isolate
city area, largely the result of the actions by these white institu
tions. In a careful study, Kansas City, Missouri was cited as the
50Brown and Dorsett, 185.
51Greene, Holland and Kremer, 25.
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third most segregated city of the nation’s 30 largest metropolitan
areas in 1970. Half of the innercity housing is classified as old,
21 percent as substandard, and three percent as dilapidated”.52
Private and public programs were initiated in Kansas City,
Missouri to improve the status of housing in the black community.
The city government of Kansas City during the mid—l950’s and early
1960’s received assistance from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development to develop urban renewal projects targeted toward
expanding or improving housing and street facilities in the black
community. The urban renewal projects concentrated on tearing down
dilapidated and rat infested houses and converting the vacant lots
into parking lots and commercial buildings. The urban renewal
project located in the black neighborhoods of Woodland, Highland
and Brooklyn was considered to be the worst slum neighborhoods in
Kansas City, Missouri. Black families lived without running water
or toilets and some of the dwellings had dirt floors. To improve
these neighborhoods, the houses were torn down and a middle income
apartment complex was built on the land.53
Housing statistics compiled by the United States Bureau of
Census in 1970 showed that 33,729 or 44.8 per cent of the housing
units in Kansas City, Missouri, was occupied by black families
compared to 176,370 or 53.6 per cent for white families. Of
52 Ron Harris, “Kansas City, One of the Few Liveable Cities
Left”, Ebony (November 1980), 90.
53Brown and Dorsey, p. 257.
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the total number of housing units occupied by blacks, at least 3.7
percent of them lacked some or all plumbing facilities. Data
from Table III, on page 57 indicates that Kansas City, Missouri, had
housing units with plumbing and structurally related problems.
At least 62.0 per cent of the residents in Kansas City owned
their homes in 1970 compared to 66.4 per cent in 1980. In 1980,
an estimated 56.2 per cent of blacks owned their homes, compared
to 68.6 per cent of white families. Even though the population
grew by only 3 percent during the 1970’s in Kansas City, Missouri,
the number of housing units increased by 20 percent from 442,840
to 530,280. Of all the cities in the state, Kansas City, Missouri,
was stable in terms of the number of housing units. At the same
time, the number of persons living in their homes declined from
25 per cent to 12 per cent.54 Overall, the decline was from 3.02
to 2.66 persons per household. For both white and black resi
dents living in Kansas City, Missouri, this indicates an increase in
both the value and the quality of housing. The median value of a
single family house in the Missouri counties of Platte, Jackson and
Clay in 1978 was the following:
• • . $43,000 in Kansas City, Missouri the medium
value is $34,600. . . . Low value homes intended to
be concentrated in the older parts of the city
• . .55 Census figures from 1960 to 1970 show
54Gerald W. Olson, C. Ross Stephens and L. Kenneth Hubbel,
“Taxation and Revenue in Kansas City and Selected Surrounding




BOUSING 1970 — OCCTJPIED UNITS
KANSAS CITY STATE
Housing Occupied Units 176,370 1,520,567
Owner OccuDied 33,729 136,549
Lacking Some/All Plumhin~ Facilities 3.3% 9.4%
Median Value Owner Occupied $14,114 S14,438
Average Persons Per Unit 2.9% 3.1%
Median Gross Rent, Renter Occupied ~98 $96
Median Number of Rooms 4•9 4.8
With Telephone 88.8 88.1
Vacancy Rate (Rental) 12.6 9.9
Vacancy Rate (Home owner) 1.8 1.5
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Census, County and City Data Book (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1972), 719.
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there has been little movement of black and other
minorities into the suburban areas of Kansas City,
and that Platte County and Clay County are still
almost white. Clay County had an 0.8 percent black
population in 1960, with 723 blacks, and 0.7 percent
in 1970, with 688 blacks. Only 27 of these lived in
the Kansas City part of Clay County.56 (See map on
page 59).
Eighteen years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act,
housing discrimination in the state of Missouri counties of Platte
and Clay continues to exist. Even though the law prohibits discrimi
nation in the sale or rental of public or private subsidized housing,
blacks continue to face problems in obtaining housing. A typical
case is one in which a white female states this point.
[she] looks at an apartment because her husband, who
is black, is at work. She is told by the owners
of the apartment that it is available and she immedi
ately puts down a deposit and arranges a date to
move in. When the owner discovers :hat the husband
is black, [he] suddenly decides that the applica
tion, for whatever reason, can not be processed. In
addition to discrimination, a tight mortage and the
slowdown in housing construction have contributed to
the lack of affordable low and moderate income hous
ing for black families in Kansas City and the Mis
souri counties of Clay and Platte.
An estimated distribution of occupied housing units for the
black population in these counties totaled 136,549 of which 43.2
percent was owner occupied, compared to 1,520,567 housing units
with 67.2 percent owner occupied for whites. The availability of
56Ibjd., 220.
57”How Fair is Area’s Housing,” Kansas City Time (July 1978),
1A.
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housing units in 1970 lacking some or all plumbing facilities was
estimated at 10 percent for black families and 3 percent for white
families. The structural conditions of available plumbing facilities
for blacks in the metropolitan counties of Cass, Clay, Platte, Jack
son, Ray, and Johnson counties were relatively poor. Statistically,
the percentages of those housing units lacking some or all plumbing
facilities in these counties were 5,7, 2.5 5.4, 12.0, 21.5 and 2.9
percent respectfully.
The percent of overcrowded housing units in the state of
Missouri (above 1.0 persons per room) was estimated at 5.2 percent
for whites. Similarly, the percentage of white and black occupied
housing (above 1.01 persons per room) in Kansas City, Missouri, was
85.1 percent for white families and 54.8 percent for black fami
lies.58 In The Economics of Racism in the United States, Victor Pero
helps one to aggregate a framework for exploring the extent to which
economic discrimination in mortage and lending institutions constrain
ed the black electorate from making structural improvements to their
housing that lacked some or all plumbing facilities.
Much larger proportions of whites than blacks are
homeowners. Homeowners in general, and especially
white homeowners, receive billions in direct and in
direct federal subsidies, including , as of 1966,
about 7 billion in tax benefits . . . . Banks and
savings and loan associations use the savings of city
dwellers, including black workers, to finance the
housing of suburbanites. Central city dwellers, es
pecially blacks, find it impossible to get mortgage
58County and City Data Book, 1972, 275.
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loans, loans for buying or improving houses, because
of redlining. Banks systematically refuse to sink
money into neighborhoods that they believe are de
clining and around which they draw at least a theo
retical red line.
Our economic losses in the housing area included
the lower degree of public services supplied where
black people live, and the less convenient accessi
bility of good job location. To overcome these dis
advantages, a common apologetic argument suggests
that all the black people need is more education. To
a large degree this analogy overlooks the fact that
presently, there are at least seventeen states where
the median educational level of blacks is equal to a
a little more or a little less than that of whites.59
The problems of unemployment, continued white flight, dispro
proportionate black unemployment, segregated housing patterns, median
income level of black families, and troubled school system continue
to confront blacks and city administrators in Kansas City, Mis
souri. 60
EMPLOYMENT
Kansas City, Missouri is a major, financial capital for indus
try and agriculture in six states: Missouri, Kansas, Iowa, Nebraska,
Oklahoma and Arkansas. Although manufacturing, transportation,
aerospace, automobile and truck assembly and railroad car construc
tion, and shipping dominated the economy of Missouri in
59Vjctor Pero, The Economics of Racism in U.S. (New York:




1970,61 black disproportionately faced greater difficulties than
their white counterparts in gaining employment.62
By 1970, the civilian labor force employed some 1,767,310
persons of which 112,852 of the labor force partipants were black.
By 1979, there were 339,218 persons 16 years and over employed in
the civilian labor force in Kansas City, Missouri, of which there
were 247,508 white and 83,193 black.63 These black labor force par
ticipants 16 years and over were employed as barbers, janitors,
laborers, cooks, stock and inventory clerks, freight, stock and
material handlers, teachers, plumbers, assemblers and construction
workers.64 These labor force participants 16 years and over worked
mostly in unskilled occupations, for which no special training,
judgement or manuel dexterity usually is necessary, and in which,
“the workers usually supply mainly muscular force for the perfor
mance of heavy work or for the performance of services, usually
personal”.65 Doeringer and Pierce have described this type of em—
61Pierce, p. 45.
62Ibid. 75.
63U.S. Bureau of Census, Poverty Areas in Large Cities (Wash
ington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1985), 356.
64U.s. Buerau of Census, Detailed Population Characteristics
of Missouri (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1980), 27,
206. See also C. Ross Stephens, 219—220.
65Stanley Lieberson, A Piece of the Pie: Blacks and White
Immigrants Since 1880 (Los Angeles, California: University of
California Press, 1980), 334—335.
63
ployment as generally involving low wages, poor working conditions,
considerable variability in employment, and often arbitrary discipline
and little opportunity to advance.66 In their report assessing the
employment of black males and females in the labor force in the state
of Missouri, the United States Commission on Civil Rights concluded
the following:
Significant differences exist between the propor
tions of minorities and women in the state work
force and comparable proportions in individual
state agencies. . . . There are disparities in
umemployment rates between whites (6.2 percent)
and others (rising to as high as 11.9 percent for
blacks) sufficiently large enough to suggest that
minorities seeking work find it more difficult
than their white counterparts. Moreover, compari
sons of the utilization of minorities and women at
the highest salary level show that only for white
women do even a third of the state agencies’ work
force match the state work force. In top jobs,
while most agencies do well in employing white
females, only a third do well in their employment
of minorities. . . . Clearly, little change is
likely to occur without further substantial modi
fications in official procedures for outreach,
recruitment, testing, placement, promotion, and re
tention of employees and without much more sophi—
cated analysis of program effects than now exists.67
Between 1970 and 1980, the work force of both races continued
to shift away from garment manufacturing, dry cleaning, barbershops,
66Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Pierce, “Internal Labor
Markets and Manpower Analysis,” in David M. Gordon (ed.), Theories
of Poverty and Underemployment (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath and
Company, 1972), 49.
67Iowa, Kansas, Missouri and Nebraska Advisory Committee,
State Government: Affirmative Action in Mid—America (Washington,
D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 30—31.
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and agriculture occupations and toward the white collar and service!
information oriented economy in Kansas City. The utilization and
employment of the labor force participation of blacks over 16 years
old accounted for 26,616 of the managerial and professional specialty
occupation; 9,114 of administrative support occupations including
clerical; 48,941 of the service occupations; 3,927 protective service
occupations; 12,963 craft and repair occupations; 50,879 technical,
sale and administrative support occupations including drafting,
health, and engineering; 23,535 machine operations and assemblers;
and 43,579 laborers.68
Much of this change is related to the character of the local
economy. According to C. Ross Stephens in his study on “Politics
in Kansas City, Missouri” argues the following ideas:
Due to continued construction of circumferen
tial highways, less dependence on railroads, and an
increase in the manufacture of small, higher—valued
goods, some manufacturing and warehousing have moved
away from the congested core.69
The employment rate of the labor force in Kansas City, Missouri
between 1970 and 1980 as a whole increased very slowly. In 1980,
there were 688,777 person 16 years or older employed in the civilian
labor force. Of these, 29,148 were unemployed.70 Statistically, the
unemployment trends among blacks were much more pronounced in Kansas
Bureau of Census, Detailed Population Characteristics
of Missouri, 368. See also Stephens, 219.
69Stephens, 219
70Kansas City, Missouri Greater Chamber of Commerce, Community
Profile of Kansas City, Missouri (Kansas City, Missouri: Kansas City
Area Economic Development Council, 1979), p. 2.
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City, Missouri. As a result, blacks are nearly three times as likely
as whites to be unemployed, 16.3 percent, up from 5.8 percent in 1970.
In 1980, there were 8,544 or 11.2% of the black civilian labor force
unemployed compared to the 26,815 or 4.6 percent white persons 16
years and over unemployed. Moreover, the unemployment rates for
teenagers in Kansas City, Missouri were much higher in 1970. The
rate of unemployment among black teenagers was estimated at 45.6
percent in Kansas City, Missouri.7’ David H. Swinton, an economist
at the Southern Center for Studies in Public Policy, has argued
that in Kansas City and other metropolitan areas:
A number of major economic and demographic shifts ac
companied the 1950 and 1980 period of change in the
labor force partication of black teenagers and adults.
Probably the most important consequence of the
changes which occurred between 1950 and 1980 is that
black youth came into much sharper head to head com
petition with white youth for available employment
opportunities. Between 1950, and 1970, for example,
there was a major shift in the black population from
rural farm areas to urban and rural non—farm areas.
Thus, this shift in population meant that during the
period, black youths were shifting into labor markets
where they have been traditionally less successful at
getting jobs than the~ had been in the labor markets
from which they moved.’2
71”Kansas City Itself One of the Few Liveable Cities Left,”
Ebony (November 1980), p. 89. See also David H. Swinton discussion
on Labor Market Trends from the Early 1970’s to the Early 1980’s
(Atlanta, Georgia: Southern Center for Studies in Public Policy,
1984).
72David Swinton, The Labor Market Problems of Black Youth and
Public Policy (Atlanta, Georgia: Southern Center for Studies in
Public Policy, 1983), 3—4.
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All of these factors have played a role in shap
labor market trends for blacks, especially black
females. Employment of females in general increased
in e~ry worker class except private household work
ers.
Although the black population continued to migrate and expand
in Kansas City, Missouri, the ratio of employment and unemployment
rates continued to exist between black and white families)4 The
total number of black families in Kansas City, Missouri, below the
poverty level was estimated at 11,193 or 20.5 percent compared to
8.9 percent of all white families. C. Ross Stephens described the
per capita income of Kansas City, Missouri, and the median family
income of the metropolitan area as follow:
The per capita income in the Kansas City area is
higher than that in St. Louis or Dallas, Texas, but
lower than that in Denver, Colorado, or Minneapolis,
Minnesota. Nationally, the purchasing power of per
sonal income dropped 1.4 percent during the 1970s.
In Kansas City, the decline was less than the nation
al average at 0.8 percent. A family income of $7,412
is considered the poverty level by the government.
In the nietropolitian area, the family income for
1980 was $22,715, or 14 percent above the national
average. At $13,900, the median family income for
blacks was 10 percent above the national average but
40 percent below the median for the entire corn—
mun i
A black family in Kansas City, Missouri in 1970 lived off
73David Swinton, Labor Market Trends from the Early 1970’s
to the Early 198O’s: A Decade of Declining Utilization of Black
Workers (Atlanta, GA: Southern Center for Studies in Public Policy
1984), 2, 10.
74Ray Marshall, Black Employment in the South (Dallas, Texas:
Center for the Study of Human Resources, 1974), 3.
75Stephens, p. 218.
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a median income of only $7,241 a year in a home valued at $14,114
on the housing market. A recent study by the Census Bureau con
cluded that the patterns of social and economic change which have
occurred for blacks in Kansas City, Missouri, in the area of income,
employment, and housing during the 1970’s varied. Advances have been
made in the improvement of black family income; however, the income
levels of black families and the extend of comparability with their
white counterparts are affected by a number of factors such as the
type of family and family composition, work experience of family
members, inflation, and the down turn in the economy of Kansas City,
Missouri. Progress in some other areas such as housing and employment
has for the most part been impeded largely due to the confinement and
concentration of the black population of Kansas City, Missouri.
Agitation by the black electorate to end segregation in housing,
school and unemploymnt, represents a stage in the development of
political empowerment where practices and policies of governmental
bodies and institutions are targeted through protest and electoral
action for change.
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND BLACK PARTICIPATION
The Kansas City, Missouri, governmental structure operates
under constitutional home rules created by the 1925 charter. Kansas
City has a council manager system that contains characteristics of
both the mayor—council and the council—manager organizational
structures. The mayor is elected every four years and appoints,
68
with council approval, the treasurer, engineer, tax assessor and
collector, comptroller, auditor, city attorney, supervisor or regis
tration of voters, fire chiefs, city physician, marshall, purchasing
agent and members of numerous boards and commissions, some of which
run departments and regulatory groups.76
The police department, although funded by the city, is run by a
commission made up of the mayor and four members appointed by the
governor. Kansas City, Missouri, is made up of 26 wards. From these
wards, 12 members are chosen by the electorate to represent them on
the city council. Of the twelve members, 6 are elected at—large and 6
are elected from wards. Even though there are six predominantly black
wards in Kansas City, Missouri; the black electorate has not succeed
in electing blacks to the city council proportionate to their popula
tion numbers. Nevertheless, blacks have been successful in electing
three black representatives to the city council. Joanne Collins
represents the third district at—large while Charles Hazley and
Emanuel Cleaver were the other black city councilmen, elected from
the third and fifth district, respectively. In addition to the
election of city councilmen, seven blacks have been elected to the
Missouri House of Representatives, two to the Board of Educaton, and
two as count legislators. Bruce Watkins has been elected as circuit
clerk of the county seat, Lee Vertis Swinton as the first black state
senator, and Leon Jordan as a member of the County Committee.
221.
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Blacks have also gained control over the six predominately black
wards.
In 1979, the black electorate chose Leonard Hughes, Sr., and
his son Leonard Hughes, Jr., to serve as judges in the Kansas City,
Missouri Municipal Court System. The Kansas City charter provides
that all municipal judges be selected by a non—partisan court plan.
Terms and salaries cf municipal judges are also decided by munici
palities. Terms may not be less than two years, and compensation
ranges from nothing to over forty thousand dollars per year in Kansas
City.
Black activism during the 1950’s and 1960’s was concerned
with the inability of blacks to become directly involved in deci
sion—making roles on local governing bodies in Kansas City. Efforts
by the 1965 Voting Rights Act to open the political area to blacks as
voters and as elected officials by providing for federal intervention
in the registration and voting procedures in certain areas, where
blacks and other minorities had been denied the vote, has been instru
mental in securing black representation on governmental bodies.78
Before the enactment of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the deve
lopment of Freedom Incorporated and the protest movement, the black
77Hardy and Dogin, 98.
S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act:
Unfullfilled Goals (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office,
1981), 1.
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community was denied access to governmental services. This denial
was based on race and hesitation and unwillingness on the part of
city officials to relinquish even a modicum of control to the black
electorate, its decision makers or its political organizations.79
It seems that throughout the black community, the streets were
unpaved, houses were dilapidated or torn down, and the schools were
segregated and, at times, experienced a shortage in teachers
and operating expenses. As late as 1940’s and early 1950’s, the
streets and alleys were muddy and unpaved in the black community.
The odor and smell of accumulated trash on the streets and unpaved
sidewalks prevented blacks from walking or playing in their neigh
borhoods. The black electorate was told by Kansas City municipal
government, that the city could not build, or improve the sanita
tion and sidewalks in the black community because it had no money.8°
Prior to the election of blacks to public office, the municipal
government during the late 1950’s and early 1960’s refused to allo
cate time and resources to improve sanitation and street problems in
the black community. To some degree, this reflected the attitude of
the white community as a whole when its business and political
leaders bragged about the pavement of streets, pruning and planting
of beautiful trees, and the building of neighborhood parks in the
79Harold Ross, Black Ghetto (St. Louis, Missouri: McGraw—Hill
Co., 1971), 103.
80A. Theodore Brown and Lyle W. Dorsett, K.C.: A History of




white community. Whites never allowed descriptions about streets and
housing conditions in the black community to become a part of its
projected image to the nation.8’
In the low income black neighborhood of Vineyard, the city
government excluded it from being included in the community deve
lopment plan during the late 1970’s as an area eligible for loans and
grants, due to the lack of business in the black neighborhood. As a
result, the black community could not get financial support aimed at
removing trees from the area and the planting of new trees where they
may be needed.82 Moreover, it could not get support from the city
government to improve street lighting, street conditions, weeds,
vacant lots and trash collections and the building of commercial
enterprises throughout Kansas City’s black community.83
Lack of attention and efforts by the city government in Kansas
City, Missouri to deliver services and goods to the black community,
“stimulated black voter education campaigns, protest demostrations
and law suits against the city government.”84 Agitation by the black
811b1d., 256.
82Kansas City, Vineyard Management Committee, Minutes of
Meetings of the Residents Subcommittee, (May 28, 1975).
83lnterview with Mrs. Mary Holiday, Chairman of the Vineyard
Management Committee, Chairman of the Vineyard Management
Committee, July 1986).
84Kansas City, City Development Department, 49—63 Neighborhood
Coalition Status Report, (Kansas City, Missouri, 1975).
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electorate to improve distribution of city services resulted in the
city government establishing a committee to propose ways to inte
grate the black electorate into a program for, “turning around
declining neighborhoods in Kansas City, Missouri.”85
Segregation and discrimination prevented the city government
from providing sidewalk repair or replacement like curbs and gutters;
rodent and weed control, sewer maintenance or repair, street repairs
and resurfacing to the black community in Kansas City, Missouri. In
the white community, the city government allocated funds to provide
new curbs, sidewalks and street improvements, rat and weed control;
sewer maintenance or repair and tree trimming and replacement.86
Although discriminatory patterns existed with respect to distribution
of municipal service; curb, gutter, driveway entrance repair and
rodent control, sidewalks and drainage services were provided in some
sections of the black neighborhoods in Kansas City, Missouri.87
The collection of trash, cleaning and repairing streets, weed
and rodent control, tree trimming and replacement were conducted
85Kansas City, City Development Department, Neighborhood Con
servation Demonstration Program: An Evaluation (Kansas City,
Missouri, 1974), 5.
86”A Renaissance, of Sorts, Hits Westport, “Kansas City Star,
17 January, 1977, p. 1.
87lnterview with Mr. Smalls, Chairman of 49—63 and Mrs.
Holliday, Chairman of Vineyard, August 1980 and 1986); see also,
Kansas City, Missouri, Community Questionnaire: What do you think
are the worst problems in your Neighborhood? (Kansas City, Mis
souri: City Development Department, Kansas City, Missouri, 1979).
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once a week in the black community. These perennial problems were
not a concern for white community residents because they were sat
isfied with the quality of services the local municipal government
provided for them.
Prior to the development of Freedom Incorporated in Kansas
City, Missouri, in 1962, black electorate participation in the
franchise to improve distribution of governmental services was quite
limited. From the 1890’s to late 1950’s, blacks in Kansas City,
Missouri, had participated in moderate numbers in choosing candi
dates; however, their limited participation was specificially target
ed toward the voting and election of white candidates endorsed
and backed by white political organizations. Handouts of food, fuel,
clothing and aid in finding employment and help when they were in
trouble with the law kept the black electorate subordinate to the
whims of white political leaders and their organizations. Before the
development of Freedom Incorporated, the gambling element of Kansas
City’s black population had been told that a vote for the candidates
backed by all white—Pendergast machine would mean less police inter
ference with their illegal activities.88 Lack of political power
to elect its own candidates to public office as decision—makers along
with segregation and discrimination forced blacks to develop as a
subcommunity within Kansas City, Missouri. The first step by black
electorates to improve their social status through the political
88Lyles W. Dorsett, The Pendergast Machine (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968), 63.
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process began in 1964 when Leon Jordan and Bruce Watkins decided to
become candidates for the position of City Clerk. They led protest
marches and gave speeches at rallies in which they criticized white
political governing authorities in Kansas City as “being a bunch of
phony politicians who have been getting richer while the poor get
poorer.”89
Bruce Watkins and Leon Jordan with the support of the black
electorate in Kansas City developed the Freedom Incorporated Organ—
ization. The organization formed to improve the quality of sanita
tion services, housing, employment and election of blacks as office
holders in Kansas City, Missouri’s, political system, decided to
compete against Louis Wagner and his white political organizations,
the Jackson Democratic Club, by building a black, grassroots, precinct
organization to elect candidates at the local, state and national
levels capable of aggregating the needs of blacks in Kansas City and
Jackson County. Bruce Watkins, Leon Jordan along with Leon S. Hughes,
Jr., Howard Maupin, Dr. Charles Moor and Marion Foote guided the
development of Freedom Incorporated in its effort in the August 1964,
primary to run candidates for the County Committeeman and County
Committeewoman post against the candidates supported by the Jackson
Democratic Club. The defeat of Wagner’s candidate for County
Committeeman post during the August 1964, primary encouraged the




Freedom Incorporated organization to conduct voter education and
registration campaigns throughout the city and the county to elect
blacks to public office. Members of Freedom Incorporated, after its
successful effort in defeating Louis Wagner’s candidates began en
couraging the black electorate to work with the organization and end
bossism in the black community.
Freedom Incorporated, after voter education and registration
campaigns of the 1964 Voting Rights Act, assisted in the election of
blacks throughout Kansas City and the state of Missouri. In spite of
the organization’s successful efforts in defeating the candidates
backed by Jackson Democratic Club, the all—white political organiza
tion steadfastly continued to run white candidates against Freedom
Incorporated for municipal, state and county offices.
As a result of this competition for political power, Kansas City
had two political machines, Louis Wagner and his all—white political
organization and the all—black, grassroots Freedom Incorporated, which
was started in 1962 and proved successful in uniting the black com
munity within the Democratic party organization. According to
Robert T. Perry in his book, Black Legislators, Freedom Incorporated,
on the other hand
has served as a balancing force among the county’s
factions in the past several years. It formed alli
ances with different organizatins while maintaining
its independence in almost all city and county
elections. Using its bargaining position as the bal
ance of power between the old—line factions and the
Committee for County Progress in Jackson County
politics, Freedom Incorporated successfully elected
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two black county officials, and subsequently there
after, elected a black county chairman of the Demo
cratic party. 90
When the black electorate decided to organize Freedom Incorpo
rated in order to allow them the opportunity to choose their decision—
makers and govern their community, they then became subject to charges
of racism by blacks and whites, especially members of the white—Jack
son Democratic Club. On the nature of this enigma, Edwards Clayton
wrote the following:
Down the years, I have never questioned the abi
lity, capacity, or integrity of white ?ersons to re
present me in public office. I believe that when
they represented “all the people” well they repre
sented me well, too. I hold that Negroes can also
represent all the people including their white con
stituents. . . . And as the Negro becomes more and
more a political issue, or as disrespect for law,
order and public morals in the name of state rights
and respect for fundamental meaning of the constitu
tion are made synonymous with a denial of Negro civil
and political rights, there can be no doubt about the
dangers to the two—Rarty system of government as we
have known it to be.~’1
This type of criticism can be conceptualized as a particular stage in
process of blacks building political empowerment in Kansas City,
Missouri.
The founding of Freedom Incorporated by the black electorate
represented the mood, temperament and growing black disenchantment
with the black political struggle of trying to improve their socio—
90Robert T. Perry, Black Legislators (San Francisco, California:
R and E Research Associates, 1976), 39.
91Edward T. Clayton, Negro Politician (Chicago: Johnson Pub. Co,
1964), 178, 186.
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economic conditions by working within the framework of the regular
Jackson Democratic party in Kansas City, Missouri. Their goal was
not only to elect blacks to public office but to utilize the elec
toral process as a vehicle for
improving streets, curbs, sidewalks, sewers and
streetlights in the black community. As Hazely
points out, these developments are significant be
cause blacks have never been involved on this kind of
level in their community before. It is sad to say,
but true.92
Black political groups and citizen organizations
in Kansas City, Missouri at long last have learned to
work together for community goals instead of fighting
among themselves.93
In a sense, the concern of the black electorate and Freedom
Incorporated was not just centered at all around the question of
competing against Louis Wagner and his all white Jackson Democratic
Club to elects its candidates to office, but instead, they sought
to use this struggle for power.
• • in the building of a black precinct organiza
tion around a philosophy, not personalities .
and in the coordination of organizing efforts at the
city, county and state levels to elect candidates to
to public office. . • ~
Participation by Freedom Incorporated and the black electorate
in the electoral process was based on a general assumption that by
gaining access to the franchise, the black electorate could partici—
92Jeanne A. Fox, “In Kansas City, Missouri,” Black Enterprise,
(March 1978), p.44.
93”Priniary Brings ‘Sweet’ Victory to Freedom, Inc.,” Kansas
City Call (August 1980), pp. 1, 2.
94Fox, 44.
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pate in the political system as decision makers, and thereby obtain
improvements in their social and economic status. This participation
represented the end product of a major effort by them to gain control
over the distribution of goods and services to the black communitiy.
Electoral politics and protest activity aimed at improving the quality
of black life in Kansas City, Missouri were the dominant form of
politics for the black electorate during the development of Freedom
Incorporated. The overall goal of electoral and protest activity was
to change “de jure segregation in public accommodations; all—white
juries; police brutality and especially voter registration
denials”. ~
Utilizing the electoral process to improve their social and
economic conditions, in the opinion of the William E. Nelson in his
book, Electing Black Mayors, signaled the beginning of a new effort
by blacks to remove the socioeconomic problems blacks have tradition
ally faced in their efforts to construct a decent life for themselves.
Nelson makes this point:
The historical and contemporary evidence shows that
black communities exist as subsystems of the larger
communities. That is, the land, housing, health fa
cilities, institutions, schools and political organ
izations and police forces within black communities
are controlled by people and institutions outside of
the community.
Politically, black have either been shut out of
political decision—making and administrative processes
95Michael Preston, “Limitations of Urban Power: The Case of
Black Mayors,” in The New Urban Politics, ed. Louis H. Masotti and
Robert L. Linberry (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1976), 114.
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through repression, deception, and discrimination,
or as victims of various so—called reforms that make
it extremely difficult for blacks who truly represent
the needs of the black community to get elected.
Because of the criticial state of the black economy
in the cities, political machines and leaders have
been able to count upon solid support from the black
community without providing much in return beyond
welfare handouts and low level patronage positions to
a few select black politicians.~’6
Throughout the early and the latter part of the nineteenth
century, white political machines and agricultural organizations
agitated to attract blacks and European immigrants to Kansas City,
Missouri, because they provided the city and the state of Missouri
with the surplus of cheap labor to replace those blacks who had
been freed as a result of emancipation. Jim Pendergast, with his
brother, Tom, worked hard to attract blacks and European immigrants
to Kansas City because “it would allow his organization the oppor
tunity to control the politics of Kansas City and rural Jackson
County with the support he received from them.”97 At times, the
machine was able to garner the support of blacks by manipulating and
persuading black politicians to buy drinks and give money to the
black electorate on election day in exchange for their votes.98 On
96William E. Nelson, Jr., Elected Black Mayors: Political
Action in the Black Community (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University
Press, 1978), 7, 21, 23.
97Lyle W. Dorsett, “The Campaign to Dominate the Local Democra
tic Party and the County Government,” in Lyle W. Dorsett, The Pender—
gast Machine (New York: Oxford Press, 1963), 63.
98Ibjd., 78.
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the nature of the Pendergast machine, efforts to attract potential
voters and organizational supporters to Kansas City, Lewis N. Wynne
states this point:
When one views the persistence of the immi
gration movement despite the rather dismal success
es, it is logical to suspect that the real reason
reason for such attempts was to warn the former
slave of the fate which awaits him unless he can
and will act as the friend . . . of whites, and
unless the freedmen became honest and faithful
laborers. The freedman was on trial and he must do
the work and do it well, or he must get out of the
way and make room for the European immigrant who
will prove a more useful member of society. . .
Pendergast operated his machine in Kansas City, Missouri, based
on the support that it received from his black and European lower
class base. Pendergast was able to gain the loyalty and support of
these groups by spreading the benefits of the organization wide
enough so that he controlled the vote of the economically and social
ly depressed immigrants, and also, commanded the allegiance of a suf
ficient number of blacks, European immigrants and the middle class to
give his system a legitimate base.’°°
The chapter has attempted to examine the social and economic
demographics in Kansas City, Missouri, during the development of
Freedom Incorporated. It also attempted to point out that the
99Lewis N. Wynn, “The Role of the the Freedmen in the Post Bellum
Cotton Economy,” Phylon (December 1981), pp. 311—312.
100Jay S. Goodman, Perspectives on Urban Politics (Boston: Allyn
and Boston, Inc., 1970), 284.
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black community has not been able to choose its elected officeholders
in proportion to their population. Nevertheless, we shall now turn
to an investigation of the rise and demise of both machine and reform
movements in Kansas City, Missouri, and the emergence of black polit—
ical empowerment.
— — .~ — C_i. _jI, ii ilL Jbu~lu~~hi S1 —
CHAPTER III
THE BLACK ELECTORATE AND THE PENDERGAST MACHINE
IN KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI
For a long time, the machines were a conspicous and powerful
institution in the United States.’ The evolution of political
activity in the state of Missouri since the advent of the 1900’s
has been, to some degree, the history of the rise and decline of
both machines and reform movements in Kansas City, Missouri.2
Between the Civil War and World War II, the political machine became
such a powerful institution in American politics that it became very
active in administering and carrying out policy decisions affecting
large and small municipal governments. This social engineering proess
personalized and humanized assistance to the urban poor.3
The machine under the direction of men like Edward Crump, James
Curley, Frank Hague, Richard Daley, William Tweed and Tom and Jim Pen—
dergast was quite effective in organiziing and mobilizing the ethnic
electorates as a key element in its political strategy to gain control
‘Edward C. Banfield, Urban Government: Reader in Politics and
Administration (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1969), 166.
2john Fenton, Politics in the Border States (New Orleans: The
Houser Press, 1957), 128.
3Banfield, 167.
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of city hail.4 One of the most striking features about the Pendergast
machine was its development into a bourgeois democratic organization
of an exclusive political nature.
The evolution of the Pendergast machine as a party organization
was motivated and held together by a personal desire to control the
vote, to promote harmony in the Democratic party, to put down faction
alism and to furnish a meeting place for good fellowship among whites
and blacks and fellow democrats. Out of this effort to promote
harmony, Jim Pendergast founded the Jackson Democratic Club, which
became the Pendergast machine.5
The Jackson Democratic Club (J.D.C.) was better organized,
recruited, disciplined and trained. Every district of the J.D.C. was
captained by experienced strategists. The wards or districts of
Kansas City were divided into precincts and the contact man in each
precinct was a sub—boss known as the precinct captain. The precinct
captains were for the most part on the city or county payroll. It was
his or her duty to look after the interests of those who showed a
desire to support candidates endorsed by the J.D.C. or Pendergast on
election day. Each captain had a fund provided him by the organization
which he could use to aid low income blacks in time of want or suffer
ing.6 The precinct captain was also a personal relations man who
4Alan Shank and R. W. Canant, Urban Perspectives: Politics and
Policies (Boston: Bolrook Press, Inc., 1975), 13.
5Maurice M. Milligan, The Inside Story of the Pendergast Machine
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, LTD., 1947), 59.
6lbid., 135.
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met each new resident and saw to it that the water was turned on,
and the gas and electric hookups were connected by the utility com
panies. ~ It was the captains duty to make sure that each new black
resident was duly registered on the rolls of the election books.
Moreover, it was their duty to keep in touch with the black electorate
and their families, and if they got in trouble with the law in Kansas
City, Missouri, the following would take place:
It was their [the captain’s] duty to see that
bond was arranged and that no harsh treatment was
meted out by city and county officials. If a son or
daugher got a ticket for some traffic violation the
helpful precinct worker was ready to speak to the
proper person.
Any applicant for political office had to have
the endorsement of the precinct captain before his
candidacy could be considered. On election day,
cars were provided for the transportation of the
voters to the polls and scores of precinct workers
met the voters and handed them a sample ballot con
veniently marked so that there would be no misunder
standing as to the names of the “best” candidates.
Pendergast’s philosopy was get out the votes in
the precincts and the wards will take care of them
selves • 8
Without a guiding ideology, the machine operated an exchange
system. At the organization exchange lowest level, the machine pre
cinct captain exchanged jobs and material rewards for blacks who lived
in the slum areas. These areas were already known as slums before Pen—
dergast got there. The name “Hell’s Half Acre,” was often applied to
whole area. By the early twentieth century, the Kansas City Star
7lbid., 135—136.
8lbjd., 136—137.
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newspaper was referring to “the human derelicts of the North End, as
the bums, the hoboes and the vagrants.”9
At the highest level, the machine gave the political boss of the
black community capabilities to influence the financial and industrial
interest of Kansas City, Missouri. Through the exchange system, the
political boss could exchange franchises for contracts, transportation
systems, favors and protection.’° The Pendergast machine emerged on
the scene in Kansas City, Missouri, at a time when the principles of
Jacksonian democracy shaped the function, operations and direction of
local governments in the United States. The development of urban
municipalities during the nineteenth century motivated city adminis
trators to devise and embrace a new management format for administer
ing the structure of local government and the selection of council
members. The reform mode]. allowed local administrators heavily
influenced by the principles of Jacksonian democracy to embrace the
use of council manager government, and nonpartisan ballots. At—large
elections, as a precourse for separating national and state elections
from local elections, lessened the influence of the political party
and the party organization.’’ These modified procedures to some
degree restrained individuals from managing ~he duties and responsi
bilities of other city officials. As Kansas City developed with
9A. Theodore Brown and Lyle W. Dorsett, K.C.: A History of Kansas
City, Missouri (Boulder, Colorado: Pruette Pu.blishing Co., 1978), 63.
10Shank, 63.
“David R. Morgan, Managing Urban America: The Politics and Admin
istration of America’s Cities (Massachusetts: Durbury Press, 1979), 43.
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the advent of industrial and migration patterns, city officials
recognized that there was a need to better coordinate their programs
and to cater to the needs of the urban dwellers. Historically, the
evolution of political machines and the advent of rules and organiza
tional structures affecting the governmental process’2 occurred during
a time when the U.S. was becoming more urbanized. By 1910, intra and
interregional migration patterns contributed to more than a quarter
of a million inhabitants living in sixteen cities with three, New York,
Philadelphia and Chicago having more than one million.’3 Much of the
expanding populaton can be linked to the growth of foreign immigration
and of blacks in the U.S. settling in urban areas. More than a quarter
of a million foreign born immigrants migrated to central cities by
the early twentieth century. Statistically, nearly half of the entire
population in U.S. at that time was living in urban areas. 14 According
to the United States Census of 1870 there were 118,071 blacks in the
state of Missouri. The black population in the Missouri counties of
Jackson, Platte and Clay which made up the Kansas City, Missouri, area
was small.15 By the 1870 Census, there were 5,223 blacks living in




‘5William E. Parrish, A History of Missouri (Columbia, Missouri:
University of Missouri Press, 1973), 151.
‘6U.S. Bureau of Census, Compendium of the Ninth Census (Washing
ton, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1872), 66—69.
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population of Missouri had emigrated during the last two years of the
war. Of those who remained, the vast majority concentrated themselves
in the Jackson, Clay and Platte Counties, bordering the rivers, es
pecially the Mississippi and the Missouri.’7 The relatively small
proportion of blacks in the state of Missouri by the 1870 Census
suggested that, “apparently the state offered little attraction for
black immigration as the census reported that with the growth of the
black population from 3,618 in 1810 to 118,071 in 1870 better than
99 per cent of Missouri’s blacks had been born within the borders.”18
The emergence of the U.S. as an urban nation took place simul
taneously with the rise of city bosses. Moreover, the functional
characteristics of political machines or organizations were varied
and sundry ranging from the inner ring to party workers. To a large
degree, these activities were dependent upon procedural and substan
tive electoral support blacks gave the political machine. Programs
developed to improve the social and economic conditions of blacks, at
times, placed undue stress upon the Kansas City, Missouri, municipal
government to provide a broad spectrum of urban programs to cater to
their needs, that it truthfully could not afford or even offer. As
a consequence of this, the city government was financially unable to
provide public works programs, minimum wages, adequate maximum hous
ing, and social security or unemployment compensation to eliminate or
mitigate the pervasive and persistent social and economic problems of
~-7Parrish, 151.
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poverty encountered by these inhabitants. 19 To fill the vacuum, the
Pendergast machine provided the European immigrants with services to
alleviate those pervasive economic and social ills which were not
ameliorated by the broad based programs offered by city government.
Political corruption was commonly associated with the function of
Pendergast’s political machine. As Cabell Phillips has stated, “a
political organization is not an uplift society; it is a blunt instru
ment for seizing and using political power.”2° But having power is a
beginning, not an end. How the Pendergast machine and the people
within it used the organization’s power provides a useful case study.21
Authority, loyalty, voting fraud, violence and other strong arm
enforceable methods were commonly associated with the election of
candidates to political office. Craft, extortion, blackmail, bribery
and other methods of thievery allowed men like Tweed and Pendergast
to maintain their control over the party, and treasury, to discipline
and sanction party workers, to extract influence from public officials
at national, state and local levels of governments and to form allian
ces with businessmen.22 The machine gave business, including illicit
‘9Shank, 22—23.
20Larry Crothaus, “Kansas City Blacks, Harry Truman and the






business, the kind of protection it needed in order to survive by
providing a route of social mobility for some to whom other routes
were closed.23
Robert K. Merton in his essay, “Latent Function of the Political
Machine,” helped us to forthrightly develop a framework to identify
the salient events which contributed to the growth of political
party machines in the U.S. He stated the following points:
in large sectors of the American population,
the political machine or the “political racket” are
judged as unequivocally bad and undesirable. .
To understand the growth and role of the political
machine and bossism, we must look at two types of
sociological variables: (a) the structural context
which makes it difficult, if not impossible, for
morally approved structures to fulfill essential
social functions, thus leaving the door open for
political machines (or their structural equivalents)
to fulfill these functions, and (b) the presence of
subgroups (ethnic voters) whose needs too distinctive
as they may be are left unsatisfied, except for the
latent functions which the machine in fact ful
fills.24
The purpose of this chapter is to examine and describe why the
black electorate supported Jim and Tom Pendergast and their political
organization in Kansas City, Missouri. Agitation by the black elec
torate in Kansas City, Missouri, to end racial discrimination, to
elect and appoint blacks to public office, and to improve the social
and economic status of black life in Kansas City before the enactment
of the Civil and Voting Rights Acts and the decline of the Pendergast
machine was very dismal.
23Banfield, 167.
24Ibid., 224.
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Development of the Pendergast Machine in Kansas City, Missoui
The roots of the Pendergast machine go back to the 1880’s when
Pendergast put together his political machine with the support of low
income blacks living in the West Bottoms neighborhoods. When Jim
Pendergast arrived in Kansas City at the age of twenty, he had very
little education or income. With the support of his brother, Tom
Pendergast, and the funds he acquired by betting in a horse race on a
horse named Climax, he was able to establish a saloon and hotel
business in the West Bottoms area. The saloon was named after this
race horse to show his sentimental ties to the sport and his apprecia
tion for its providing him with the income to get the saloon and hotel
business started. Pendergast’s saloon became the headquarters for
talking politics, making friends, and establishing contact with blacks
and city officeholders as well as gamblers and lawyers.25
Pendergast’s special kinship with blacks in the West Bottoms
allowed him to become a private banker for the black electorate
employed on railroads and in the packing houses who experienced
problems with cashing their paychecks,and he acted as a sort of
philanthropist dispensing goods and services to those in need. Low
income blacks, most of whom have lived and worked in the West Bottoms
for most of their lives, constantly found themselves confronted with
the problems of health care, crime, education, housing and the inabi—
lity to find suitable employment, food and decent housing. Jim
Pendergast taught his younger brother, Tom, that the science of
25Pendergast, 22.
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politics consisted of doorbell ringing, giving out free food, helping
the local clergy and acting as a mediator with the police.26 The
service to the black voter and their ability to, “recall that effort
amidst the campaigning of your political foes when you aspire for
political office, is what wins their hearts, and not the use of polit
ical violence to settle political debates.”27 He taught his brother,
Tom, these points
the angles of organizing the electorate in
volves making every man you meet and speak to your
friend. Through this friendship and mannerism, you
will then come to grips with knowing how to get to
the urban poor and select ward captains to enrich
their understanding of you and your ability to inter
mingle directly with them.
Giving out food, coal, shoes and clothing from
funds established by the machine provides a service
to the urban poor. When a poor man comes to old
Tom’s boys for help, we don’t make one of those
damn fool investigations like these charities. No
by God, we fill his belly and warm his back and vote
him our way.
The basic tenet in Jim’s code of ethics was that
when a man gave his word he was honor bound to keep
it. As Jim’s lieuteriat, Tom adopeted this theme, and
it became as important rule in his political career
as other basic tenet prescribing total loyalty to the
boss. 28
It took an imaginative Jim Pendergast to build a dependable
organization in such an environment. Certainly, Kansas City has its
neighborhoods of underprivileged blacks who often could be won over
26Fenton, p. 129.




by the traditional machine handouts.29 In his role as caretaker of
the black electorate and of the poor in general, Pendergast conducted
extensive charitable activities among blacks in the West Bottoms
area. The grocers, butchers, bankers and coal men were instructed by
the Pendergast machine to see that there was no suffering among
blacks and the poor and to send the bills to Jim Pendergast.3° As
leader of the West Bottoms area, Pendergast fed thousands of blacks
and poor and the unemployed during the traditional Thankgiving and
Christmas holidays in Kansas City, Missouri.3’
During the sixty years that the Pendergast machine existed in
Kansas City, Missouri, its political strength was centered functional
ly in the West Bottoms neighborhoods where low income and unemployed
blacks lived in overcrowed housing and worked in machine shops, fac
tories, warehouses, railroad yards and packing houses.32 Pendergast
realized that he could not have an effective political organization
if the workers were not a part of the neighborhood which they were
attempting to organize. He believed that he could not send out city
slickers to organize the wards of the black poor.33 Therefore, he
had to recruit members of his organization from all walks of life
2Lyles W. Dorsett, Kansas City Politics: A Study of Boss Pender—
gast’s Machine, Arizona and the West (1966), 109.
30Brown and Dorsett, 112.
31”Larry Grothaus, Kansas City Blacks, Harry Truman and the
Pendergast Machine,” Missouri Historical Review (October 1974), 79.
32Brown and Dorsett, 4—5.
33Lyles W. Dorsett, 109.
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and from all parts of Kansas City. In order to do this, he had to
provide services for them.34 Some of the most loyal black supporters
that Pendergast had were various groups within Kansas City’s North End
and West Bottoms. These two neighborhoods housed the bulk of the
city’s destitute poor and low income black labor force.35
Geographically, the West Bottoms area was bounded by six neigh
borhoods. On the west, the West Bottoms area was bounded by the state
line; on the north by the river and railroad tracks; and on the east
and south by the medium to high income neighborhood of Quality Hill
(see map page 94). The West Bottoms neighborhood has a reputation
for being called the “Bloody Sixth” district due to the violent
confrontations and killings on election day between machine support
ers and its opponents trying to select candidates to represent the
West Bottoms residents during the Democratic and Republican primaries
to attend their respective conventions.
The Pendergast machine emerged in the West Bottoms area at the
time of the industrial and business expansion into the are during the
depression years, and grew fat and arrogant on the boodle from the
spending spree that accompanied national economic recovery.36 The
growth and development of the Pendergast machine during this period
came about quite tediously because of its everlasting task to
34Ibid., 110.
35Ibid.
36William Redding, Tom’s Town, K.C, and the Pendergast Legend
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manage and control politics throughout the West Bottoms area.
Prescriptively, this prognosis was the key element the machine needed
due to the expanding size of the black population and because Kansas
City was fast becoming a regional financial and mercantile plateau
for industrial and commercial development. Capital improvement
projects for renovation of the Kansas City, Missouri, infrastructure,
the fertility rate and migration pattern of blacks and of the middle
class population contributed further to the needs of the Pendergast
machine for broadening its political base. Industrial and population
growth from the late 1880’s and early 1890’s hastened the process of
urbanization, commercial and industrial development and the migration
of blacks to Kansas City, Missouri, as labor force participants.
Blacks migrated and eventually settled in the West Bottoms area from
southern states in their relentless search for housing. Schools
were needed to educate their children. Jobs and improved police—com
munity relations were also needed. As the black population grew from
3,400 in 1870 to 8,100 in 1880 and 17,500 in 1900, industrial plants
took up much of the West Bottoms land where many blacks had been
living. The period from 1880’s and early 1890’s posed resilient and
perennial problems for Jim Pendergast and his political machine as
his lower class black constituency base began to migrate from the
West Bottoms east and southward to the North Side, Quality Hill and
North End areas. Each of these neighborhoods exhibits the similar and
distinct demographic characteristics that formed a nucleus for the
political domain and black support of the Pendergast machine.
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The North Side neighborhood was bounded on the south by the
state line, and southeastward between Troost and Woodland Avenue in
Kansas City, Missouri.37 The movement of the black electorate from
the West Bottoms area to the North Side did not in any form or fas
hion enhance their economic and political fortunes. The North Side
was an area that unlike the West Bottoms lacked an industrial district
but in many other respects the two areas were similar. Unskilled
blacks, most of whom worked as laborers in the old buildings used for
small factories, as helpers, janitors and in other professions as
waiters in the retail stores and in the meat packing industry lived
in dilapidated tenement houses.38 Because blacks had a harder time
finding new housing than whites, blacks were forced to keep more
people under one roof, and this encouraged the partition of large
homes into small crowed apartment.39 The North Side during electoral
campaigns supported Pendergast’s •candidates because of its patron
age job system and the ability of the machine’s precinct captains to
deliver fuel and other supplies when they were unable to purchase
these commodities themselves.40 The movement of the blacks out of the
West Bottoms area from one dilapidated area to the next at the time of
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its political strength from its matrix in the West Bottoms to Quality
Hill and to every corner of the North End and North Side where the
black population eventually settled.41 Black migration eastward into
part of Kansas City’s North End shortly after 1900 produced a fashion
able neighborhood around Lincoln School alongside of an expanded slum
known as “the Bowery” between Troost, Woodland, Seventeenth and
Twenty—fifth streets. In the face of bitter and violent resistance,
the line of black housing pushed gradually southward. When it reached
the 1900 block, a wave of bombings held it up, but only temporarily.
The pressure for expansion came not only from sheer numbers but also
from the slowly growing black middle class in the Quality Hill neigh
borhood which wanted the comfortable houses and yards that other
substantial citizens could have.42
The Quality Hill neighborhood is located on the east by the state
line, on the south by Thirteenth Street and on the east by Troost
Street. In many respects, economic and social differentation distin
guished the Quality Hill area from the overcrowded housing conditions
and deteriorating street facilities that constantly threatened low
income blacks living in the North End and North Side neighborhoods.
Between 1865 and the 1870’s, black teachers and other professionals
along with a growing number of relatively prosperous businessmen,
doctors, dentists, real estate owners and others with more money than
41Dorsett, 5.
42Ibid., 185.
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the average income of their race settled in Quality Hill. In some
cases they found the area to have a much more pleasant environment to
live in than the West Bottoms or North Side slums. This small middle
class neighborhood was sometimes referred to as the Black Quality
Hill. The black elite lived in comfortable brick houses compared to
low income blacks in the North Side and West Bottoms who lived in
delapidated tenement housing. The North End neighborhood became a
key variable in Jim Pendergast’s scheme to mobilize the black electo
rate to support its machine and policies when he purchased a saloon
in the North End. The North End has characteristics similar to those
of West Bottoms. The North End is an economically poor area located
between Locust and Woodland and from Eighth Street north to the
Missouri River and state line, on the east by Independence Avenue and
Clayton County; on the west by Woodland Avenue and on the south by
Grand, Troost and Monroe Avenue. On one side was a black slum and on
the other a Russian—Jewish neighborhood.44 The North End did not have
as large a black population as the West Bottoms, but it was largely
inhabited by poor black laborers who lived in dilapidated tenement
houses.
Historically, the North End had a reputation for harboring
prostitution, gangsters and graft protected by the police. Fenton
presents these points about the Pendergast machine:
43Brown, 96.
44Ibid., 186.
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they knew the machine people at the precinct and
ward levels. The Pendergast people came to the
black community and asked us what we wanted and
needed. When we wanted something done or needed
a job or were in trouble we could turn to the
Pendergast precinct or ward leader for help. And
the machine produced for us. Reform candidates
opposing the reign and rule of the machine never
came to the black community and asked us what we
wanted or our support.45
The black electorate shared at least marginally in the periods
between 1886 and 1890 in the “Gilded Age progress of Kansas City,
Missouri although the sanguine faith in urban growth and its rewards
which were so often repeated in the press and trade journals invari
ably left them out of accounts.”46 Even though blacks in Kansas City,
Missouri were forced to develop a community increasingly separated
from the dominant white one because of the rigourous patterns of
racial segregation, during the era of Pendergast and his organization
they began to develop their own organizations and leaders. The black
community was able to sustain the development of its institutions and
organizations with the support it received from low income and middle
class blacks.
As the black population grew from 3,400 in 1870 to 8,100 in 1880
and to 17,500 in 1900, social as well as political activity for blacks
became more and more intense.47 A growing desire for political






ing School, NAACP, International Order of Twelve of the Knights and
Daughters of Tabor, masons and lodges and the United Labor Party.
As early as 1898, Samuel Easton, a black bricklayer and plasterer
by trade with very little money or education, rented a house on High
land Avenue in Kansas City to serve as a shelter for black orphans and
old women in need of food and shelter. It became one of the major
charitable institutions in the city under the name of the Nile Home
for Negro Children. At first Easton received very little help from
blacks, so he organized a group of women to run the home. Donations
of food at the City Market were taken to the home in a wheelbarrow
to feed and shelter those in need of food.48
As early as 1886, black educators during the Pendergast machine
in Kansas City, Missouri, began to agitate for the improvement in
quality of education, housing and employment for black children.
The success story of Richard T. Coles, a young teacher during this
period in Kansas City’s history, represents an important era in the
agitation for improvement in teaching and educational facilities
available to black children. It was in 1886 that Richard Coles was
asked by the Kansas City floard of Education to supervise the organi
zation of its summer school program for black children. When an addi
tional school for black children was deemed necessary, Cole was chosen
and he immediately arranged for its first classes to meet in the base
ment of a church, as the school buildings were not yet completed.
48Ibid., 93—94.
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After much persuasion, Coles got permission from the school board to
arrange for manual training at Garrison School. The experiment was
so successful that Garrison’s enrollment began to expand rapidly.49
Agitation by black educators to end the problems of police
brutality and improve educational facilities for black children pro
duced a heated debate between two of Kansas City’s most prominent
black leaders, D. V. A. Nero and Paul Gaston. Nero taught school
in Kansas City, Missouri Public School system and assisted others in
the development and planning of Lincoln High School. When the school
was built, Nero became its first principal. Paul Gaston, on the
other hand, was a lecturer and actively involved in politics. Both
Nero and Gaston consistently criticized the Republican Party because
it failed to condemn the police for the killing of blacks. The more
the black electorate began to agitate for the improvement in quality
of education and an end to police brutality, the more the Republican
party continued to avoid them and caused Nero and Gaston to ally with
other groups and organizations to put pressure on the police and Re
publican Party. Ambivalence with respect to the value of the Republi
can Party to local blacks probably played some part in Paul Gaston’s
criticism of the Republicans. The black electorate, according to
Gaston, “have concluded to cleave unto that party that will favor us
[blacks] the most. The Republicans have not treated us right and we
[blacks] have forsaken them for another political party.”5°
49Ibid., 94.
50Ibid., 95.
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In the mid 1880’s, a reform ticket calling itself the Citizens
Party made up of Germans and blacks supported the demand of the
black electorate and its leaders for representation on the Kansas
City, Missouri, police force. A few blacks had jobs in the police
and fire departments where they made up 4.0 percent and 2.5 percent,
respectively, of the force.51 Agitation by the black electorate and
the Citizen Actions Party failed to produce any tangible movement
toward increased black employment or an end to police killings.
Indeed, reports of police brutality, and harrassment continued. In
January 1882, the killing of a black by a white policeman led to
protest demonstrations and riots throughout the black community.
Black organizations, businessmen, civic and religious leaders deve
loped the Negro Protective League to challenge the power and influence
of Kansas City Police Department. For years the police department had
been insensitive to the demands of blacks. Strategically, the Negro
Proctective League and the Citizen Party could do little other than
condemn the police, prosecutors and grand juries for failing to
indict police officers engaged in the killing of blacks. To some
extent, police brutality and lack of employment by blacks on the
police force in 1972 played the following role:
weakening some black’s allegiance to the Republican
Party. The Republican Party abandonment of the Negro
Negro is a long one, reaching its climax in the last
decade of the nineteenth century and extending on
into the twentieth. During these years, it became
apparent that the Negro was not going to be accorded
his civil rights —— suffrage and equality in public
51Ibid., 184—185.
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places and carriers and in the schools. Nor was
there to be an economic foundation established——
land, opportunity, and training to enable him to
further his own cause in becoming a citizen.
If the Republicans were reformers, they were
also politicians who were apt to accomodate their
reform program to political necessity. That is
what they did in 1872, and in seeking a success
for their cause they looked in the same direction
that Rutherford B. Hayes’s regular Republicans
were to look in 1876 and 1877, to the white South.
Once this decision was made, there was to be no
turning back away from amnesty and there was to be
meaningful civil rights for blacks.52
In addition to the black electorate organizing the Negro Protec
tive League, lodges and churches to promote improvement in quality of
black life. The electorate worked along with liberal whites in
Kansas City, Missouri, and formed an Independent Negro Party. This
was a political organization which was formed to agitate against se
gregation and discrimination and to influence electorate participation
at the local level. The Negro Political Party was quite active as it
attempted to raise the social and political consciousness of the
black community. The Negro Political Party mobilized the black
electorate to agitate against segregation and discrimination in
Kansas City as well as publicized the killing of blacks by the police.
The Negro Political Party fused with a local Labor Union party,
mostly white, which placed a black on its credentials committee and
nominated another, James Woodland, for justice of the peace. The
52”The Radicals Abandonment of the Negro During Reconstruction,”
Journal of Negro History 54 (April 1960): 82—89.
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Labor Party got nowhere, but several black leaders peformed the fol
lowing activity:
continued to inveigh against unthinking support of
“the party of Lincoln.” This probably helped James
and Thomas Pendergast when, in the early twentieth
century, they made efforts to build some voting sup
port among blacks for the Democratic machine the
two men were to build.
The appearance of a Union Labor Party in municipal elections
of Kansas City during the machine area was quite unfavorable. But
the party’s lack of success at the polls apparently quieted fears
among whites in Kansas City that the Union Labor Party was promoting
socialism. At no time during the nineteenth or early twentieth cen
tury, was socialism given serious public attention in Kansas City.
It had no measureable effect on improving police black community
relations, employment and educational development of black children.
National black protest and civil rights organizations were slow
in getting established during the era of Pendergast and his organiza
tion in Kansas City, Missouri. The first such organization was the
National Urban League founded in New York in 1911. The Urban League
of Kansas City was formed in 1920. Unlike the Urban League, the
National Association of Colored People (NAACP), the largest and most
influential civil rights organization in the country found difficulty
in getting established in Kansas City, Missouri. There was general
fear on the part of many blacks that the white population would be
hostile to such an organization. Also, many blacks were not inter
ested in joining any organization which was not secret. The NAACP
53Brown and Dorsett, 47—48.
~ihin~rnLidi — — - — — Li ii di di ~di Jt!U~&jOddHISMIILOWb~dd L J. ~d - d
105
owes much of its existence in the state, in part, to the institution
of lynching. Between 1890 and 1923, lynching occurred throughout
the state of Missouri on a regular basis.54
In addition to the aforementioned traditional organizations, the
black electorate organized the International Order of Twelve of the
Knights and Daughters of Tabor. Its founder, the Reverend Moses Dick,
a black, organized the International Order of Twelve of the Knights
and Daughters of Tabor and the Knights of Liberty, a secret Negro lodge
designed to carry to success the secret and great work of obtaining
social and economic justice for blacks.55 The Knights of Liberty,
Baptist, Methodists and Presbyterian churches and black businesses
agitated during the era of the machine for liberty, justice and econo
mic development in the black community.
In 1925, Kansas City witnessed the agitation by the health and
medical profession to improve the care of blacks living and working in
the North End. In order to accomplish this task, black doctors such
as Dr. J. E. Perry of Kansas City, Missouri, turned abandoned and di
lapidated houses into impovished hospitals which were used to estab
lish treatment centers to care for black patients.
Even though Dr. J. E. Perry and the health and medical profes
sional association, Samuel Easton and Nile Home, Richard Coles, Paul
54Lorenzo Greene, Antonio Holland and Gary Kremer, “The Role of
the Negro in Missouri History 1719—1970.” in James C. Kirkpatrick
and Thelma Goodwin, Official Manual State of Missouri, 1973—74 (Jef
ferson City, Missouri: The Von Hoffman Press, Inc., 1973), 20—21.
55Ibid., 19.
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Gaston and A. Nero and the educational establishment along with
numerous organizations were able to realize some progress in their
request to improve the status of blacks, it was not enought to provide
adequate care for the entire black population living in the North
End. The resources and contacts with local politicians provided them
by the Pendergast organization helped in gaining access to food and
medical supplies when race and financial assistance inhibited them
from achieving their goals and objectives.
Efforts by the Pendergast machine to help the black electorate
achieve its goals can be conceptualized as part of the organization’s
ongoing political objective of controlling politics and factionalism
in the West Bottoms neighborhoods. The net consequences of these
changes within the purview of democratic politics have altered geo
graphically the boundaries of the West Bottoms due to demographic
population shifts and the transformation of its name from the Bloody
Sixth to Fifth Ward.
Everette C. Ladd and Charles D. Hadley contend that machines
such as Pendergast’s consistently take advantage of these kinds of
transformation in order to advance their particular interests over
others. Efforts by politicians and political machines to transform
conflict and politics have inevitably, in Ladd and Hadley’s view,
contributed to the growth and development of the following:
new collections of political interests, new
packages of concerns and of demands among colliding
groups; a basic redrawing of the political agenda.
Inevitably, in such a context, political leaders
find themselves grouping. That the lines of con
flict have shifted, that interests, alliances and
party loyalties are in flux, is obvious, but the
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sources of such change are so recent and unprece
dented as to becloud the matter of appropriate re
sponse. . . . The issues are so structured and
situated that they serve admirably as the foci of
attention in an enterprise concerned primarily
with charting the changing directions of the
polity within the larger context of a changing
social order.56
The transformation of this enterprising relationship between the
politics of the Pendergast machine and the black electorate emerged
at a time when the Democratic party began to offer the people of West
Bottoms a management format alternative to mob primaries for the
nominating of its area representatives. These mob primaries were
simply “the assembling of blacks who lived in the West Bottoms area
and voted on the selection of eleven delegates, including Jim Pender—
gast, to represent them at the Democratic Convention to be held in
Kansas City, Missouri, in 1884.” This structural alternative elec
toral mechanism afforded the machine voters who attended ‘mob pri
maries’ (as those meetings were called) a chance to elect a chairman
of the First Ward with the power of attorney to appoint heads of
committees and to select their delegates to the Democratic Party
Convention and to help elect its candidates to political office
during the primaries. The prestigious and important variable in the
electoral management format was the power of the chairman of the
delegation to use his power and his delegates to support candidates
for political office in exchange for political patronage. The demo
graphic design that provided the base and foundation for the growth
56Everette C. Ladd and Charles Hadley, Transformation of the
American Party System (New York: W.W. Horton and Company, Inc., 1975),
xxi—xxii.
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and development of Pendergast urban and industrial political organi
zation in the North Side and North End also constituted the basis for
its ability to bring other organizations and their leaders into the
arena of Kansas City, Missouri, Democratic politics. These skills
were meaningless without the personal and financial support of the
black electorate and other ethnic groups living in the First Ward.
There were at least three factors which contributed to blacks’ support
of the machine. First, the Pendergast machine operated an exchange
system. In this sense, Pendergast was able to weld together an
efficient political organization of low income blacks living in
Kansas City, Missouri’s West Bottoms. At the poil these low income
blacks reciprocated for the personal favors Jim Pendergast dispensed
from his saloon in the First Ward. Secondly, prostitution, corruption,
gambling, narcotics and other forms of vice were economically very
profitable to the politicians of the First Ward since most of them
made money from the blacks who purchased these commodities for enter
tainment and pleasure. By building an efficient political organiza
tion capable of uniting fractional leaders and their organizations
and intergrating them along with the black electorate into Kansas
City Democratic politics, Jim and Tom Pendergast were able to consol
idate their influence and political power in the First Ward. By
welding together his organization of discordant factions in the
city’s West Bottoms,57 Jim Pendergast soon found himself promoted by
57Frankljn D. Mitchell, Embattled Democracy: Politics 1919—1932




his lower—class constituency base for to an alderman’s post on city
council. Black voters attended a rally in 1892 to organize and
mobilize the electorate to elect Jim Pendergast to the alterman post.
The switchman, freight handlers, . . . engineers wore only blue
jumpers and, had packinghouse mud on their boots. These were the
hard—handed men of the First Ward. These men came to see Pendergast
because; “he provided home furnishing for many families, and put many
of the stricken back on their feet again.”58
The political support of the black electorate in the First Ward
of the organization and agitation on the part of the machine to elect
Jim Pendergast to the alderman post were simultaneously met with a
counter resistance from anti—Pendergast forces competing for the lead
ership and control over politics of the First Ward. Edward Kelly,
participating member of the West Bottoms Democratic Club Executive
Committee, and John Grady, City Councilman from the same community,
vociferously opposed the leadership of Jim Pendergast and the
politics of his machine. Competition between Kelly and John Gray
to control the First Ward Democratic primaries and the allocation of
jobs to its supporters ostensibly contributed to the politics of
chaos and confusion in the district. The magnitude and complexity
of this political crisis gave rise to the election of delegates to
the Democratic Convention with diverse loyalties and a deadlock
primary. One group supported Kelly and Gray on the one hand, while
58Ibid., 111—112
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a competing group of machine loyalists supported Pendergast. Competi
tion by these two men for leadership and the election of two groups
of delegates were seen by Jim Pendergast as a sign he should refrain
from taking part in politics of confusion during and the First Ward
primaries.
Pendergast was by no means the commander of the First Ward as
long as the struggle between Kelly and Grady persisted. To help
mediate the conflict, Pendergast invited Kelly and Grady to his
saloon for consultation and advice. According to Lyle Dorsett,
Pendergast’s refusal to take sides in the
First Ward faction troubles between Kelly and
Grady paid rich dividends, he cooperated with both
men. In 1890 he opened the doors of his hotel,
Pendergast Hall, to Kelly so that he could hold a
campaign meet for the First Ward Democrats. Pen—
dergast had gained the favor of Grady, too, for
in March 1892, the latter made known his wish to
retire from the council, if Jim Pendergast could
replace him.59
Jim Pendergast’s candidacy for alterman had the support of his
political machine and the black electorates of the First Ward. As
a result, Pendergast became the undisputed leader of the First Ward
neighborhoods when he was nominated for the city council with no op
position in the party and walked away with the election in April, 1892,
by a majority of five to one over his Republican opponent.6° From
April 1892 until May 1910, as a member of the Kansas City, Missouri
59Lyle Dorsett,
60Brown, 109—110.
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City Council, Pendergast’s active involvement in the politics of the
First Ward contributed to less factional strife and more organization
al development. After his election to the city council, Pendergast,
with more favors to bestow to the black electorates of the North Side
for their support, established himself as a champion of the workingman,
successfully fighting against salary reductions for blacks who were
employed as police and firemen in the labor force. In other quarters
though, he won support from reform elements by favoring lower tele
phone rates and the promotion of a city park building in the First
Ward neighborhoods for use by blacks and other ethnic groups.6’
Historically, Jim Pendergast’ s political machine functioned
like other political machines in Chicago, New York, Philadelphia
and Memphis. The traditional pattern of delivering and dispensing
food, fuel and clothings, making jobs available and helping to secure
the release of its constituents from jail allowed the machine to
receive support from blacks throughout the First Ward neighborhoods.
In the black community, the Pendergast organization operated an
exchange system whereby votes were used as a key element in recovering
and extracting favors. In addition to having the charges dismissed
when blacks were called into district or federal courts, arrested for
violation of some obscure ordinance or finding housing and employment,
it produced one—sided political majorities from the black community
thus maximizing the importance of the black vote. Politically, the
black vote was a very effective tool by which 5lacks at times attempted
61Brown and Dorsett, 119.
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to use it as a weapon to better their economics and social status.
To ensure both the machine’s longevity and ability to elect its people
to public office, the Pendergast machine through its exchange patron
age system paid the black electorate for the use of its votes and, in
return, the machine provided them with goods and services.62 As a
result, the machine was able to forthrightly intensify its efforts
at expanding the organization throughout black communities in Kansas
City.
After Penderdast organized the Jackson County Democratic Party
and Club and his election to the board of Alderman, he faced a con—
tinous political challenge by his opponents competing for political
power. The nature of the opposition to the Pendergast’s machine
by the American Protective Association (A.P.A.), and Joe Shannon over
the use of patronage and power reveals a great deal about why the
machine decided to pause from its other activities and give effective
leadership to counter this opposition. In most instances, opposition
to the politics of the machine led by APA and Joe Shannon threatened
the prestige and power of the machines to appoint blacks to chair
boards and commissions to elect their candidates to political office
and to provide his constituencies with lucrative jobs.
The A.P.A. was politically very active and extremely conservative
and played a very visible and influential role in shaping the course
and direction of politics in the First Ward in Kansas City. The A.P.A.
was vociferously upset with the mode and method of Jim and Tom Pender—
62Fenton, 132—133.
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gast’s efforts to use Catholic, Germans, Irish and especially,
black voters as part of their grand design for organizing and building
their political machine to elect their candidates to office. As such,
the A.P.A. decided to sponsor a candidate and challenge Pendergast in
his subsequent re—election bid to the city council in 1894. Opposi
tion to the machine, however, allowed the A.P.A. to generate support
for its candidates by appealing to racial hostilities of white America
and by opposing preliminary efforts by the Pendergast machine and his
Jackson County Democratic Party to open up the political system by end
ing the degrading practice of systematically disenfranchising blacks,
Germans and Irish participating in the political process. Members of
the Jackson County Democratic Party in 1894 agitated and campaigned
against each other on the race issue raised by the APA and other
matters. Chance and personality contributed to the state of political
confusion on the part of the Democratic Party and its efforts to formu
late a prescribed strategy for neutralizing the personal racial appeal
that attracted whites to support the APA. As local Democrats fought
among themselves on this and other matters, the APA was campaigning
feverishly to unseat Jim Pendergast from the city council and to deny
him and his lower class black electorate constituency base the chance
of influencing politics in Kansas City, Missouri. The Democrats in
Kansas City were fighting among themselves to the extent of running
slates of candidates, one of which offered itself as a reform movement
aimed at attracting the support of the APA and independents for its
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own city council nominee.63 The second slate of candidates backed
by the North End Democratic leaders supported re—election of Jim Pend—
ergast as its party nominee.64 While the Democrats competed against
each other for power, the APA during the Republican Party Conven
tion nominated Regan as its candidate for city council. The Republi
can Party lined up with APA and the Klu Klux Klan to bring political
violence into the 1894 city council election. The rugged nature of
the violence inspired by the Klu Klux Klan and the APA was periodi
cally demonstrated whenever a member of Jim Pendergast’s machine
tried to persuade white voters to change their support of the candi
dates backed by the APA and Republicans to the Democratic or machine
candidate. The brutal form of corporal punishment instituted varied
from mob shootings to mob lynchings of the individuals perceived by
the Republican or APA to be converting their members to support the
programs and politics of Pendergast machine.65
The anti—black character of the APA, the continued political
pressure exerted by the Republican Party to attract white and black
voters away from the machine and the Democratic Party and the call by
reformers to end political corruption ostensibly forced Jim Pendergast
into a balance of power strategy guaranteeing the right of all politi
cal groups and their leaders to share in the allocation of political
63Brown and Dorsett, 16
64Ibid., 110.
65 William Redding, 32—33.
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patronage. To offset the politcal thrust of the APA, Pendergast
forged an alliance with Joe Shannon, the political czar of the 9th
Ward, and with the independent nonpartisan ticket headed by a Demo
cratic labor leader by the name of Frank Johnson.66
A closer analysis of the 1894 city council election showed that
Frank Johnson was unsuccessful in his electoral campaign and failed
even to make a close race of it. Johnson finished in third place
with 137 votes, Pendergast received 687 votes while his Republican
opponent Regan got 212 votes. Charges and countercharges of vote
fraud in the election were levied by Johnson and Regan against Pender—
gast, Shannon and others vying to maintain their power and control
over the political process in Kansas City.
The declining status of Jim Pendergast’s health due to Bright’s
kidney disease was the chief reason he decided to resign from the
city council. The need to continue with the operation of the machine
led Jim to ask his brother, Tom, to run for his council seat. To
pave the way for Tom’s entry into the city council political cam
paign, Jim had brought his younger brother along through the intri
cacies of city politics, “. . . and as the end approached, he recom
mended the apprentice to his associates. When he retired, he asked
his followers to take Tom; he’ll make a fine city councilman and
he’ll be good to the boys.”67 After his resignation, Jim devoted the
66Dorsett, 16.
67Brown and Dorsett, 122.
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remainder of his life to his liquor, construction and ready—mixed
concrete companies, and explored possible ways to assist his brother,
Tom, and expand his political machine beyond the three or four wards
they controlled in Kansas City. Strategically, Tom Pendergast was
able to accomplish his goal of expanding the base of the machine by
building an organization in the low income black neighborhoods of
the First Ward and the middle to higher income neighborhoods of
Quality Hill. The major technique of expanding the Pendergast machine
was the creation of political clubs in each of the wards of Kansas
City, Missouri.68 Tom was wise enough to realize that he could not
enlist the services of ward and precinct captains in the residential
wards by giving them baskets of food and buckets of coal, for they
already had those things.69 The scope and magnitude of this plan was to
link these clubs up to the Jackson Democratic Club charged with the
responsibility for networking and dissimilating information to and
from each area. These political clubs functioning throughout the
First Ward neighborhoods performed the task of integrating the black
electorate into electoral process, but, perniciously, only election
time. These clubs were very active throughout Kansas City, and the
First Ward was a mechanism for providing a social milieu for the
supporters of the machine.70
68Ibjd., 190.
69Dorsett, 112.
70Brown and Dorsett, 82—83.
• i .L4 JiURthiMLLW~. L 4 - C - — —
117
Baseball and bowling leagues, dinners, picnics, parties, and
bridge parties were supported by these clubs for men and women to
entertain themselves. These political gatherings were sponsored
bi—monthly. It was hoped that through this process, the clubs
organized by the Pendergast machine would provide a social outlet
for blacks who otherwise could not economically afford the cost of
attending or belonging to the more expensive and prestigious country
clubs in Kansas City. In return for those who reaped the social
benefits from the organization’s clubs, the black electorate was
asked by Jim Pendergast’s machine to help elect its candidates elec
tions, by passing out campaign literature and one election day calling
its friends to vote for the slate of candidates backed by the Pender—
gast machine.7’
Between 1899 and 1910, the social, political and economic status
of blacks became further subordinated as Jim Pendergast used the
black vote as a weapon to support the election of James A. Reed for
mayor. The machine’s support of Reed as a candidate for mayor had
its beginnings in the 1898 Jackson County election when Jim Pendergast
welded together an efficient organization of blacks, who lived and
worked in the First Ward to elect the young lawyer to the office of
prosecuting attorney, on the Pendergast slate.72 During the time that
Jim Pendergast was developing and expanding his political organization
71Dorsett, 82—83.
72Mitchell, 9—10.
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into the black community, Reed’s high intelligence, his oratory
skills and his innate courage to express his convictions brought him
immediate success and favor among politicians in Kansas City, Mis
souri. While Pendergast used the black electorate as a means for
elevating his prestige and power far above the general level of his
adversaries, at no time did he include within this political thrust
an attempt to end the practice of excluding blacks from participating
in the labor force. The association of the black electorate with the
Pendergast organization and its moral candidate, Jim Reed, help the
organization expand its influence far beyond the periphery of the
city. The election of James Reed took on such an importance because
for the first time the black electorate would be mobilized by the
machine under the direction of Pendergast to play an active entre
preneurial role within the political system. The unique facilitation
of such a cumbersome discourse entailed Jim Pendergast’s asking Joe
Domico, the boss of the Italian ward, to mobilize his constituents to
support Reed for mayor. On the other hand, Mike Heim was asked by
Jim to make campaign speeches and drink beer and wine with his German
population in order to persuade or influence them to vote
according.73
In the black community, the Pendergast machine took on the image
of a traditional political machine competing for the support of its
73Dorsett, 29.
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ethnic base. Talking politics, voter registration drives and old
fashion shaking hands door to door were carried out by Joe Shannon,
Tom Pendergast and Cas Welch, a white ward political boss of the
black community. Welch had a large group of black ward leaders can
vassing the black community charged by him with the specific respon
sibility of buying the black electorate drinks and giving them money
in exchange for their votes. When Welch became justice of the peace
in 1910, his sympathy for poor black and white litigants won their
support.74 Conversely, other white ward political leaders paid blacks
in exchange for their votes under assumed names; and when election
judges questioned these blacks they themselves were intimidated and
abused, both verbally and physically.75 The black electorate was told
by Pendergast and his white ward political bosses that a vote for James
Reed for mayor meant less police interference with their right to
engage in illicit traffic of gambling and prostitution.76
Opposition to Jim Pendergast’s selection of James Reed for
mayor of Kansas City was led by Joe Shannon the political boss of the
Ninth Ward and William Nelson, owner of the Kansas City white morning
newspaper, the Kansas City Star. While James and Tom Pendergast
74Larry H. Gaothaus, “The Negro in Missouri Politics, 1890—1944”
(Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Missouri—Columbia,
1970), 16, 17, 23, and 24.
75Pendergast, 60.
76Ibid., 15.
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mobilized the black electorate as part of their lower class constitu
tency base, Shannon, on the other hand, in 1892 was serving as a
policeman, and delegate to the Democratic National Convention, and
was attending business and law schools. Joe Shannon made his greatest
strides in Kansas City as boss of the Ninth Ward. On some occasions,
Shannon supported the Pendergast machine between 1880 and 1901 during
the local campaigns, however, the quest by the machine to nominate
James Reed as mayor allowed Shannon to build up his rival political
factional association with Nelson to contest Pendergast in the 1900
Kansas City mayoral election. To integrate and manage factional
dissent most industriously, the machine entered into a fifty—fifty
accord with Joe Shannon and his organization. They agreed that if
one or the other couldn’t accept a particular candidates, each would
run his own choice in the primary, but would back the winner.77
Joe Shannon emerged at a time when the machine had just begun to
take the initiative to consolidate its power in the First Ward patro
nized by low income blacks, most of whom lived and worked there and
experienced perennial problems of overcrowded living conditions. Joe
Shannon and Jim Pendergast were commonly known by these inhabitants
as the Rabbits and the Goats. The Goat label had been pinned on the
the Pendergast faction because poor Irish families residing in the
West Bottoms neighborhood of Kansas City kept goats for their milk
supply. Across town where Joe Shannon lived and worked in the O.K.
77Alfred Steinberg, 312.
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Creek Valley neighborhood, rabbits roamed wild. As a result of
rabbits in the area, the name became synonymous with Joe Shannon.78
Under the mantle and direction of Shannon, alliances were formed with
anti—Reed and Pendergast forces living in Independence, Missouri, as
a technique for broadening their base of political support, resources
and contacts. The engineering of this process was politically astute
for it allowed him to spread his influence and organizational politics
and structure into an area that traditionally was considered by pro
fessional politicians to have been off limits. The character of this
support was based on a white conservative community that became
alarmed as Pendergant’s support of the growing black population and
his insistence on using his organization as a vehicle for providing
them with a much needed link between the governed and the governors.79
Chance, personality and competition by Joe Shannon for the right
to share in the distribution of political patronage and the failure
to reach an accord between his organization and the Pendergast machine
Co elect a compromise candidate for mayor other than James Reed contri
buted to the bitter factional disorder between both organizations at
the expense of the Pendergast machine.
In most instances, opposition to Reed’s candidacy by Shannon
and his organization threatened the Pendergast machine’s prestige and
its power to appoint its loyal supporters to chair boards, and com




elect whomever it chose, to hold political office. To the machine,
the most important consideration was not that James Reed was opposed
by Joe Shannon and his organization but how effectively this opposi
tion could be conducted. Factionalism articulated within the politi
cal boss or neighborhoods of the Pendergast machine can be much more
disruptive than the factionalism that Joe Shannon expressed outside
the machine’s political boundary areas. Distinctions are made between
opposition by certain members who perform a certain function and
opposition due to the nature of specific policies. In most instances,
opposition to the politics of the machine was categorized on substan
tive grounds. To help control factional dissent, such as that which
was articulated by Shannon, the Pendergast machine used several
techniques available to the organization leadership in its resolve to
attempt to neutralize Shannon and to try to prevent the emergence of
new factions. First, there was the technique of rewarding those who
supported or at least did not oppose the machine. Secondly, there
was the technique of integrating those opposed to a particular policy
or decision by entering into negotiation and promising to divide
political patronage on an equal footing. Thirdly, there was the
technique for punishing those who opposed the political machine and
its balance of power sharing plan. These rewards include such things
as contracts and licences, regional allocations of public funds and
grants, and loans for modern amenities (sewer systems, bridges) and,
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for the development of the city’s infrastracture (communication,
energy, roads, transportation facilities).80
In any event, the problem of inducing a dissenter such as Joe
Shannon to support the Pendergast machine mayoralty candidate is based
upon the notion that “individuals in a large aggregate will not volun
tarily pay for the cost of collective goods even if they are all
rational men and are aware that they will receive individual benefits
from these goods.”8’
Strategically, both Joe Shannon and Jim Pendergast with the aid
of his black electorate constitutency base had different strategies
for nominating their candidates for mayor of Kansas City, Missouri.
Shannon wanted the nomination to be made by the delegates attending
the Democratic Party Convention by primary ballot. Jim Pendergast,
on the other hand, saw Shannon’s tactic as a play for stripping the
machine of its power to nominate candidates and to reduce the number
of blacks who historically came out during electoral campaigns to
nominate their candidates during the primary.82 To resolve this
procedural question, the Democratic City Center Committee (D.C.C.C.)
became the depositing authority for referring this most important
80Samuel P. Huntington, Politics in Modern Society (New York:
Basic Books, Inc., 1970), 3.
81Marcus Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods
and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1956), 70.
82Dorsett, 13.
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political subject. The D.C.C.C. became the chief arbitrator of the
dispute because both men belonged to the committee. The D.C.C.C.
ruled in Pendergast’s favor because of his legal challenge that the
people of Kansas City, Missouri, have a sole vested responsibility
for choosing the people it deemed qualified to represent their
interest.
Concerned about the support given by D.C.C.C. and the black elec
torate to the Pendergast backed mayoralty candidate, Joe Shannon in
structed his organization to support the former mayor of Kansas City,
Missouri, George M. Shelley for mayor. The strength of the Pendergast
machine during the election was quite noticeable given the extent to
which as a precinct organization it was able to mobilize the black
electorate to campaign and to go to the polls and vote for James Reed
as mayor. The results of the mayoralty campaign showed that Reed
carried every ward in Kansas City except ward sixty—one out of a grand
total of 1000 votes cast that he lost in the political domain of Joe
Shannon’s Ninth Ward. A cursory exploration of Reed’s plurarity vote
will show that he received a substantial amount of support from the
black electorate of the Fifth Ward with the help of the Pendergast
machine. In the Fifth Ward, Reed received 440 votes compared to the 18
votes his opponent George M. Shelley received. In the Second Ward,
Shelley earned 44 votes while Reed got 440. Of the estimated 438 votes
that were cast by the voters of the Sixth Ward, Reed got 348.83
____ 29.
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Pendergast hoped that this strategy would indeed strengthen the
organization and Reed’s political chances of winning additional votes.
After successfully backing James A. Reed for prosecutor and then for
mayor with the help of the black electorate, and with a friendly
governor in Jefferson City, Pendergast was almost unchallengeable
anywhere in Jackson County. Pendergast and his organization were able
to gain the support of the black electorate in the mayoral and munici
pal elections by protecting the civil rights of blacks in Kansas City
and the state of Missouri when rural and out—of—state Democrats
attempted to pass discriminatory legislation. State legislators from
Kansas City refused to support the measures. When the out—of—state—
Confederate wing of the party urged a ballot reform measure that
would have disenfranchised blacks and depreciated political alliances
with blacks, Joe Shannon defended his association with black voters
as did Mike Ross, a Pendergast ally. Only when Jim Pendergast was
sick could Kansas City independent Democrats, who had won temporary
control of the local party, urge disenfranchisement in the state.
When Jim recovered shortly thereafter, he suppported the black elec
torate and killed a proposed ordinance in Kansas City which would
have called for the segregation of public transportation.84 In 1910,
when Joe Shannon was state chairman of the party, Democrats pledged
in their platform that they would never discriminate against blacks
84Grothaus, Negroes in Missouri, 16, 17, 23, 24.
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by legislation or disenfranchisement.85 Support by Jim Pendergast
and his organization against the proposed ordinance to segregate
transportation facilities and to continue to elect its candidates to
public office gained the support of black electorate and increased
the political influence of his organization in local and state
politics. As a result, he was able to control over a hundred jobs
on the police force, a goodly number in the fire department, and
could get his backers at one of the city’s largest breweries and
in the Metropolitan Street Railway Company to hire men who needed
employment. Part of Jim Reed’s pay off to the Pendergast machine
was to name Jim’s younger brother, Tom, to the position of Super—
intendent~of the Department of Streets where he employed over 200
men to assist him. Moreover, Pendergast asked James Reed to employ
blacks as firemen in the fire department.86 On the other hand, Pen—
dergast’s man was appointed as the city’s deputy license inspector,
an important job because saloon and other business establishments
needed licenses to function. By 1902, Pendergast had named 123 of
the 172 patrolmen on the police force. This alliance of Pendergast
and Reed provided each with the political opportunity for advancing
their political interest in state and local politics. Reed used the
mayoralty as a position from which to bid for state and national
85Larry H. Grothaus, “Kansas City Blacks,” 67.
86Dennjs R. Judd, The Politics of American Cities: Private
Power and Public Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 58.
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office, while Pendergast benefited from Reed’s command of patronage
and his campaigning abilities.87 During the 1902 election, both
Jim Pendergast and Joe Shannon under the fifty—five rule supported
Tom’s candidacy to become a deputy marshall for the county. The
support rendered by both political organizations had been the frame
work utilized to integrate their voter constituency base into Tom’s
deputy county marshall campaign. Tom’s familiarity with the function
and operation of county government due to his tenure as a member of
the executive steering and policy committee of the Democractic County
Committee in 1896 contributed to his political victory and broad
base of support whereby he was elected by a 5,240 vote majority.88
The period between 1902 and 1904 allowed Tom to adjudicate
and refine his law enforcement capabilities while at the same time
giving the Pendergast machine added name recognition. Subsequently,
in 1904 and 1906, Tom received the Democratic county machine nomina
tion as a candidate again for the county marshall post. Unlike his
previous landslide victory in 1894, he was soundly defeated by a
Republican landslide with black support from other areas. As a
deputy county marshall of Jackson County, and later as marshall
of Jackson County between 1904—1906, Tom Pendergast was able to gain
the respect and support of the black electorate for several reasons.
Through its weekly newspaper, the Kansas City Call, the support given




statement about politicians and their innate ability to govern
local municipalities.
Mr. Pendergast’s term as marshall established a new
era in penal progress. He stood for the Negro as
well as the white man. No cruel treatment of pri
soners. No jail scandals. Let us try him again.89
Between 1906 and 1910, Tom Pendergast’s election and defeat as a
deputy county marshall provided him with the fortitous chance of
learning from his older brother how to master the art and science of
political organizing and mobilizing the black electorate to support
those candidates backed by the machine. Secondly, blacks generally
went along with the machine because Tom in his capacity as marshall
went to great extent to improve relations between the sheriff and the
black prisoners. Black laborers felt at ease being employed during
his leadership. Bestowing these favors upon blacks allowed Tom
Pendergast and his organization to extend their power base in Kansas
City and as a power to be reckoned with.
Before the l870’s and 188O’s and the advent of the Pendergast
machine, neither the Republican or Democratic party had a permanent
political organization based in the black community. This is primar
ily due to the lack of political leadership by both parties and their
organizations’ devoting an inordinate amount of their time, resources
and manpower to organizational development, recruitment and retention
of party members and catering to the concerns of blacks in Kansas
City, Missouri. These voters directly faced prejudice and discrimina—
89Ibid., 43—44.
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tion, within the Pendergast machine. The political implications
of this alliance infuriated members of the Republican party to the
extent that they began a systematic campaign of terror as a way of
intimidating and eliminating blacks from the political process. To
respond to this impending challenge, blacks living in the First Ward
neighborhoods held a meeting in 1890 in which they adopted a resolu
tion which stated that
it shall henceforth not be considered unrepub—
lican or wanting in patriotism for the black elec
torate to work for or vote for the election of only
such candidates for office as he had good cause to
believe are friendly to the recognition and repre
sentation of his people in public office in the
ratio of their numerical strength and qualifica
tions for preferment. The seriousness of such a
threat can no more be measured than its motivation.
A week after the meeting, the Republicans nominated
a black who was close to one of the movers of the
resolution for the position of alderman in the
council’s upper house. Many leading Democrats were
more openly racist than Republicans, and in any
event even as late as 1912, black registration ac
counted for only one—fifteeth of the city’s electo
rate. Of the total population, blacks made up
about a tenth.9°
Lack of a permanent Democratic Club or organization to attract
the black electorate to support its policies and programs until the
advent of the lS9O’s and the dismemberment of the Republican party
due to fractional discord and strife was such that it could seldom
work efficiently at providing even a ceremonial challenge to Pender—
gast’s power let along his charisma.91




Agitation on the part of the black electorate to get the Demo
cratic and Republican party officials to respond to their concerns
emphasized such issues as relationships with the police and educa
tional facilities to a large degree weakened its alliances to both
political organizations. The disappointment of the black electorate
with both parties enabled the Pendergast machine to attract black
support for his political machine.92 The support it received allowed
the machine to develop as a result of the lack of political organiza—
tion. Both the Democratic and Republican party leaders came and went
with the annual city elections because many of them were businessmen
with only an incidental interest in local politics.93
Even though Jim and Tom Pendergast continued to elect their
candidates to public office with the support of the black electo
rate,94 the period between 1913 and 1920 held out small hopes of social
and economic improvement for blacks in the neighborhoods where the
machine functioned. By 1913, the Board of Public Welfare in Kansas
City, Missouri, published a report entitled ~‘A Social Prospective of
Kansas City” and described the West Bottoms area where many blacks
had been living as “lacking in decent housing, churches, schools, but
well saturated with saloons and brothels and almost monopolizing the





city’s illiteracy.95 So bad were the condi:ions that the Missouri
Association for Social Welfare in a related study reported in 1914
that, “so much of the problem lies in the unthinking, inconsiderate
attitude of white people that no specific remedies for present
conditions can be proposed which in themselves offer help for blacks
living in Pendergast’s neighborhoods.”96
Kansas City during the early years of the twentieth century
“emerged as a roughly crystallized social structure with a social
and business white elite at the top, a large number of blacks living
in the area in which Pendergast settled, whose daily bread was most
often insecured on the bottom.”97 There is considerable amount of
research data on Kansas City, Missouri which suggest that even though
the black electorate supported Jim Pendergast and his political
organization, they were forced to develop a community increasingly
separate from the dominant white one. Refusal of the dominant whites
to accept the black supporters of the Pendergast machine into the
political and social life of the broader community simply intensified
their practical difficulties. These black electorates, as Dorsey and
Brown discovered in their research on Kansas City, Missouri, experi
enced more segregation and discrimination prevalent during the early
part of the twentieth century than they had thirty years early. In
addition, they argued that
95Greene, Holland and Kremer, 17.
96Brown and Dorsett, 114.
97Ibid., 114—115.
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thirty years early. In addition, they argued that
Theaters had always segregated audiences, but
until around 1903 the accomodations offered blacks
were as good as those offered whites. Now most of
the city’s theaters began to restrict tickets for
blacks to the balcony seats. Black and white
teachers had associated freely at teachers meet
ings, but beginning in 1904 the black teachers were
assigned a separate block of seats at the auditorium
where these meetings took place. Black organizations
found it increasingly difficult to rent halls for
their meetings. They began to think of building
their own hall shortly after 1900 when they found
that Turner Hall would no longer be available to
them.
Black were being slowly excluded from occupat—
tions which many of them had formerly held. White
barbers displaced black barbers, the downtown
hotels employed fewer and fewer black waiters and
bell—boys, and the number o f Afro—American nurses
for white children declined drastically. At a ban—
banquet in 1905 a prominent black educator, J.
Dallas Bowser, warned his hearers that the position
of the Afro—American in Kansas City life was actu
ally growing worse. He was supported by a collea
gue, A. 0. Coffin who had studied recent real
estate and housing developments and found them more
restrictive then ever. Nelson Crews, the most prom
inent black politician at the time, took issue with
Bowser and Coffin, as did the editor of The Rising
Sun. They pointed to the growth of wealth ai~d
business enterprise among Kansas City blacks, but
in the end had to concede that “we are not merging
into Saxon social life.” In the midst of urban
economic growth and changing forms of community
organization, blacks remained closed to “bedrock”
than the Commercial Club speaker who had used the
work in describing the constructive tasks which he
discerned on Kansas City’s agenda.98
In the period betwen 1914 and 1918, Pendergast continued to
expand his organization and influence in local and state politics
with the support of black electorate. During these years, blacks
98Ibid., 97.
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still had very little political influence in Kansas City, Missouri.
At best, all blacks could hope for was a small political job from
the Republicans. Out of gratitude, the black electorate largely
supported the Republican Party.99 Even though the Republicans did
very little for blacks, the Democrats did even less. By the 1920’s,
Pendergast and his organization had gained the support of the black
community by throwing his organization behind a black candidate who
was opposed by a white Democrat. Some of the workers in the organi
zation rallied support to the machine by reminding the voters that
blacks were given many jobs by the organization.’°° The Kansas City
Call newspaper wrote an editorial and reminded voters that “a debt
of gratitude is owed Pendergast for finding jobs for blacks, who re
presented a small segment of the state’s population in number and
influence.”0’ The jobs Pendergast got for members of the black
community were diverse. There were the caretaker jobs, of course,
but soon as the machine gained control of the city government in
1926, two black physicians were given posts in the city’s hospital
and in the Health Department.’°2 In fact, the Democratic Party in
Kansas City and throughout the state was opposed to the black elec
torate being employed in the building industry, as waiters, janitors,




and helpers in retail stores and the meat—packing industry.’03 The
black electorate faced prejudice and discrimination in its effort
to participate as electorates within the Republican Party. From the
early 1890’s blacks in Kansas City had not received the recognition
of a party nomination, but finally in 1918 William C. Hueston was
selected by the black community to run for the city council. The
Republican Party became upset and blamed the selection of Hueston on
the “boss faction” led by Thomas R. Marks. Both the all white daily
newspaper, Kansas City Star and Matthew Foster, Commissioner on the
Board of Police, opposed William C. Hueston’s nomination on the
grounds that someone from Kansas City’s south and white side should
have been selected. 104 Opposition by Foster and the Kansas City Star
contributed to the Hueston’s defeat and lack of white support for his
election to the city council.
During the mayoral and city council election in 1922, the black
electorate supported Theron B. Watkins, a black, who ran as an inde
pendent when the Republican Party refused to nominate a black for the
city council post. After the party refused to nominated or endorse
Theron B. Watkins for city council, Nelson Crews, publisher of the
Kansas City Star newspaper and city council candidate, William C.
Hueston denounced the Republican candidate, Matthew Foster, as a
racist who had refused to run with Hueston in 1918. 105




Even though the black electorate of Kansas City, Missouri,
supported the Republican ticket, blacks figured significantly in the
defeat of candidates backed by the Democratic Party. Many of them
supported Watkins in his successful bid, and some urged on by Dr.
William J. Thompkins and the Central Black Democratic Organization
supported the Democrats.’06 Before the election, “William J. Thomp—
kins predicted that the black electorate in Kansas City would desert
the Republican ticket since more and more blacks are coming to under
stand that the Democratic Party is the organization that stands for
the welfare of the mass of the people.”’07 The impact of black elec
torate participation in the election of candidates to public office
revealed itself also, in congressional contests in those districts
with a large black population. 108
The black newspaper publisher, community activist, Republican
and influential leader of the black community, Nelson Crews sup
ported Watkins and the Democratic mayoralty nominee, James Jones
for at least two reasons. First, Crews wanted to elect someone to
public office who would work to improve the social and economic
conditions of the black electorate in Kansas City. Crews, one
of the most prominent black politicians at the time, argued that in






forms of community organizations in Kansas City, Missouri, the black
electorate continued to remain closed to bedrock bottom.’°9
Secondly, as an influential leader of the black community, Crews
supported James Jones as the Democratic nominee for mayor because of
efforts by Jones and the prosecuting attorney, Frank Lowe, to end
the prostitution, bribery and gambling in Kansas City which was
protected by the police department. Pendergast was able to gain
police protection in his saloon with the support he received from
Marcy K. Brown, a factional and influential county leader in Kansas
City and Jackson County politics. During the late 1920’s, Marcy
Brown began pressuring then Governor Stone to appoint a new board of
police commissions and to fire Thomas M. Speers as chief of police
and replace him with L. E. Irwin as the new police Commissioner.
Organizationally, the control of the police by the state of Missouri
is constitutionally achieved through the board of public commissioners
appointed by the governor. This board constitutionally has the
responsibility to establish salaries for members of the police force
and to hire and to fire the chief of police and all other subordinates
employed within the police department. Governor Stone appointed a
new board of police commissioners and they immediately began to
acquiese to the pressure by Marcy Brown and fired Thomas Spears.
Thomas Spears provided Marcy Brown with the chance to form an alli
ance with Pendergast and his political machine to ensure her politi—
109Brown and Dorsett, 97.
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cal survival and influence in the county and state politics. This
coalition was based on quid pro quo, that the Pendergast machine
would encourage the black electorate to support Brown’s election to a
county position and in return for this favor, she was to use her
influence to get the police to sanction her gambling operations. In
addition, Brown was to grant Pendergast the right to control, through
the appointment process, members of the police force as a precau
tionary measure for monitoring Brown’s activity and to enforce a
campaign pledge to the black community to end police brutality which
was a serious problem before Pendergast gained control of the police
department. Although Brown’s alliance with the machine afforded
Pendergast the opportunity to keep his gambling room opened, the
cooperation evoked political dissent to the gambling by a Kansas
City, Missouri, police judge by the name of James Jones. Both the
APA and the Republican Party in their effort to compete against Jim
Pendergast during the 1896 mayor and city council election used the
gambling and race issues to drive a wedge between the machine and
its supporters.
Because of James Jones’ name recognition and his highly visible
oppositon to gambling in Kansas City, the APA Republicans nominated
Jones for mayor and he ran on a platform which pledged to run Ed.
Findley, the gamekeeper at Pendergast’s two saloons, out of Kansas
City.’1° While the APA supported Jones for mayor, a political battle
was being played out between Joe Shannon and James Pendergast in the
~0Dorsett, 19.
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black community over the choice of prosecutor for Jackson County.
Although Pendergast and his organization supported James Reed, the
victory went to Frank Lowe from the 10th district and to the Shannon
organization, which worked hard to win during the political contest.
Lowe’s electoral campaign, though based on the immorality and illegal
ity of gambling, soon became the structure he used to garner support
in his quest to further challenge the power and influence of the
Pendergast machine. During the campaign, Lowe promised that if he
were elected as the prosecutor, he would use the labor and power of
his office to apprehend and arrest those blacks or organizations
engaged in the illicity trade of gambling, and prostitution and to
work concomitantly with the newly elected mayor, James Jones and his
bid against the police—protected gambling at Jim Pendergast’s saloons.
The anti—boss force in Kansas City in 1922 urged the Republican Gover
nor, Arthur M. Hyde, to support James Jones and Frank Lowe in their
campaign to “make it tough on the . . . crap shooting Negroes who
should either get jobs or get out of town.”’~ Mayor Jones believed
that the only way to effectively take the police department from under
the mantle control of Jim Pendergast was to constitutionally enact a
series of laws by the Missouri State Legislature to grant municipal
home rule, a power which historically was given to the state by its
constitution of 1875 for all cities with populations of 100,000 or
over to draw up their own charters. This charter then could be
enacted by a three—fifths majority rule vote. Kansas City received
‘1~Dorsett, 19. See also Grothaus, 69.
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its home rule in 1889.112 Agitation on the part of Crews for home
rule cautioned the machine to wonder whether or not he represented
a crack in his control over the black electorate and whether Jones
with the black leadership could attract the necessary numbers politi
cally and challenge his power and influence in the black community.113
Economic and social conditions of the black electorate and the
changing forms of community organizations contributed to the belief
by Nelson Crews that neither Jim Pendergast nor his political machine
was going go elevate the economic status of blacks nor was it going
to grant them the power to break free from the shackles of boss
politics. Providing home rule was conceptualized by Crews as part of
the machination process for dismantling the power of the machine, and
thereby providing the opportunity for blacks to gain political
empowerment.
In his attempt to moderate Jones and Crews’criticism of the
police department, Pendergast ordered his chief of police, L. E.
Irwin, to raid his saloons in order to counter the criticism lodged
by Crews, Jones and the Kansas City Star newspaper. The gamblers
did not like the pressure of the police, but when the police raided
a black club at least 106 times without even obtaining a conviction,
the issue was no longer gambling. The issue was persecution, and
‘‘2James W. S. Peters, “Home Rule Charter Movements in Missouri
with Special Reference to K.C.,” Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science (January 1906), XXVII, p. 156.
‘13Ibid., p. 112.
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the Republicans with using the police force for political purposes. 114
According to Dorsett,
under home rule, as long as Pendergast and his or
ganizational controlled the city government, he
could dictate the policies of the department,even
if a Republican governor were in the state house
• . • . Many illegitimate business profitted from
the Pendergast police force because gambling and
other forms of crime were protected. But legiti
mate businesses profitted too.1’5
At best, Irwin’s token and remedial responses to the growth of prosti
tution, bribery, and gambling in the black community were undoubted
geared largely toward managing public discontent about the image of
their police department while on the other hand sanctioning state
interference, machine control of political party nominations, contract
graft, election frauds, apathy of the electorate, an imaginative role
of the city of servant, and the corruption of the police.’16
The entrenched and corrupt political practices employed by the
machine to elect and mobilize the black electorate to defeat home rule
and support it policies and practices and to appoint officials in
Kansas City to public office grew, according to Alfred Hodder in his
book, A Fight for the City, out of a need to sanction profit and
opportunity. He exclaims that
There are laws on the . . . book which were
never intended by the men who passed them to be en
forced, and which the people will not allow to be
114Larry Grothaus, 77.
115Lyle W. Dorsett, 114.
“6Ernest S. Griffith, A History of American City Government:
The Conspicuous Failure 1870—1900 (New York: Praeger Pub., 1974), 249.
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enforced; the law prohibiting the opening of the
Pendergast saloon on Sunday, the law prohibiting the
gambling and the law prohibiting prostitution.
Public opinion demands the passage of these laws;
and it enforces both demands at the polls. The
results are evident. The mayor, the chief of police,
L. E. Irwin, and every white and black patrolman
from the day they are sworn in must choose between a
violation of their oath of office on the one side
and on the other an enforcement of these laws. The
one is perjury, the other is political suicide.
If they choose political suicide, there need be
nothing further said of them by any one; they cease
to count. If they choose perjury, they find them-
selves in position of singular power.11’
Opposition to gambling, graft and prostitution by Crews, Jones
and others did not deter the black electorate from supporting.
Pendergast and his stance against home rule. For example, the black
electorate was impressed when Alderman Jim took the time and effort
to put up bail bond when Irwin raided the Pendergast saloon and
arrested its patrons.’’8 With the support of the black electorate,
Pendergast was able to defeat the proposal by Crew and Jones to bring
home rule to Kansas City, Missouri, which for the most part, would
have challenged his power.119 In 1905, he teamed up with Frank
Shannon to defeat a proposed new charter which would have facili
tated the closing of the saloon.’20 After losses to the Pendergast
‘17Alfred Hodder, A Fight for the City (New York: Praegar Pub.,
1903), 63—67.
‘18Dorsett, 49.




organization in the election of 1924 and 1925, Shannon wisely settled
for a junior partnership in Tom’s machine. Under Pendergast, leader
ship, the new and united PendergastShanflOn organization commanded
unprecedented power with the support of the white ward boss, Cass
Welch, and of colored organizers among the city’s black residents.
By 1924, according to the Kansas City Call, at least 42 percent of
the black electorate in Kansas City voted in support of Democratic
candidates competing against the Republican Party for public
office. 121
The prevailing pattern of blacks and politics in Kansas City,
Missouri, in 1924, was clearly discernible as the state began a second
century of statehood. The black population then, constituted a mere
5.5 percent of the total population. The Republican and Democratic
parties drew heavily upon the old Anglo—Saxon elements for electoral
support. The Republicans gained ethnic diversity by adding blacks
to their primary constituency base.’22
The demographic design that provided the foundation for a rural—
urban political machine also constituted the basis for a diversified,
but balanced, agricultural and industrial economy. According to the
fourteenth census, 53.4 percent of the state’s 3,404,055 residents
lived in the rural area and 46.6 percent were urban dwellers. Approx
imately 70 percent of Missouri’s 1,586,903 urban population lived in
‘21Mitchell, 101.
1221bid. , 5—6.
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Kansas City and St. Louis, Missouri.’23 A majority of Kansas City,
Missouri residents in 1920 (62.5) was classified by the U.S. Census
as native whites and native white parentage.’24 During this period
the Republican Party was able to regain some of their losses among
the black voters, but the gains were not made until the general elec
tion. Social and cultural issues dominated the general elections,
but they affected the Democrats more than the Republicans. The
Democratic Party nominated Arthur W. Nelson for governor in 1924,
whom the Republicans charged with being a member of the Klu Klux Klan.
Nelson admitted that in the past he attended their meeting but vehe
mently denied being a member of the organization. The denial by Nelson
allowed Pendergast and his organization to endorse the candidacy of
Nelson.’25 However, the conviction of old and new black citizens
alike that a vote for Nelson would be a vote for the Klu Klux Klan
was reflected in the gains Republicans posted in the black com
munity.126 In other words, where Democrats had polled a majority
of the votes in the 1920 and 1922 election’s, the black vote helped
erase or diminish the traditional Democratic margin and even Cass
Welch was unable to influence the outcome of the black vote on this oc
casion. Editorally, the Kansas City Times newspaper reported that the






held even or carried were going hell bent Republican.”’27 The black
electorate feared Klan support of Arthur W. Nelson because the Klan
had been advocating black disenfranchisement in Kansas City, Mis
souri.128 The Democratic Party in Kansas City, Missouri, attempted
to recover from the defeat of Nelson in the 1924 election by distancing
itself from the Klu Klux Klan and returning to the broader social and
cultural views of the people of Kansas City, Missouri. There were at
three events contributng to the Democratic Party, “regaining its
strength and support from the black electorate during this period.”29
First, the black electorate was unhappy with Republicans who contin
ued to publicly deny them patronage and segregated them when they at
tended their political meetings. Secondly, Pendergast and his organ
ization assisted the black electorate in its campaigns to rehabil
itate the construction in its physical territory. The delay in
the building of a second G~nera1 Hospital to cater to the health
care of blacks gave rise to condemnation of city manager, Henry
McElroy, by the leadership of the black community. Periodic meetings
with the city manager failed to break the impass and they appealed to
Pendergast to intervene given the nature of the problem and especially
since the first General Hospital did not provide medical service to
the blacks. Given the history of Pendergast opposition to the Klu
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tuency base to elect his candidates to office, Pendergast stepped
in and ordered that the hospital be completed and that its adminis
tration employ William J. Thompkins, a black, as its first super
intendent. The appointment of Dr. Thompkins to a city hospital
position helped to reunite black Democratic forces, and they responded
to the party’s continued attacks against the Klu Klux Klan and police
brutality.130 And thirdly, the black electorate supported the Demo
cratic Party as a result of Tom Pendergast and the efforts of the Demo
cratic Party to support the efforts of Charles Lee, the State Superin
tendent of Schools, who endorsed and agitated for state support of
Lincoln University in Jefferson City, Missouri. It was hoped that the
superintendent’s support of this undergraduate institution would allow
the black community to improve the quality of health care, employment,
training and educational skills for its children. 131 In March 1925,
health care was still a problem for blacks. During the Negro Health
Week, the Secretary of Missouri’s Negro Industrial Commission, Robert
S. Cobb, estimated 13,000 of Missouri’s Negroes were ill all of the
time and their annual loss in earnings was approximately $1,350,000.
The problems of inadequate health care for blacks in Kansas City,
Missouri, contributed to an excessive death rate caused by tuberculo
sis and associated diseases, ignorance of health laws, poverty, envi
ronment, and the migration of blacks to urban areas. Futhermore,
~-30Larry Grothaus, 73
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most white doctors refused to treat them and white hospitals refused
to admit them.132
Pendergast and the Democratic Party were able to continue receiv
ing black support by creating a hospital to treat blacks exposed to
tuberculosis and a juvenile reform institution. As a result, the
black electorate responded during the municipal election by giving
forty percent of its votes to the Democrats. Pendergast and his organ
ization continued to mobilize the black community to elect its candi
dates to public office throughout Kansas City, Missouri, in 1924 and
again in 1925 when Kansas City adoped a new charter. The charter
centralized city administration for greater efficiency. It provided
the city manager with great administrative authority as long as a
majority of the city council would back him. It drew the local white
and black electorate closer together into four large districts super
imposed upon the existing wards, which continued to exist but not as
units of representation in the council. 133 Although party designa
tions could no longer appear on the ballots, the black electorate
knew that there were in effect two slates: one Democratic and one
Republican.134 Pendergast and his organization apparently sensed the
charter’s likely passage. In February 1925 when the Kansas City
voters went to the polls and voted 37,519 to 8,832 to place the
132Greene, Holland and Kremer, 21.
133Larry Grothaus, 74.
‘34Brown and Dorsettt, 196—197.
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city under a mayor—council manager government, only Shannon’s Ninth
Ward returned a margin of only 200 votes against it.’35 The charter
culminated what could be called a quarter—century—long municipal
reform movement in Kansas City.
For too long, the reform movement talked and wrote about the
support it had from lawyers, businessmen, Protestant clergymen, Repub
licans and Democrats to end the corruption politics of the Pendergast
machine. Perhaps the most striking statistical features of the reform
movement in Kansas City were its overwhelming majority of Protestants,
the absence of organized labor representation, and the absence of
blacks.’36 Even though the reformers in Kansas City had succeeded in
establishing municipal reform, they rejected the idea of taking a
public position on lynching and disenfranchisement of blacks in Mis
souri because they felt that taking a position would hurt their
chances of consolidating their power between the various groups which
did not benefit under machine rule. Instead, the reformers placed
more emphasis upon class unity working in concerted effort to eject
Tom Pendergast machine from power. Indeed, this led some to respond
to the NAACP’s public criticisms by claiming that there were no mass
lynchings in the state of Missouri. To the contrary, there were 81
persons lynched in Missouri between 1889 and 1925. Of that number,
30 were white and 51 were black. Consequently, it can be said that
~-35Mitchell, 85.
1361bjd., 152—153.
- -; u. UL.o Ib~ I~uJdUI~UflL~~. *
148
the reform movement during the Pendergast era overlooked murder and
lynchings of blacks and proceeded to concentrate on ending the rein
of political corruption in state, county, and municipal politics.
The response of Torn Pendergast’s political organization to the
political needs of blacks (i.e. housing, police protection, schools,
officeholding, employment, etc.) and the reformers response were
quite different. Whereas the political machine centralized its mode
of political power in its own hands, the reformers overtly attempted
to employ a pluralistic model for dispersing political power by using
the nonpartisan, election, the referendom and the recall to integrate
the media, civic associations, the civil service and better government
groups into a power—brokerage relationship with the black electorate.
When viewed through a socio—economic lens, the Pendergast machine
appears as a black lower and middle class based organization. It
is from these classes that its principal support had always come.137
The reformers treated this kind of support as providing the mechan
ism for facilitating the government of urban America during a time of
severe discord and social tension in the fiber of American politics.
The success of its mode of operation in providing this facilitation
must be examined in the context of the machines posture of occupying
and exploiting the black community through its appointments of
white ward political bosses of the black community. Blacks, as
137Murray S. Steadman, Urban Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1972), p. 123.
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opposed to European immigrant groups in Kansas City, were not
represented proportionally in the Pendergast machine except through
the white ward bosses appointed by the machine to accelerate the pace
of accumulating the short and long range concerns of the black com
munity. This mode of plantation or overseer politics was designed
by the machine to perpetuate the disenfranchisement of blacks at all
costs, and to prevent black agitation on a broader scale from emerging.
The reformers paternalistic attitude toward the problems experienced
by blacks, i.e. lynchings, murder, jobs; their reluctance at times to
engage in ethnic politics and their indifference to the material needs
of blacks prevented them from developing a reliable constituency base
with them.’38 To proceed in this fashion at best disregarded both
the nature and the data base of knowledge which currently exists
about the lynchings and murders of innocent black people that took
place .during the era of the machine between 1889 and 1926. The
reformers hoped that by employing a pluralistic model for distributing
political power, social and economic problems would eventually be
resolved. As the black electorate
turned to the pluralism of the reforms, they began
to recognize that loyalty to a political organiza
tion was fundamental when the black electorate sup
ported the Democrats in the mayoralty election in
1930, many agreed that the organizational collapse
138James Q. Wilson, “The Economy of Patronage,” Journal of
Political Economy 69 (1961): 270.
138Larry Grothaus, 76.
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of the Republicans had been caused by reformers
who had attacked and wrecked the boss element of
the Pendergast machine led by Tom Marks.’39
The black electorate argued that the anti—boss element led by the
Kansas City Star and Matthew Foster was basically anti—black and
represented an effort by middle class whites in Kansas City, Missouri,
to transfer power away from the Democrats and blacks in Kansas City,
~Iissouri. 140 The Kansas City Call newspaper concluded in its editori
al that:
The trend away from the republican party has been so
unmistakeable [sic] that the leaders should have
seen the change with half an eye. That they did not
can be interpretted [sic] two ways, either they were
satisfied to lose the votes, or they are wedded to
the habit of taking the Negro for granted.
The G.O.P. and Klan had worked together in Jackson
county and charged that the Republican controlled—
police were brutal to blacks. Party loyalty.
depended on the help and service a party offered,
and Republicans simply had not done enough in hous
ing, education, fire protection and public parks. 141
In the late 1920’s to the mid 1930’s, Pendergast and his machine
were able to extend its power with the support it received from Truman
and blacks in Kansas City. Each of them learned to function within a
system of machine politics to the advantage of both.142 As a protege
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Jackson County Court in 1922, 1926 and again in 1930.143 As an
informed political practitioner and candidate, Truman was aware of the
social and political problems that the black electorate encountered.
When it was charged that a “physician at a Kansas City old folk home
mistreated and abused them, Judge Truman investigated and discharged
the man.”’44 The response by Truman to the needs of the black elec—
torate contributed to his re—election in 1930 as a county judge. The
black newspaper, Kansas City Call, endorsed him because of his work in
building county roads and improving the quality of black life in Kansas
City. Under Truman the County Court established a new home for
delinquent girls and provided qualified persornel to operate it. More
over, Truman showed concern for the contribution of the black elec
torate to county, local and state politics. He thought that the Jack
son County Home for Delinquent Girls should be named after a black
man, Hiram Young, a blacksmith on the Santa Fe Trail, but the idea
was not adopted.145
As a presiding judge of the Jackson County Court, Truman enhanced
the growth and development of the Pendergast machine by allowing it
to control the county precincts outside of Kansas City. The county
court was an administrative rather than a judicial office, and
143Edwjn C. McKay, Missouri: A History of the Crossroads (Norman,
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press,l962), 353.
‘44Larry Grothaus, 77.
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Truman’s top post in the court gave him control of almost all of the
county’s patronage. Thus, there were ample rewards to give those
blacks voters who were willing to work for boss Pendergast and his
organization in the county districts.’46 The black electorate
supported the Pendergast machine in Kansas City and Jacksin County
because it provided a way in which they could better their social
and economic status. The Pendergast machine paid blacks for the use
of their vote during election. Thus, the Pendergast machine performed
a valuable service for the black electorate living in the North End.
By the 1930 U.S. Census, there were 122,000 people living in the North
End Ward. Of this total, 44 percent were black. In addition to pro
viding them with jobs and bail money when they were arrested, Pender—
gast and his organization produced one sided political majorities from
the black community, thus maximizing the importance of their vote.147
In the Kansas City, Missouri municipal election of March 1930, 70
percent of the black electorate voted, compared to only 47 percent
in 1928 that voted Democratic despite the effort of the Kansas City
Call to have blacks support John E. Wesson over Cass Welch for justice
of the peace and to back L. A. Knox over his white opponent for the
state legislature. During the election Both the Kansas City Call and
the Kansas City Star newspaper warned the black electorate that its
continued support of candidates endorsed by Shannon, Welch and Pender—
146Dorsett, 115—116.
‘47Fenton, 133.
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gast and his organization for public office would enable them to use
patronage and policies to attract the black electorate and control
the city.’48 The Kansas City American newspaper in its editorial
response to the Kansas City Call and Star newspapers, dismissed their
objections and stated the following position of the black electorate:
What has Kansas City got against Pendergast, Shan
non and Welch? Anyone can gain an audience with
either of them on any matter day or night. Each of
them employ Negro labor and there is not a Negro
church in Kansas City at some time in their struggles
that have not had a helpful check from one or all of
them . . . . Judging from the contributions they have
made the Negroes of Kansas City should entertain a
very high regard for Tom, Joe and Cass.149
In a letter to the editor following the remarks by the Kansas
City American, a black voter expressed the opinion that, blacks
switched away from the G.O.P. and supported Pendergast and the Demo
crats because “the Abe Lincoln talk of Republicans was hypocritical,
blacks charged when contrast with their deeds.”5° Blacks gave
loyalty, manpower and support to Pendergast and his organization and
received tangible relief and protection in time of need. When the
state legislature returned control of the Kansas City, Missouri,
police to local government, Pendergast obtained seven hundred patron
age jobs, and the mistreatment of blacks ended. Shortly, the new




- - ~ a _h hal h,h U~lal~ ~tLJLaMja ~#~Ii - J U
154
black man. To the electorate, the end of police brutality was a
major accomplishment of Pendergast and his organization.151
In the 1930’s, Kansas City, Missouri, and the rest of the nation
were in the midst of the greatest depression ever experienced. The
depression hit the black electorate the hardest of all. They were
the last to be hired and the first to be fired. Whites began taking
what were once regarded as, “Nigger,” jobs —— waiters, porters and
other menial work. When the state government changed its administra
tion in January 1933, white girls even replaced black elevator
operators at the state capitol as well as in major state offices.’52
The battle for employment continued to he uphill for blacks
during this period. These labor force participants had no share in
the construction of Kansas City’s new municipal auditorium. Presi
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal program brought some relief
to blacks in Kansas City, Missouri. The black labor force was able
to gain employment from the New Deal Administration. During the New
Deal years, the Kansas City Call newspaper criticized Roosevelt for
doing too little for blacks and for tolerating racial discrimination
in federal programs. Despite its anti—Roosevelt sentiment, the Call
admitted that
• . blacks were treated equitably in Kansas City
and Jackson County. The black labor force not only
had its share of jobs with CWA and WPA, but also had
151Larry Grothaus, 80.
~-52Greene, Holland Kremer, 22.
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Jobs blacks obtained as a result of the shortage and the need
for cheap labor were lost during period because the color bar in
employment placed them in unkskilled positions which were the ones
most easily and quickly eliminated during the periods of economic down
turns in the economy. The black vote had gone from eighty percent
Republican in 1922 to seventy percent Democratic in 1932 when Hoover
carried only two black precincts in Kansas City.’54 Joseph McLemore
was a candidate for Congress, but because of the governor’s veto of
a redistricting plan, he had to campaign for the post on an at—large
basis. Both the Pendergast machine and the black electorate supported
his candidacy. On the Republican side, Crittenden Clark campaigned
for the office sought by McLemore with little support from the party.
The Republican party, according to the Kansas City Call,
• . . simply did not understand the significance or
organizational politics. Had the republicans been
mindful of their followers had they played fair to
Negroes, for instance, a few black precincts on Vine
Street would have saved them. The day when the anti—
boss faction opposed the nomination of a Negro for
alderman of the old Eight Ward, they started the
breakdown of their party’s strength among the most
dependable supporters. Whatever legimate complaints
could be made against the leadership of Thomas R.
Marks, when they deposited, the anti—boss insurgents
should have known at the start that centralization of
power is the way to victory. 155
The period of 1932—1936 represented a turning point for the
Pendergast organization and the black electorate in Kansas City. In





ment (N.Y.M.) and which they hoped might lead to the creation of
non—partisan political movement to condemn the politics and influence
of Pendergast and his organization. Efforts by the NYM to condemn
the Pendergast machine and the boss did not concern the black elec
torate. For blacks “it was not how much power Pendergast and his
organization had, but what he does with it that concerns us.”56 The
National Youth Movement was a middle class w~iite organization that
supported ending the partnership between city government and Pender
gast and his organization; reduction in the cost of city government,
strict civil service procedures in hiring and the creation of a
reform party to enter candidates in the municipal election of 1934.
The NYM provided the stimulus for a Citizen Fusion campaign to emerge.
The Citizen Fusion Campaign was organized during l9334934.’~~
The Citizens Fusion party, a mixture of Republicans and non—
machine Democrats, ran candidates in the 1934 Kansas City municipal
elections. The Fusion ticket was headed by Dr. A. Ross Hill, a former
President of the University of Missouri, and Kansas City Real Estate
Board. Some of the younger members of the Fusionists organization
were vigorous in their denunciation of the graft, corruption and in
efficiency of Pendergast and his organization. Pendergast was not
frightened by the activities of the Fusionists’ organization, but he
was, nevertheless, quite concerned. He sent word to his organiza
‘56Grothaus, 81.
157Brown and Dorsett, 210.
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was, nevertheless, quite concerned. He sent word to his organiza
tional members that 1934 municipal election in Kansas City, “has
to be won or else.” He was determined to win the election at all
costs. During the general election of 1934, an estimated 50,000
to 100,000 fake registrations were placed on the books to aid the
election of machine candidates, but still, Pendergast and his organi
zation were afraid that in spite of these efforts, the Fusionist
organization could win.158 Efforts by Pendergast and his organization
to stimulate an end to the political challenges by the Fusionist
organization and finally consolidate his political strength led to
his use of violence, murder and voter fraud to accomplish this agenda.
The ravage of violence and murder inflicted by the machine crossed
sexual and racial lines.
The Fusionist campaign headquarters during the election had seven
bullets fired through it windows. Shortly, thereafter, a black chauf
feur of the Kansas City Star’s editor was kidnapped and driven to an
alley where he was seriously beaten. The black chauffeur was beaten
because he had been caught in the act of driving a Fusionist worker
to the election polls. These machine “thugs” got a little confused
during the 1934 general election. In their efforts to continue their
reign of terror during the election, mistakes were made. In one of
their blunders, they mistakenly killed one of their own precinct
captains. James Lindley, a black, had been working for the Fusionist
ticket. On the night before the election, he was taken to police
158Steinberg, 300.
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Headquarters by Bush Wells a black policeman, where he was booked for
investigation. After his release from jail, he worked during election
day at the polling place whereby he was accosted by Wells and asked
to report up the street for a few minutes. After refusing to go, a
car containing six men drove to the polling place where Lindley was.
He saw them and ran. One of the men grabbed the first black in
sight. He happened to be a machine worker. Finley, a black Demo
cratic precinct captain in Kansas City, came to the aid of the black
man and drew a gun. The man shot and killed Finley before he had a
chance to pull the trigger of his weapon.’59 Eleven other blacks
were injured in what was the bloodiest balloting in the history of
Kansas City. In the same week, gunmen tried to prevent blacks from
exercising their franchise by terrorizing the Southeast Missouri
Community of Holland, climaxing a series of anti—black demonstra
tions. 160
The training Jim Pendergast had given to his younger brother,
Tom, unfortunately, did not manifest itself when it became Tom’s turn
to hand over the machine mantle of leadership to his nephew, Jim Pen—
dergast, Jr. Although Tom did not try to train Jim on how to mobilize
and organize the black electorate of the various wards and districts
encompassing the areas where the machine was politically active, Jim
just couldn’t shake off the image that the black electorate and other
159Ibid., 300—301.
‘60Ibid., 239.
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voters had perceived of his uncle as a corrupt politician. The
Internal Revenue Service’s investigation of the tax records of Ernest
Hicks, a close friend and confidant of Pendergast, provided them with
an array of information contributing to PendergaSt’S conviction. The
$100,500 that Hick’s law firm received from the insurance companies
in the state of Missouri to pay off Pendergast’S gambling debts and
the omission by Hicks to record it on his income tax records led to
his arrest and the subsequent grand jury indictment of Tom Pendergast.
Pendergast’S indictment was restricted to income tax evasion involving
the insurance bribe. As a result, Pendergas: was sentenced to serve
fifteen months in the Leavonworth Federal Prison and fined $10,000
and agreed to a payment of restitution to the state of $434,000 to
settle his back income taxes that he owed the federal government.161
The transferring of political power from an accomplished and
seasone’i politician to an inexperienced leader in charge of a declin
ing organization created a political window of vulberability. As
such, efforts were made by groups and organizations to seize upon
this initiative and try to supplant their organization and program as
a counter to that offered by the machine. Such an effort transpired
during the 1940 municipal elections when the non—partisan citizen
reform organization ticket made up of professional and civic associa
tions agitated and succeed in wrestling control from the Pendergast
machine by electing John P. Gage, as mayor along with seven of its
‘61Ibid., 361.
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candidates to city council. In its effort to attract the former
black supporters of the Pendergast machine, the Citizen Association
used Jim Reed, the former mayor, Senator and ardent supporter of the
machine, to rally support for its mayoral candidate, John P. Gate.
In his campaign speeches, Reed denounced the machine as being corrupt
and preventing Kansas City from transforming its social and political
structure from competing against innovations in municipal administra
intration, agriculture, industry and technology occurring in other
municipalities. The Citizen Association candidate received support
from business and civic associations in Kansas City, Missouri, except
from the black community because of his support for the policy by the
police department to use excessive and brutal force as a technique
for dealing with disrespectful and disgruntled blacks. 162
The decline of Pendergast machine can be linked to the carica
ture of national administrators to establish a comprehensive urban
policy which enacted the immigration law to establish quotas biased
in favor of Northern—European Protestant immigrants and against
Southern and Eastern European Catholic immigrants,’63 threby limiting
annually the number of foreign immigrants migrating to the United
‘62Steadmen, 364.
163Thomas Dye, Politics in State and Communities (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Co., 1969), 266.
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States and to provide economic stimulus for cities and regions severly
impacted by the Depression.’64
The New Deal programs, however, created the social and economic
institutions that expanded and contributed to the development of a
civil service system which eliminated job patronage. National welfare
services eliminated the need for the machine to take care of the
sick. Organized labor began to operate the local registration and
election efforts that had been the work of Pendergast’s machine ward
organization. Public education and a growing and thriving economy
created an urban middle class in Kansas City that became socially
conscious of national and local issues, thereby making them easiler to
organize than the poor and black laborers of the early 18th and 19th
centuries.165 The exodus of this middle class from the cities
to the surhurbs in search of their promised land threatened Kansas
City by limiting its spatial growth and drawing from it a dispropor
tionate share of the affluent.166 The technological innovations in
transportation and the spread of urbanization in Kansas City, Mis
souri between the 1940’s and the mid—1950’s allowed people who could
afford to or who were not restricted by race to migrate to the suburban
l64~j. s• Contress, House, Emergency Quota Act of 1921 (Sess. 1,
H. R. 4075. PL. 5; see also U. S. Congress, House, National Origins




areas. Changing transportation technology is reflected in the cost
relationship among three types of transportation activity: the move
ment of goods and raw materials between urban areas, the movement of
goods and raw material within urban areas, and the movement of blacks
and whites between the location of residence and the place of
employment.167
The development of the car, which made the suburbs more accessi
ble from greater distances with little transportation cost, and the
white exodus from the city contributed to the steady decline of the
Pendergast machin&s political base. As urbanization spreaded,
houses, streets and highways were constructed only for the rich when
land became available. This land, of course, was always located on
the periphery of the city and in time it was passed on to those low
to middle income blacks in search of decent housing. In spatial
terms, the clearest statement about the political economy of segmented
housing of this kind has its roots in the historical and structural
theory of urban form. The theory of urban form developed by William
Alonso
explains how the well—to—do live on expensive
land. In brief, it holds that as a city grows the
houses near the center of the city becomes old and
therefore unsatisfactory to high income families.
The rich then build new houses where open land is
167Arthur Schreiber, Paul Galons and Richard Clemmons, Economics
of Urban Problems: An Introduction (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co.,
1971), 11.
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available which, of course, is on the periphery of
the city. The movement parts of this theory are
the aging of structures, sequential occupance by
income levels and population growth, for the number
of low income families must increase to provide a
demand for the houses vacated by the well—to—do.168
The structural theory according to Alonso assumes that a city
which develops before its housing structures have time to age or
multiply would undoubtedly cause hardship for low income people com
peting for housing in the city. As a result, one would find on the
average more low income people living in the city while the high to
medium income people are able to live farther out because of their
ability to pay for expensive housing. Alonso and others have argued
that between 1940 and 1960, there was relatively little intermixing
of the black residences in Kansas City and other communities with
whites in these respective areas. Actually, the segregation of blacks
and whites systematicaly increased during this period. 169
Loans provided by the federal government to build middle class
homes in the suburbs and to construct roads and highways to build a
link between them and Kansas City in which the suburbanites were
employed contributed to an economic loss of its financial tax base
and segregated housing patterns. Some urban affairs specialists
have conceptualized this process as resulting in dual migration
whereby low income households migrate into the city to increase
their net private benefits, and higher income households migrate out
168Ibjd., 415—418.
____ 195.
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for the same reason. The decrease in the tax base amounts to a
decrease in the amount of money the city could collect from the pro
perty tax. People who lived in the suburbs and worked on their jobs
in Kansas City during the day were subsidized by the city. Com
muters, who failed to contribute to the city’s taxes and employee
organizations, were demanding higher wages, cost of living clauses
and improved working conditions, all of which required more money to
be spent.
Bad housing, fear of crime, poor schools and sanitation services
and the net in—migration of blacks to Kansas City, Missouri, during
the decline of the Pendergast organization contributed to the reasons
why whites left the urban areas and moved to the suburbs. The
private sector was involved also in the real estate practice of dis
investment, whereby it chose not to invest its resources in Kansas
City, but instead to develop new housing for middle and upper income
whites living in the suburbs. The private sector, according to
Leonard Rubinowitz in his essay, “Problems of Metropolitan Housing
Choice,’ Who Gets to Live Where?”
appealed to and contributed to white flights
from central cities. They appeal to people’s pre
ference, encourage white , middle income people to
move out of their decent homes and living environ
ments in the city or older suburbs to preferred
homes and environments in the surburban area. 170
1-70Leonard Runinowitz, “Problems of Metropolitan Housing
Choice, Who Gwts to Live Where” in Cities in Change: Studies of
the Urban Condition, Second Edition by John Walton and Donald E.
Games (Boston: Allyn and Boston, Inc., 1971), 381.
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The exodus of Tom Penergast’s lower class constituency base to
the suburbs spurred by the impact of urbanization and black migration
has contributed to an the development of organizations, forge alli
ances and associations competing to supplant their reformed organiza
tion and goals to fill this political void. Those indigent immigrants
fortunate enough to improve their economic status soon also moved to
the suburbs which have reached a level of population and purchasing
power sufficient for the provision of amenities which once only the
central city was capable of sustaining. These city emigres left
behind blacks and low income whites,’7’ the unwanted and those who
make a business or career of managing them for the rest of Kansas City.
The reformers utilized political organizations and civic associa
tions as an organizational effort to build a state wide political
movement. In a sense, they perceived that by utilizing political
organizations to wrestle control away from the dying machine they
could build a united network of ideas, goals, strategies which were
formulated in such a way that the organization generated, mobilized
and directed the movement toward political empowerment.’72 The
Citizen Association, the Democratic Good Government Association and
other political groups had to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of
171George Sterlieb, “The City As Sandbox,” The Public Interest
(Fall 1971), 16.
~72David Apter, Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1965), 179—222.
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the black electorate, but they also had to assure them that once the
struggle against the machine was over the re—emergence of political
corruption, which in the name of organizational loyalities, would
not recreate in a round about mannner, —viz—the same system of ex
changing votes for jobs. The key bodies to this task utilizing the
organizational framework as a vehicle for building black political
empowerment in Kansas City, Missouri, came with the organizing of
the Freedom Incorporate Organization. Electoral strategies and ex
pending energies utilized by the Freedom Incorporated Organization
to move Kansas City, Missouri, toward black political empowerment
building were challenged by remnants of the old Pendergast political
organization, the Citizen Association.
Strategies and goals by the Citizen Association to end the cor
ruption of state politics and the determination by Freedom Incorpo
rated and the black electorate to gain access to appointed and elected
positions, infused both groups into a competitive challenge for shar
ing power in Kansas City, Missouri. This competitive challenge by
the black electorate allowed Freedom Incorporated to consolidate
around symbols and groups to act during its early years to provide
better services to the community, to challenge bad housing, and un
employment, and to recruit members to participate with them in the
delivery of goods and services and in the election of black candidates
to public office.
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CHAPTER IV
FREEDOM INCORPORATED: FACTORS WHICH GAVE RISE TO IT’S
DEVELOPMENT AND BLACK POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT
Chapter IV attempts to show that the black electorate in Kansas
City, Missouri maintained close ties with prominent white leaders of
the Pendergast machine in order to acquire housing, employment and
education for their children.’ Dr. Lorenzo J. Greene, Antonio F.
Holland and Gary Kremer have pointed out in their research on black
life in Kansas City that during the Pendergast era black professors,
teachers, doctors, dentists, and real estate owners crisscrossed
Kansas City with their white counterparts, holding meetings and
rallies at which they agitated for the right to elect blacks to
public office and to improve their social and economic status.2
With the rise of the black middle class ~n the industrial cities
of the United States has come a greatly accelerated demand for full
equality for the black electorate during the twentieth century.3
‘William Parrish, A History of Missouri (Columbia, Missouri:
University of Missouri Press, 1973), 146.
2lbid 262.
3Edward T. Clayton, The Negro Politician (Chicago: The Johnson
Publishing Co., 1964), 169.
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Prior to the enactment of the 1965 Voting Right Act and the decline
of the Pendergast machine in 1942, black electoral participation was
very limited to electing machine sponsored candidates for public
office in exchange for social, economic and political favors. This
chapter will attempt to examine and describe the factors contributing
to the development of Freedom Incorporated as a black, grass—root
political organization and to the rise of black political empowerment
in Kansas City, Missouri.
The task designed for this chapter has as its focus three inter
related themes. First, this chapter will attempt to examine the
activities of Freedom Incorporated, its tactics and strategies, during
the 1960’s to allow blacks in Kansas City to participate in the politi
cal system as elected officials. Secondly, this chapter will also
focus on the registration of new black voters and the passage of public
accommodation ordinances to ban segregation in public facilities.
Finally, this chapter will attempt to examine white resistance to the
efforts of the black electorate to utilize the electoral process as
a vehicle for building community empowerment.
In many ways, Kansas City is an atypical city and unique in the
sense that the movement for the franchise during the 1960’s to improve
upon the social and economic status of the black electorate was, by and
large, sustained by the meticulous rediscovery of the tradition of
protest thought pioneered by W. E .B. Du Bois and a subordinate
strain of black political reflection since the early decades of the
169
century. The characterization of Du Bois’ protest enigma was, hereto
fore, based on an assumption of the intrinsic importance of black
people and a demand that any refusal to acknowledge that importance
was a violation of the individual’s dignity and should be immediately
and forthrightly protested. The political posture suggested by this
reduction of reality was the obligation to protest any racial restric
tions encountered, especially disenfranchising laws which restricted
participation in the political process. The protest tradition became
the main theoretical resource for overturning the hegemony of the
status quo and affirmed those of Du Bois.4
The most distinctive character of the Duboisian protest tradi
tion during the 1960’s was its acceptance of the American Liberation
Democratic Thought as a valid general statement of principles. This
body of thought argued that the social, economic and political oppres
sion of the black electorate in Kansas City could be eliminated by
the extension of those rights and privileges as written about in the
American Constitution. According to this theory, the primary role of
government was to protect these civil liberties.5 Moreover, the
4Alex Willingham, “The Impact of Activism on Political Thought
in America” (Prepared for presentation at the Symposium on Race,
Politics and Culture, Howard University, Washington, D.C.: (October
1977), pp. 7—10.
5Ted Roberts Gurr, “A Comparative Study of Civil Strife,” in
Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Gurr, Violence in America: Historical




protest of the 1950’s and early 1960’s was conceived as a way of
eliminating black oppression by applying economic pressure and
appealing “morally” to the consciences of a nation alleged based on
democratic principles.6
The protest movement of the 1960’s against social and political
inequality marked the era of blacks gaining the right to vote through
political organizations designed by them as a stepping stone to com
munity empowerment. As in the case of Kansas City, Missouri, the
struggle by the black electorate to improve the quality of city ser
vices was very instrumental in the development of Freedom ]~ncorpo—
rated. With the development and organizing of Freedom Incorporated,
“the interest of the black electorate shifted to the arena of elec
toral politics as the civil rights movement increased its activities
steadily in Kansas City, Missouri”.7
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREEDOM INCORPORATED ORGANIZATION
The Freedom Incorporated Organization in Kansas City, Missouri
was organized by Leon Jordan, Bruce Watkins, Leon S. Hughes, Jr.,
Howard Maupin, Fred Curls, Dr. Charles Moor and Marion Foote in
Maupin’s Barber Shop, May 6, 1962. This group of Kansas City blacks
6Max Mark, Modern Ideologies (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1973), 224.
7Melba Marrow, “1963 The Year When Watkins Began Long Service
to City,” Kansas City Call (September 1980), 1.
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formed the Freedom Incorporated Organization in response to the
political, social and economic problems that had been defined as
legitimate concerns for black community residents: the building of an
effective precinct organization to elect candidates at the national,
state and local levels, capable of improving the conditions of blacks
in Kansas City and Jackson County; the improvement of the neighbor
hoods in the black community and the sponsoring of bills and neigh
borhood economic development related projects through its candidates,
in an attempt to exercise political influences within the state
legislature of Missouri and the City Council in Kansas City, Missouri.
The leadership of Freedom Incorporated was successful while deve
loping the organization into forging an alliance among labor unions,
businesses, elected officials and liberal whites to work together on
such issues as voter registrations, fair employment practices, police
brutality, contract compliance and quality education.8 Previous
studies have found both a positive and negative relationship exists
between black political mobilization, organization, and the following
socioeconomic data: percent of total employment, poverty, percent of
blacks in the total population. Explanations suggested negative
relations vary depending upon degree of political interest, type of
organization, apathy and economic dependence and independence among
blacks.9
8”County Legislature Adopts Resolution Honoring Bruce Watkins,”
Kansas City Call (September 1980), 4.
9Johnny Daniel, “Negro Political Behavior and Community Political
and Socioeconomic Structural Factors,” Social Forces (March 1969),
275—276.
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When Freedom Incorporated was established in 1962, it developed
into an organization seeking to:
play an active entrepreneurial role in the formation
of new ideas, in the establishment of a network of
communication for those ideas and in the linking of
the public and the leadership in such a way that
power is generated, mobilized, and directed.1°
The above statement illustrates one of the most important con
tributions of black political organizations to the movement for
social change in Kansas City, Missouri.” The Freedom Incorporated
Organization was considered by the black electorate as a vehicle for
determing who will contest for office; priorities for changing the
way decisions are made involving the distribution of governmental
services; patterns for establishing priorities and mobilizing the
black community. 12
The organizational structure of Freedom Incorporated took on
the character of a pyramind structure, with:
thirty—five members of the Board of Directors at
the top controlling the key decision—making bodies,
the Executive Committee (BC) and the Standing Commit
tees (SC). The Executive Committee is elected by the
Board of Directors to act upon matters of emergency
and to exercise the authority on its behalf in the
management of the Corporation. The Executive Commit—
10David Apter, Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1965), 186.
“Reverend James Tindall, Research Data on the History of Free
dom Incorporated (Kansas City, Missouri: Freedom Incorporated, 1980),
1—3.
‘2Mack Jones, “Black Political Empowerment in Atlanta, Myth or
Reality,” Annals, AAPSS, 439 (Septmeber 1978), 92.
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tee shall consist of the President, Executive Vice
President, three Vice Presidents (each of whom shall
have specific responsibilities for designated commit
tee operation); Secretary and a Treasurer. Constitu
tional powers invested in the President grants him
the power of attorney to oversee the operations of
the Nominating Committee and the Finance Committee.’3
At the bottom of the organizational pyramid are the Standing
Committees, including the Program, Membership, Communication,
Public Relations, Election Day, Youth, Operations and Education
Committees. The Executive Vice President shall oversee the opera
tions of these committees.
GOALS AND OBJECTIVE
The black electorate was able to develop Freedom Incorporated
as a rather sophisticated political machine that became a power
broker in Kansas City’s politics. Ideological assumptions related
to the manifestation of a power struggle between whites trying to
maintain their superordinate position of dominance and blacks struggi—
ling to escape this dominance,14 guided the development of Freedom
Incorporated and the movement for community empowerment.
As a black, grass—roots, political organization, Freedom Incor
porated provided a political base for black candidates; it gave the
~-3Archie Welch, Fuzzy Thompson and Byths Williams, The Organi
zational Structure and Committee Functions of Freedom Incorporated
(Kansas City, Missouri: Freedom Incorporated Nominating Committee,
1983), 2.
~-4Mack Jones, 92.
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black electorate an alternative to the state’s dominant party candi
dates,’5 and it worked with political groups and neighborhood organi
zations to end the power and influence of political organizations in
the black community. Freedom Incorporated was confronted with a
diverse white and black electorate who, at the time, charged the or
ganization with advocating the formation of an all black political
organization. Historically, whenever a black political organization
such as Freedom Incorporated “comes into being advocating this proce
dure, the big question most often raised by whites and blacks is: how
can they agitate for integration one day and contend for a segregated
all black organization the next?”6
The Kansas City Star, the white daily newspaper, acknowledged
that when Freedom Incorporated began to provide the black electorate
with an organization for getting its candidates elected and appointed
to public office in Kansas City, Louis Wagner and his political bosses
began to charge that Freedom Incorporated did not actually hold the
interest of the black community to heart.’7 Supporters of Louis
Wagner went so far as to declare that as a white political boss,
1-5jeanne Allyson Fox, “In Kansas City, Missouri,” Black Enter—
Enterprise (March 1978), 43.
~-6Clayton, 176—177.
17Kansas City Times (August 1968), 3.
— LJk~iil.~b! - -
175
Wagner was more of a friend to the Negro that the leaders of Freedom
Incorporated. 18
The philosophy and ideological basis for the organization were
incorporated into the organizational structure and spelled out as part
of the duties and responsibilities of its Vice President for Community
Affairs. These duties are as follow:
• . . (a) to monitor the education and academic stan
dards prevailing in the Kansas City Public School
System: monitor the district policies and procedures
of the school board whenever necessary to ensure the
adequate education of our children; (b) to conduct
ongoing community outreach activities involving but
not limited to those designed to inform and educate
the public on matters concerning legislation, govern
mental policy (state, county and federal) (c) to
develop an organizational program to involve children,
youth and young adults for future and present respon
sibilities in the organizations; Cd) to continue our
path of progressive politics based on strong and capa
ble ward leadership; competent candidates and broaden
ing the base of the others in the political process
through vehicles designed to assume just and fair re
presentation at all political levels; (f) to educate
the general public as to the process and the need to
gain equity in all facets of living in the greater
Kansas City area; (g) the establishment of social
justice; and (h) to involve the organization in com
munity affairs such as housing, jobs, economic deve
lopment, foreign policy, peace and justice.’9
The goals listed under alphabets d, e, f and g were immediately
pursued while action on the latter and forrier three were gradually
given organizational attention. This kind of organizational structure
was intended to, over the years, gain support of elected officials,
18 Ibid.
19welch, Thompson, and Williams, 2, 10.
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civic leaders, “necessary for continuing our path of progressive
politics based on strong and capable ward leadership, competent candi
dates and broadening the base of our organization.”20 The leadership
of Freedom Incorporated has shown a willingness to mobilize the black
electorate to use the electoral process as a vehicle for challenging
the power and influence of Wagner and his political organization,
which for years have retained their political •power and kept:
the black community chained to political slavery.
These factions are united in a single goal to keep
us in bondage as long as they possibly can. If po
litical groups are against fair housing, if they are
against equal employment and opportunity, they are
against you. Let the faction stooges buy your vote
and boast that they own you, then go to the polls and
vote for Freedom Incorporated . . . . Boss Wagner
lives in a fancy house. . . and better believe he
doesn’t want you to be anywhere near hira.21
The quest by blacks to participate in Kansas City’s political
system as elected officials, planning and policy analysts enabled
Freedom Incorporated to play a role in agitating for the improvement
of the economic and social standards of living for the black wards
(2nd, 3rd, 14th, 16th, 17th, and 18th) as well as establishing working
relations with residents, neighborhood groups and political clubs with
elected representatives from the 1st District, 1st District at—large,
2nd District and 3rd District at—large. As a community, the leader—
20Freedom Incorporated Memorandum: Endorsement for 1983 City
Elections (February 1983), 1.
21”Don’t Get Mad, Get Smart,” Kansas City Call (July 29, 1966),
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ship of Freedom believed that the times that we are now experiencing,
“demand that we support one another as long as we pursue the common
goals of competent leadership, commitment to the cause and the courage
to continue the fight for a better life for the community.”22
Along with Freedom Incorporated’s notions of community unity and
coalition building, we find similar notions on the process of maxi
mizing the bargaining power and leverage of the black vote with
white allies, in an ad hoc alliance. Freedom Incorporated’s philoso
phical disposition allowed it to conceive of transformation from the
divisiveness of our community in past elections to coalition building
as a peaceful process:
Freedom must force an unprecedented solidarity of
interest and commission of purpose with an understand
ing that diversity of style and opinion is acceptable
and even encouraged. In past elections, our community
has been divided and attacked one another, thus making
it difficult to work together after the elections.
And it is time that we not attack but pull together,
even though we have diverse views. Sometimes it can
be to our advantage to have friends on both sides of
the issue.23
We have a chance to become in the 1966 election part
of the County government in Jackson County. I urge
all my supporters to vote for . . . the . . . white
members of the Progress Team who join with Freedom In
corporated candidates. They pledge equality and
decency for every citizen in our community.24
22Freedoni Incorporated Memorandum (1983), 4.
23Freedom Incorpareted Memorandum (1982), 2—3.
24”Watkins Continues Fight for Freedom,” Kansas City Call
(July 29, 1966), 1.
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Freedom Incorporated has approximately 35 members on its Board
of Directors. Supporters of the organization and its philosophy,
including all committee people and elected officials who are not
serving on the Executive Committee but function in their capacity as
committee members, are required to pay a minimum of $25.00 in dues
monthly to the organization. Moreover, each ward must share in off
setting some of the organizational utility bills and other debts
associated with electoral campaigns by selling at least two books of
tickets at $2.00 each or $20.00 a book for prizes to be given away.25
Additional sources of finances are acquired through public appeal,
letters to area businesses and residents encouraging them to support
programs of the organization and its candidates. Membership dues,
solicitation to corporate and charitable organizations, political
candidates’ committees and county, state and national committees
allow Freedom Incorporated to support itself financially.
The Operation, Program, and Public Relations Committees conduct
ongoing community fundraising and outreach activities, including but
not limited to educational seminars, forums, community meetings,
political organizing and workshops to inform and educate the public
concerning legislation, sales tax propositions, jail bond issues,
25Memorandum from Phil B. Curl’s, “President of Freedom to its
Supporters” (October 1983), 1.
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sale of the Jackson County Service Center and police—black community
relations • 26
Freedom Incorporated established its office at 2506 Prospect
Street in the heart of the black community in Kansas City, Missouri.
The building in which its base of operations is located is considered
by the black electorate as a contact place for receiving information
on the activities and programs of the organization. In addition, it
also serves as a centralized place for meeting elected representa
tives, and as a means for mobilizing ad hoc committes, task forces,
parents and concerned community residents whenever the need arises,
to quickly respond to issues, events and concerns which impact upon
the future existence of the organization. During election time,
Freedom utilizes it headquarters to distribute campaign literature to
its people working at the poiis, preparation of required campaign
reports, phone bank operations, ward and district coordinations and
the delivery of the electorate to and from the polls. Through this
process, it was hoped by the leadership of Freedom Incorporated that
by developing the organization and establishing control over the
Jackson County and Kansas City, Missouri, political process, the dis
enfranchised black electorate could alter substantially “the social
and economic status of blacks by establishing complete control of
26Freedom Incorporated Memorandum: From Harold L. Holliday, Jr.,
Chairman of the Board, To the Board of Directors, Freedom Incorpo
rated, Notice of Meeting (August 23, 1979), 1.
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the black community of Jackson County by blacks. In those days and
now, we had big dreams.”27
In a sense, shaping the future course of politics in Kansas
City would involve the understanding of blacks and the need on the
part of liberal whites in Kansas City to cooperate with Freedom
Incorporate which, if successful, would shape the sine qua non of
Knsas City and Jackson County’s political destiny. At the time
Freedom Incorporated was founded in 1962, the black vote was con
trolled by Louis Wagner and his Jacksonian Democratic Club. In
Kansas City and in the county, Wagner attempted to command the support
of political bossess who controlled a large block of votes28 and
factional organizations. Wagner wanted to make his organization so
powerful that candidates seeking office in the state and county would
have to obtain his endorsement of their candidacy. Wagner, following
the pattern of his mentor, Tom Pendergast, wanted also to be able to
deliver so many votes through the effort of his Jacksonian Democratic
Club that he would not have to rely upon the advice, consent or
support of any ward politician.
To accomplish this goal, he decided to devise a plan to further
the continual dependency and subordination of the black electorate and
its leaders to his organization. Under such conditions, he employed
27lnterview with Leonard S. Hughes, Jr.
28James H. Fenton, Politics in the Border States (New Orleans:
The Hauser Press, 1957), 153.
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at least two schemes. First, Wagner decided to elect his political
surrogates and political bosses to public office with the support they
received from the black population living in their respective areas.
The second objective of the plan was to expand his organization into
the six predominantly black wards and use his white ward political
bosses to discourage attempts by the black electorate to organize
Freedom Incorporate to integrate blacks into the policy and planning
decision—making process of municipal government.
The literature on black electoral participation in the franchise
in the United States has shared the central theme that the level of
black participation has been characterized by “peaks and troughs as
blacks have achieved new levels of participation only to be followed
by greater white resistance and concomitant decline in participa
tion.”29 John Hope Franklin and Kenneth Clark in their research con
tend that regardless of the level of black participation in state,
local or national elections, the American black in this contemporary
period has been and remains in a subordinate and inferior position in
the stratified American society, politically as well as socially and
economically. 30
29Mack Jones, “Black Politics From Civil Rights to Benign
Nelect in Harry Johnson,” Negotiating the Mainstream (San Francisco:
Chandler Publishing Co., 1972), 162—165.
30John Hope Franklin, “The Two Worlds of Race: A Historical
View,” Daedalus, XCIV (Fall 1965), 899. Also see Kenneth Clark,
Dark Ghetto (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 1.
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Before dealing with the contemporary period, present develop
ments should be placed in proper perspective by briefly citing
salient historical developments in the black struggle for social
change and by establishing a frame of reference for analyzing and
interpreting black political activity31 in Kansas City.
The historical evolution of Freedom Incorporate and its quest
for equality by transforming the economy and management of plantation
politics by organizing a broad base of resources, neigborhood groups
and associations and political contact to significantly alter the
solcioeconomic conditions that affect black people, can appropriately
be classified into eight distinct periods: (1) Freedom Incorporated’s
Struggle Against Louis Wagner and this Jacksonian Democratic Club to
Elect Candidates to the County Committeeman and County Committeewoman
Post (1960—1963); (2) Municipal Election and the Struggle to Partici
pate in the Political Process as Elected Officeholders, (1964—1965);
(3) The Struggle to Gain Participation in the Eight Legislative Seats
Representing Jackson County during the August 1964 primary, (1966—
1967); (4) Struggle for Access to County Legislative Seats and Riots,
(1967—1970); (5) Coalition Building and Imposition, (1970—1974; (6)
Cleavage within the Black Political Authority, (1974—1979); and (7)
Black Political Empowerment During Mayoral and City Council Election





During the first period (1960—1963), every black candidate vying
to represent the black electorate had to get Louis Wagner’s permission
before he or she could run for public office. Black politics during
this period was consequently concerned with securing the franchise by
ending the system of boss control over the black vote. The first
attempt by Freedom to wrestle control from Wagner emerged as a result
of its fundamental strategy to politically mobilize the black elec
torate to begin asking questions about the lack of blacks appointed
and elected to public office. The goal also included the election of
candidates to office in order to transform the socioeconomic and
political probems of population distribution, housing characteristics
and median income of blacks which prevailed at the time when Freedom
Incorporated was formed and which changed very little under Louis
Wagner and his white ward political bosses.
Black political activity during this period signaled the beginn
ing movement on the part of black people to transform electoral
politics in Kansas City by running Freedom Incorporated President,
Leon Jordan, for County Committeeman and Rosemary Lowe for County
Committeewoman against Richard Smith, a Citizen Association candi
date for County Committeeman, and two additional candidates in the
August 1962, Democratic Primary from the 14th Ward. Louis Wagner
opposed both Jordan and Lowe in their pursuit of public office
because he realized that if Jordan, Lowe and Freedom Incorporated were
eventually successful in their goal at mobilizing the black vote to
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elect their candidates to state, county and municipal offices, the
Jacksonian Democratic Club would be replaced and thereby Wagner would
lose his power as a white ward boss. Nevertheless, the election was
indeed held and it ended with neither candidate receiving a plurality
of the vote. Leon Jordan, however, was successful in his electoral
bid, but Rosemary Lowe was, unfortunately, defeated.
The impetus of the desegregation movemeit of the Civil Rights
struggle to focus national attention on the rights of blacks to use
public facilities ostensibly coupled with the election of Leon Jordan
to the post of County Committeeman gave the black electorate the hope
and aspiration that the existence of a mobilizable voting population
can, if significantly organized, facilitate the improvement of the
quality of black life in Kansas City.
It was hoped by the black electorate that the election of Leon
Jordan to the County Committee seat and the support of liberal whites,
would thereby signal the beginning of their efforts and take control
of their own political life by, “dealing a death knell to the remnants
of Louis Wagner and the old Pendergast political machine.”32 The
movement for social and political equality and Freedom Incorporated’s
rise to power are, in a sense, proclamations on the part of the black
community to resolve the internal contadiction inhibited in the
American political system. Mobilizing the black electorate to




council posts was likely to be the most effective and important
instrument used to challenge the power of the plantation bosses.
The second period (1964—1965) municipal elections and the
struggle by the black electorate to participate in the political
process as elected officeholders, represented a crucial step in the
thrust by black electorate to build political empowement by elect
ing a black councilman in the 3rd District (which was 65 percent
black) and a black candidate from the 3rd District at—large. Bruce
Watkins, a local mortician and one of the principal architects of
Freedom Incorporated, was given the go ahead by his co—founders to
become a candidate for the 3rd District Council seat. Opposing
Watkins for the 3rd District Council seat was a black man by the
name of Lee Vertis Swinton, and Harold Holliday, Sr., a candidate on
the Citizen Association ticket. This all white Citizen Association,
which had been quite successful in its early efforts at dethroning
the Pendergast machine in the l94O’s, decided to campaign and defeat
the candidates backed by Freedom Incorporated because it perceived
that Freedom was molding itself into a political organization
similar to that of Tom Pendergast’s machine. Therefore, they per
suaded Harold Holliday, Sr., a black attorney and President of the
local chapter of the NAACP, to run against Watkins. Moreover, Dr.
Earl Thomas, a black educator and early member of the Freedom
Incorporated Organization, ran for the 3rd District at—large post.
To oppose him, Citizen Association persuaded a black man by the name
d ~i.~Jii hr a - -
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of Everett P. O’Neal of the Urban League to compete against Dr.
Thomas. Agitation on the part of Freedom Incorporated to provide
the black community access to the franchise was met with chief and
immediate competition by the Citizen Association in its bid to mini—
mize black political participation in the electoral process. At the
time Bruce Watkins ran for the City Council post, the media experts
and professional politicians gave him very little chance of winning
the primary or general election because of his age, race and political
ties to Freedom Incorporated. Nevertheless, during the primary,
Watkins defeated Lee Swinton and acquired enough votes to place him
into a run—off against Harold Holiday, Sr., in the general elections,
Dr. Earl Thomas won in the primary by defeating the Citizen Associa
tion candidate, Everette P. O’Neal. The electoral victory of Thomas
and Watkins for the first time gave Freedom Incorporated the hope that
it could mobilize the black vote successfully enough to elect its own
to participate in the implementation and planning of public policy.
The decline and withdrawal of the black electorate in Kansas
City, Missouri from participating in local municipal politics, con
tributing historically to the rise of an all white council, can be
traced back to the bargain struck by President Hayes, who authorized
the removal of federal troops in the South, first in South Carolina
and finally in Louisiana on April 3, 1877. To some degree this was
the beginning of the movement by the Klu Klux Klan to prevent blacks
from holding public office. Through careful and calculated manipu—
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lation, the black man was pushed back, robbed of his ballot as a
result of these events and relegated to what the white electorate
wanted to be “his place.” The sum total of it all meant that blacks
who wanted to be employed in the labor force to feed their families
would not dabble in politics; that blacks of affluence and wealth,
who wanted to keep that which they had or add to it, would by silence
and acquiescence refrain from agitating to end the relegation of the
black man to second class economic status in the United States. Thus
in a word, it meant that blacks in order to earn a living were com
pelled to surrender the political power that had become theirs, due
to the growth in the black population and their desire to break free
from the shackles of human bondage.33
The struggle by Freedom Incoarporated to end political
empowerment of the black community began almost from the day it
began to mobililze the black electorate within Kansas City to end the
practice of depriving them of their right to elect blacks during the
1963 municipal elections. For the most part, the political contest
between the candidates backed by the all white Citizen Association
and Freedom Incorporated Organization spurred voter education and
registration drives by the NAACP, the Ministers Union and voter
information debate forums sponsored by the Comunity Committee for
Social Action (CCSA), the first known activist organization to spring
up in the black community and which had successfully worked to combat
33Clayton, 36.
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discrimination in hiring practices and custom service as spoken about
by the Missouri Advisory Committee. According to their findings,
there were practically unanimous reports from state commissions in
both St. Louis and Kansas City, Missouri, in 1963, of denials and
restrictions in the areas of recreation, housing and employment.34
During the debates, Bruce Watkins promised the electorate of the
3rd District, “true representative democracy,” not just for you to
elect me to sit on the City Council to argue technicalities but to
give bona fide representation to my people. He served notice to the
entire city as to what to expect of him as councilman. On the radio,
TV, in public halls or small gatherings in the homes of his supporters,
Watkins’ message was always the same from the beginning of his campaign
to the very end.
The city is a business, the longest business in the
city, and it will take a person with knowledge in
running businesses to help run the city. The func
tion of the council is not just to make laws and pass
ordinances, but to represent the city and its people.
I believe I can do that.
We have three choices: shall we be controlled by
a board of directors downtown (Citizens Association)
or shall we continue to suffer from the vulturous
group of political bosses (factions) or shall we
elect the only candidate who does not answer to any
one but you. This is the kind of city councilmen I
will be. I believe I can do that.35
34Missouri Advisory Committee, A Report of the Missouri Advisory
Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (June 1963), 39.
35”Bruce Watkins Made History as Elected Official,” Kansas City
Call (September 25, 1980), p. 12
4~ — 4~h~.! L~thd4l~tIl~I~ _!~ ~ - -.
189
In these public debates and forums, Bruce Watkins was called a
ranting, raving maniac by the print and broadcasting media. However,
in the black community, “the little people at the bottom of the eco
nomic scale who had no voice even among their black peers listened
enthusiastically” and supported Watkins, nevertheless. The black
community and Watkin’s steadfast posture on providing representation
for the black community on the city council once elected, defeated
his opponent, Holliday, Sr., with a plurality of 3,000 votes. Follow
ing the election, the black newspaper, Kansas City Call, sought to
cool tempers by appealing to the conscience of the community that the
time had come to sober our loyalties for Holliday and get behind
Watkins for the best interest of the city. This form of subpoena
to close ranks behind Watkins enjoined Dr. Thomas and then Harold
Holiday, Sr., to coalesce with Watkins giving him their support
and scholarly advice for organizing the black electorate, and the
continual development of Freedom Incorporated. This community call
for unity served notice to the remnants of the old political machine
that “divide and conquer tactics would not kill or destroy Freedom
Incorporated ~~36
The elections of Dr. Earl Thomas, of Bruce Watkins and of Lew
Clymer as municipal judge, with the help of the black electorate and
the Freedom Incorporated Organization, were spurred by a realization
of the idea that as a collective force, blacks in Kansas City could
36Marlow, 1.
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effectuate the use of the electoral process in providing themselves
with representative democracy. Strategies and tactics to operationa
lize this foregoing process became militant, demagogic, and sometimes
menancing. By the end of 1963, the black social revolution in the
United States was about to enter the critical second stage of its
metamorphosis. In the process, it changed its goals, strategies and
tactics. There were also to be wholesale changes in its base of
operation, in its leadership, indeed in its image itself.37
The operationalization of strategies by Freedom Incorporated to
elect candidates to office was part in parcel integrated within the
purview of its desire to improve the black man’s political and econo
mic status. The relative degree of this movement against the varying
forms and degrees of white racism is as old as the city of Kansas City.
The shifting goals and strategies employed by Freedom to obtain access
to the political process mirrored national patterns. By 1963, accord
ing to Robert Brisbane, almost every sizeable black community in the
U.S. could boast of its local black freedom organization, movement,
committee or conference involved in the agitation for social and poli—
tical justice.38
Criticism by Bruce Watkins about police brutality and black
agitation for social and political rights contributed to a political
37Robert Brisbane, Black Activism (Valley Forge, PA: Judson
Press, 1974), 116. 62, 73.
____ 62.
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confrontation between the police and the black community on July 9,
1967, in the neighborhood of Swope Park in Kansas City. Eleven blacks
were arrested and one was injured quite seriously following a two hour
rock throwing incident between police and 150 blacks. The riot began
after four vice squad police officers (2 black and 2 white) arrested
three blacks on a liquor violation charge. A scuffle between police
officers and a black youth occurred when the police attempted to
arrest him. The police officers telephoned and received backup
support to handle the crowd of black onlookers who, at this time,
felt the black youth was handled most inappropriately by the police.
As word of the incident began to spread throughout Kansas City, more
and more blacks began to arrrive at Swope Park to protest police
brutality. The police used tear gas to disperse the crowd, setting
off a chain of events that resulted in the destruction and damage of
store windows and police cars. The eleven men arrested were fined
$50.00 each for disorderly conduct and disturbing the peace. Governor
Warren Hearnes of Missouri gave unqualified support for the police
during the conflict. He told the police to “shoot every nigger in
sight that they caught rioting in the streets of Kansas City,
Missouri.” Both Freednm Incorporated and its president from that
point onward became bitter foes of the governor.39
William Mullens, Richard Berk and others contend that when the
economic and social institutions fail to provide life chances that a
Tribute to a Great Leader,” Voters Guide (July 1970), p.
la.
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substantial part of a population demands and when political institu
tions or organizations fail to provide a remedy, the operations of the
people begin to spill over into forms of activity that the dominant
society regards either as acceptable or illegitimate (crime, vanda—
lism, non—cooperation and various forms of political activity.)40 In
other words, participation with the body shapes a public discourse on
the nature of black reality.41 Researchers F. Meyers,42 Mack
Jones,43 Ron Bailey44 and Alex Willingham,45 have attempted to forge a
discussion through their research that the nature of urban unrest,
such as which occurred in Kansas City, Missouri, should be thought of
as part of the movement for social change and the dogmatic hesita
tion on the part of whites to share power with the black electorate.
40William F. Mullen, “Community Control and Black Political Par
ticipation,” in Terrence Cook and Patrick Morgan, Participatory Demo
cracy (New York: Canfield Press, 1971), 258—59.
41David Boesel, Richard Berk, W. Eugene Groves, Betty Eidson and
Peter Rossi, “White Institutions and Black Rage,” Transaction (March
1969), 29.
42F. Meyers, “Social Class and Political Change in Western Indus
trial System,” in Giuseppe Palma, Mass Politics in Industrial
Societies (Chicago: Markham Pub., Co., 1972), 53.
43Mack Jones, “Black Officeholders and Political Development in
the Rural South,” Review of Black Political Economy, (Summer 1976),
375.
44Ron Bailey, “Economic Aspects of the Black Colony,” Review of
Black Political Economy, (Summer 1973), 133.
45Alex Willingham, TtToward a Framework for the Analysis of
Writings about Black Political Theory,” (Memo, 1970), 1.
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Under the impact of police—black community problems, the mounting
unrest among poor blacks in Kansas City, Missouri, further consol
idated both their anxiety and support for Freedom Incorporated to
free the community from the institutional controls, that, heretofore,
have kept them in a constant exploited and oppressed political
system.
Bad housing, police community problems and the struggle for
black labor force participants to work in the labor force, focused
the thrust of the civil rights movement to ameliorate these social
inequities. Agitation on the part of Freedom Incorporated and the
black electorate to use public facilities, reflected in toto its
shifting goals and priorities from the locus of a national impetus to
a local change in its mode of operation. Across the nation, protest
organizations began to agitate for the passage of public accomodation
laws by local municipal governments. In Kansas City, the City
Council was too afraid of passing a public accommodation ordinance
because it felt that segments of the white society would vehemently
work to oppose both its introduction in the council and its passage.
In 1963, the City Council resisted all legislative initiatives geared
toward providing public accommodations and ending the process of
racial segregation in all segments of the economy. Nevertheless, the
City Council was able to, with the assistance of Bruce Watkins and
Dr. Earl Thomas, bring about changes in the council approach to the
1 dl I 1 I.’ Ill II l~ ik~l~k].L IElllfl~. C —
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treatment of its citizens. Both Watkins and Thomas initiated ex
ploratory talks with the members of the council and the legal pro
fession to design a public accommodations ordinance for the city.
After receiving a draft copy of the ordinance, Watkins introduced it
before the council and asked his colleagues to move expeditiously on
its passage. Subsequently, after its introduction, Mayor Davis and
the coalition of council members supported its passage.
However, as soon as the ordinance was passed, whites on the
city’s northside organized an opposition campaign and collected enough
petition signatures to have the issue brought before voters in a refe
rendum. This group of whites had expected the ordinance to be re
jected by the City Council and the mayor.46
Although other whites in the city were certain that the referen
dum would be approved, and the black community was not as confident.
Holliday, Sr., was asked by Bruce Watkins to head the Public Accommo
dations campaign as a counter balance to the political mobilizing
effort of whites on the northside to defeat its passsage. Freedom
Incorporated, under the guidance of its president, Leon Jordan, and
Holliday, Sr., masterminded and led a voter registration and education
campaign in order to generate public sympathy for the law and to
achieve its passage. Supporters of the ordinance assisted Freedom in
its effort at canvassing the black community and in encouraging them to
46Black Enterprise, 43.
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vote for its passage. Voter information forums held by the black
radio station KPRS, and speeches given by Jordan before church groups,
civic associations and private clubs urged blacks to get involved in
agitating the electorate to register and vote for the passage of the
Public Accommodation Ordinance. In just a few months, Freedom had
registered more than 10,000 new black voters in its campaign to
desegregate Kansas City.
Strategically, Freedom Incorporated viewed the magnitude and
complexity of this task to integrate the black community into the
political process as part of the preliminary process in achieving
black political empowerment. The success of this mobilizing effort
was instrumental in the passage of the Public Accommodations Ordin
ance on April 23, 1964. The Ordinance was able to pass with the
support it received from only nine out of 24 wards.47 It was ap
proved by 45,850 to 44,030 votes. The Ordinance was upheld by a
scant 1,743 votes out of 90,000 votes cast. The Ordinance allowed
the city to extend its 1962 ban on bias in hotels, motels and restau
rants, to taverns, transportation facilities, retail stores, trade
schools, amusement parks, hospitals and other places serving the
public.48 The political techniques of door to door canvassing and
agitating the black electorate to vote, established for the first
47Ibid., 43—44.
48Lester A. Sobell, Civil Rights 1960—66 (New York: Facts on
File, Inc., 1967), 275.
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time since the reign of the Pendergast machine, the facilitation of
an effective precinct organization. Through this precinct organiza
tion Competition for political power to acquire black social justice,
housing and jobs for blacks participating in the labor force took
on a renewed importance with the victory for public accomodations
and the migration and registration of newly registered blacks living
and working in the city.
The crucial test of Freedom Incorporated’s politcal strength to
compete against the plantation bosses came during the third period
(1966—1967) known as the Struggle to Gain Black Political Representa
tion on the Eight Legislative Seats Representing Jackson County During
the August, 1964 Primary. During this period, the Democratic and Re
publican Parties held their primaries in the month of August in Kansas
City, Missouri. These primaries, held every two years, are both
closed. Winning in the Democratic Primary almost guarantees your
electoral victory in November, since Kansas City and Jackson County
are 80 percent Democratic and 20 percent Republican. Nationally,
there are distinguishing characteristics that exist between closed
primaries that exist in Kansas City, Missouri, and open primaries in
other states. In the former, all who wish to vote in a party primary,
must stand ready to pass the past allegiance, present affiliation and
future intention test. In the past allegiance test, a voter living in
the state of Ohio claiming to be affiliated with a political party,
must take an oath and swear that in the last general election, he or
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she supported the nominee of the party. Secondly, in the present
affiliation test, a voter living in the state of South Dakota,
must swear that he believes in the philosophy and goals of the party
and that he is in good standing as a member. Finally, the future
intention test applied in the state of Missouri requires that an
electorate must take an oath swearing that during the next general
election he or she will support the party’s nominee. A combination
of the past allegiance, present affiliation and Missouri’s future
intention test is used nationally by some states.49
The candidates representing Freedom IncDrporated and vying for
public office during the primary have lived in Kansas City for the
major portion of their lives and represent both the liberal and con
servative perspective of the black community. The strategy Freedom
Incorporated employed to wrestle political power away from Louis
Wagner and the Citizen Association by was to run a slate of seven
candidates, four black men and three black women, for the eight
legislativeseats representing Jackson County.
In the 2nd State District, Freedom supported John W. Butler
against the incumbents Harry Goldberg and Henry Ross. During the era
of the Pendergast machine, Harry Goldberg assisted Tom Pendergast and
Louis Wagner in competing against the mobilizing efforts of the black
community to elect candidates to public offices. As a smart politi—
49Austin Ramney and Willmore Kendall, Democracy and the American
Party System (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1956), 206.
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cian, Wagner had noticed that blacks migrated to Kansas City and the
exodus of whites to suburban and surrounding areas, threatened his
political base in the 2nd District. To appease the mounting tide of
black agitation for representation, Wagner made a pledge to his top
black lieutenant, Sylvester “Baby Face” Norris, and the leaders of
the black community in 1963, that if they would support the reelec
tion of Harry Goldberg he would support Henry Ross, a black man for
the state house in the 2nd District in 1964. Wagner kept his promise
and he instructed his Jacksonian Democratic Club to refrain from
supporting Goldberg in his reelection bid and to actively support the
election of Ross as state representative from the 2nd District.
Leon Jordan, President of Freedom, opposed another of Wagner’s
political bosses, J. McKinley Neal, from the 4th State House District.
Every since 1954, Neal served in his capacity as a state representa
tive from the 4th District, performing at least two functions. First,
he performed the task of being the only black state representative
from Jackson County. Secondly, as a black man he was displayed before
the black community as a symbolic gesture to end the mounting criti—
cism by Freedom Incorporated, that white ward plantation bosses were
not sensitive to the needs and interests of the black community.
Nevertheless, in the race for the 5th State House District Post,
Freedom backed Harold Holliday against five opponents, including the
white incumbent, George Weatherly. Robert Roane was Freedom’s candi
date for the 17th Ward County Committeeman post against six other
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contenders vying for the same post. It also endorsed Mrs. Elinora
Reynolds for County Committeewoman, against five candidates from the
17th Ward. And lastly, Freedom supported Melvin Webb, who ran in the
2nd Ward for the County Committeeman’s seat against Sylvester “Baby
Face” Norris, and Sherrill Smith, who opposed his wife, Yvonne Norris,
to become the County Committeewomen representative from the 2nd
District.
Although Freedom Incorporated began an all out drive to register
new black voters to support its candidates, it also campaigned to get
out the black vote to support the reelection of Richard Bolling for
U.S. Congressman from the 5th District, against the Citizen Associ
ation candidate Judge Hunter Phillips of the County Court, represen—
ting the Eastern portion of Missouri. Richard “Dick” Boiling as he
was called, was endorsed by Freedom because of his ardent support of
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and as an advocate of the
war on poverty programs sponsored by the Johnson Administration. It
was during the August 4, 1964, a primary that the Kansas City Call
newspaper reminded the black electorate of the contributions made by
Freedom Incorporated and Richard Bolling to the struggle for black
political empowerment in Kansas City, Missouri.
the factions hope to replace Bolling with
Hunter Phillips. But Richard Bolling has been the
representatative from the Fifth District since 1948,
and the factions would need all the votes they could
muster for the oncoming battle. Therefore, they were
relying heavily on “Boss Louis Wagner’~ to marshall
the black electorate to vote in support of Phillips.50
50me Kansas City Call (August 1964), L, 10.
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The support given by the Kansas City Call and Freedom Incorpo
rated and the speeches and debates sponsored by members of local com
munity groups and associations urging the black electorate to vote
for Boiling and Freedom backed candidates allowed the organization for
the first time to muster enough support to challenge the power and
prestige of Louis Wagner and his Jacksonian Democratic Club. During
the Primary election held on August 4, 1964, nearly 65 percent of the
register Democrats in Jackson County turned out to vote. Statisti
cally, at least seven of the nine candidates supported by Freedom
Incorporated won their elections. The three wards with a predomint—
ly black population, the 2nd, 3rd and 14th Districts gave Richard
Bollin an impressive 7,520 votes compared to 2,974 votes that Hunter
Phillips received. Boiling won the election by better than 2 to 1
in the District that was 17.4 percent black. The black electorate
supported him and other Democratic candidates supported by Freedom,
when they failed to see a decisive difference between Phillips and
Boiling on racial grounds.5’ The only candidates backed by Freedom
Incorporated to lose their electoral contest during this period were
John Butler, who lost to Wagner’s black lieutenant, Henry Ross for
the 2nd State House District race, and Mrs. Sherill Smith, who lost
to Mrs. Yvonne Norris in her Primary bid for the 2nd Ward County
Committeewoman post, and ~1elvin Webb, who lost to Sylvester “Baby
5~-Everett C. Ladd, Transformation of the American Party System
New York: W. W. Norton and Company), 164, 248, 241.
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Face” Norris, Wagner’s top black lieutenant and advisor on black
community issues, for the 2nd Ward’s County Committeeman’s seat.
The August 4, 1964 Primary marked the beginning of the long and
bitter quest by Freedom Incorporated to end the practice by Louis
Wagner and his Jacksonian Democratic Club of handpicking candidates
to run for state—wide office to represent the black community.
Although Freedom emerged with an overwelming and resounding victory
over Wagner in the primary, it still did not control the selection
and election of its candidates for the County Committeeman and County
Committeewoman posts, which were, by the way, still controlled by the
Jacksonian Democratic Club organization. With the election of
Wagner’s candidates to these county seats, the control by Wagner of
the 2nd Ward became entrenched and secure from the challenge by
Freedom Incorporated.
The pattern of Louis Wagner and his Jacksonian Democratic Club
of electing its candidates to county and municipal seats was simply a
method of subordinating the black electorate to the whims of his
organization and for emasculating the articulation of questions
raised by the black political movement for social, political and
economic power. Freedom Incorporated was able to engineer political
tactics during the primary to elect its candidates to public office.
As a part of its goal of unchaining the black community from the
control of the white ward political boss, as the Kansas City Call
states, Freedom Incorporated showed that it could finally integrate
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the black community with access to the political process as decision
makers. After only After only two years, Freedom Incorporated and
the black electorate showed Louis Wagner and his Jacksonian Democratic
Club during the August, 1964 primary that black voters
are in nobody’s pocket but their own. By their their
overwhelming support of Richard Boiling for Con
gressman from the Fifth District, by their nomination
of Harold Holliday for state legislator over five
other candidates supported by various factional
groups and by their election of county committeeman
and committeewoman in the 14th and 17th Wards who
are not tied by factions, Negro voters demonstra—
ed that they were becoming politically free. They
are becoming unchained from “boss” leadership which
for years has dominated the Wards in which they live.
During the August Primary, we urged Negroes to vote
for Boiling no matter what the factioi leaders told
them. They did! We thank each and every voter who
pulled the lever for Kansas City’s civil rights con
gressman. Because of his outstanding work in Con—
gress, Boiling deserved renomination and Negroes did
their part in bringing about the lefeat of his
faction—backed opponent. A special vote of thanks
goes to the Negro residents of the Second Ward who
gave Boiling a good majority in the very stronghold
of the factions. Just as the factions sought to
defeat Boiling, they were out teeth and toenail to
put Freedom, Inc., out of business in the 14th and
17th Wards. Here too, they failed. Freedom candi
dates made a clean sweep through both Wards, becom
ing the dominant political organization in the
community.
This is the third time that Freedom, Inc., has
displayed its political strength. The first was in
the city election last year when Bruce Watkins was
elected to the City Council. The second time was
in the Public Accommotions election this spring.
Now, after its third triumph, Freedom, Inc., must be
recognized as a potent political organization cap
able of doing for Negro people what other politi
cal groups with a different philosophy and purpose
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are unable to do. People all over the city are
looking upon Freedom, Inc., with wonder and new
respect. 52
Immediately after the Kansas City Call’s editorial appeared
in the paper, Freedom Incorporated wrote an open letter to the black
community to thank them for their undying support during the primary.
The letter read:
August 4, 1964, proves once again that our people are
determined to achieve First Class Citizenship, free
dom in our time. Freedom, Inc., the People’s Party,
sincerely congraulates all of those intelligent
and freedom loving people who joined hands with us
in our battle.
Public accommodations and this past August Primary are
merely steps along the road to freedom. We must be
ever vigilant and mindful of this, we must close our
ranks, and join hands for the battles to come. Always
remember that Freedom, Inc., is your organization, its
members, officers and candidates are yours, and that
they are people just like you. So never hesitate to
call on Freedom, Inc., for assistance.
Freedom’s victory is your victory. Let us all be proud
of our most recent accomplishment.53
During the mid 1960’s the civil rights movement in the midwest
had a profound effect on the growth of the black political struggle
by raising anew the issue of whether “electoral politics was an ap
propriate or paternalistic strategy for ameliorating or ending
52The Kansas City Call, (August 7, 1964), 4.
53Reverend James D. Tindall, Research Data on the History of
Freedom Incorporated (Kansas City, Missouri: Freedom Incorporated,
1974), 9.
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the systematic campaign to disenfranchise black people,”54 in Kansas
City. Voter registration drives, the development of Freedom Incor—
porated, the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the defeat of
Louis Wagner and his Jacksonian Democratic Club candidates during the
August 1964, primary, followed by the passage of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, had fermented the process of political socialization of
the black community.55
Ironically, passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which focused
upon eliminating the administrative means used to perpetuate voter
discrimination was ineffective in localites56 where evidence of
voting discrimination was enforced by other means.57 In 1965,
civil rights workers under the leadership of Martin Luther King,
Jr., staged a voter registration drive in Selma, Alabama, to symbolize
to the nation that the black electorate was tired of being told that
it should wait until later to enter the American political process.58
54James Button, “Southern Black Elected Officials: Impact on
Socio—economic Change,” The Review of Black Pal Economy (Fall 1982),
1.
55John Daniels, “Negro Political Behavior and Community Politi
cal and Socio—Economic Structural Factors,” Social Forces (March
1969), 274.
56Hanes Walton, Black Political Parties: An Historical and Poli
tical Analysis (New York: The Free Press, 1972), 118.
57Pat Walters and Reese Cleghorn, Climbing Jacob’s Ladder (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and World Incorporated, 1967), 258—259.
58u.s. Riot Commission Report (New York: Banton Books, Inc.,
1968), 37.
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The struggle for the franchise in 1965 marked the era of blacks
gaining the right to vote as a stepping stone for electing black
elected officeholders. The strategies and programs that embodies
the philosophy of registering blacks to participate in the Kansas
City political system was the basic philosophy of Freedom Incor
porated. The Freedom Incorporated voter registration drive was
largerly successful in increasing the number of black registered
voters in the 3rd, 16th and 18th Wards.
ATTEMPTS AT COALITION BUILDING
With partial independence from Louis Wagner and his Jacksonian
Democratic Club occurring as a process of the August 4, 1964, primary,
the plantation bosses began to encouraged forms alliances conducive
to protect his political power and prestige. Once Freedom demon
strated that it was a political force to be reckeoned with, white
political organizations began to seek alliances with Freedom Incor
porated. The first to align with Freedom in 1965 was the Committee
for County Progress and its president, Charles Curry. The Committee
for County Progress is made up of businessment, parents, housewives,
lawyers interested in the preservation of good government in Jackson
County. The Committee for County Progress was one of the many groups
agitating to ouster Pendergast and his organization and supporters
from city government. When Pendergast was tried and convicted of tax
~LJ~h
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evasion, the Committee for County Progress along with the Kansas City
Star organized a campaign to oust the remnants of Pendergast’s machine
from city government and to end the practice of patronage in city,
county and state government. The principal reason the Committee
allied itself with Freedom was to eliminate the influence and power
of Louis Wagner’s political organization from city and county
politics. The Committee for County Progress was formed by Charles
Curry and invited Freedom Incorporated to join. Freedom accepted
membership in this powerful white organization because its leaders
realized that this alliance could only make the organization stronger.
Moreover, alliance could also aid the organization in electing a black
county official, which had never occurred before. The strategy that
evolved from the periodic meetings and planning conferences between
Charles Curry and the leadership of Freedom Incorporated to bring
about the defeat of all factional backed candidates for state district
offices, consisted of the following goals:
A. to retain presently held legislative and county committee
seats;
B. to elect a black man as circuit clerk of the County Court
House;
C. to put an end to the rule of the ‘phony politicians’ who
have been getting richer while the poor get poorer;
D. to mobilize their resources and collectively work to defeat
Louis Wagner’s candidates (Ross and Norris);
E. to elect black state legislators from the newly redistricted
13th and 15th state house districts.59
59”Curry Will Seek Equal Opportunity,” Kansas City Call (July
29, 1966), 1.
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It was hoped that through this process, a black man could be
elected to a major county office. Bruce Watkins seized the initia
tive and announced his candidacy for the position. As black voting
numbers in the cities continued to build up and blacks began to demon
strate for economic and political power, state and city governments
began to take note of these peculiarities. Civil rights agitation
reached a crescendo during this period in Kansas City and throughout
the nation. At the time, and partly as a result of voter registra
tion campaigns in Kansas City, Missouri, in 1965 and 1966, politi
cians responded to this political challenge6° by agreeing to
negotiate and listen to their discontent and demands. The net
result of this process, in some instances, contributed to improve
ment in the allocation of goods and services to the black community.
The acceptance of Freedom Incorporated into the powerful all
white Committee for County Progress was a tactic in aiding the goal
of the organization to elect Bruce Watkins as clerk of the circuit
court of the county. This occurred at the time when whites began to
migrate into the suburbs. The voting registration and civil rights
campaigns along with Freedom Incorporated alliance with white organi
zations and the continuing and ongoing shifting population movements
toward the suburbs made white state representatives of the 13th and
15th Wards quite uneasy because of the passage by the Missouri State
60Francis Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor:
The Functions of Public Welfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 239—
243.
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Legislation of its redistricting plan in February of 1966. This
redistricting plan was passed in compliance with Article I, Section 3
of the United State Constitution which states that, “representatives
and district taxes shall be apportioned among the several states ac
cording to their respective numbers . . . every ten years.”61
In 1966, the process of reapportioning the state legislature in
Missouri made the white incumbents uneasy because it had to do more
with how the black electorate in the 13th and 15th districts cast
their votes to elect state representatives. For this reason, the dis
tribution of power occasioned by the reapportionment battle in the
Missouri State Legislature altered the balance of power relations due
to the statistical and historical patterns of migration to the state
since the 1960’s. The movement toward transforming politically the
composition of the seats in the state legislature was continuously
the focus of the black electorate to wrestle political power away
from the hands of the Citizen Association and Louis Wagner and his
Jacksonian Democratic Club. In the Democratic Pary of August 1966,
Freedom Incorporated sponsored a slate of candidates for state and
county committee posts.
In the 11th District, Freedom supported the incumbent and its
president, Leon Jordan, against his challeiger, J. McKinley Neal,
Wagner’s henchman who had been the only black state representative
61The Constitution of the United State of America, Section Three.
—~ ~i.
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from Jackson County until the time that Leon Jordan defeated him. In
the 10th District, Freedom backed David Crockett against the incumbent
Henry Ross. Freedom’s candidate for the 13th District Seat was Fred
Curls, a founding member of its organization, against James W. Spencer,
another black man supported by Wagner. The Freedom Incorporated can
didate for the 14th District seat was the incumbent Harold Holliday,
Sr. His opponent was a faction candidate by the name of Fred Shel
ton. And finally, Freedom ran James Northern against Phillip Scaglia
for the 15th District State House seat.
There were at least six candidates backed by Freedom for the
county committee positions during the August 1966 primary. Freedom
supported Preston Kelly against Sylvester “Baby Face” Norris in
the 2nd Ward. Brewel Simpson and Gloria and Charles Hazely were
Freedom’s candidates for the county committeemen and committeewomen
seats. Additionally, Leon Jordan and Rosemary Lowe were running for
reelection to the county committee seat from the 14th Ward, and
likewise David Crockett and Rosalie Mason in the 16th Ward. Robert
Roane and Elenora Reynolds were supported by Freedom for county
committeeman and county committeewoman seats from the 17th Ward.
As the primary approached its finale, a considerable amount of
time was utilized by Freedom Incorporated to mobilize the black
electorate to vote for its candidates in the Democratic Primary.
Louis Wagner and his Jacksonian Democratic Club, the Citizen Associa—
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tion and Freedom Incorporated campaigned extensively throughout the
city in the areas that were transforming from a predominately white
to a black neighborhood. By the time the August 2nd Democratic Pri
mary had arrived, charges and counter charges were leveled against
Freedom Incorporated by the all white Citizen Association and Louis
Wagner and his Jacksonian Democratic Club that Freedom was actually
controlled by Charles Curry and his Committee for County Progress,
Bruce Watkins and Freedom Incorporated responded to the charges
by releasing the following press statement.
• • . after 100 years of “conditional freedom” there
are far too many people who still can make a profit
out of buying and selling Negroes. No place but in
the Negro community are humans bought and sold, and
the only people who can halt it are Negroes themselves.
Negroes in every walk of life from the secure to the
the insecure, young and old, rich and poor, educated
and uneducated, good and not so good. In the success
ful elimination of this evil, there is no room for
superficial differences of class and kind • We must
come together as one strongly committed to the total
well—being of Negroes and the steady continuing pro
gress of the Negro community in its fight against
police brutality, for equal job opportunity and human
rights. These plantation bosses who have controlled
us must be eliminated one and for all in order to
rid our community of the stigma of inferiority (that
Negroes are inferior and need white boss control)
and to take our place as the responsible people we
are in a great and growing city. In no uncertain
terms we must dedicate ourselves to the long , hard,
tedious conquest of poverty and inequality. This
is a challenge I have accepted and pray others will
UAJ,~k$kJ~4~i~
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follow that we may carry this fight to the energy
wherever it raises its ugly head.62
Conversely, Charles Curry responded to Wagner and Citizen Asso
ciation’s allegation by stating that councilman Bruce Watkins:
is an outstanding citizen in Jackson County.
We need a councilman in the county courthouse, not
because he is a member of the minority race, although
this will make him more valuable since he is aware of
the special problems of minority groups and because
he is a man of proven ability and highest integrity.
I look for a bright new day for all of Jackson County
when Councilman Watkins is elected to our county
government. 63
The support for Watkins occasioned at the time of the national
civil rights movement continued to exert pressure on state and
national administrators to open up the political process to blacks.
Editorials and articles were written by the Kansas City Call at the
time of the August 1966, Democratic primary reminding the black
electorate that:
the factions failed to endorse the public accomoda—
tions ordinance, equal employment and fair housing
and that boss Wagner and his plantation bosses want
ed to retain their power and keep us blacks chained
to slavery as long as they possibly can. Don’t get
mad get smart and break the chains of slavery by vot
ing for Bruce Watkins who, indeed, will be the first
Negro to hold an elected office in Jackson County.64
62See Press Release Statement by Bruce Watkins, (1966), and
“Don’t Get Mad, Get Smart,” Kansas City Call (July 20, 1986), 1.
63”Freedom Incorporated Joins Team for Progress,” Kansas City
Call (July 24, 1966), 1.
64”Watkins Continues Fight for Freedom,” Kansas City Call (July
1966), 1.
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By election day, Freedom and the County Committee for Progress,
Citizen Association and especially Louis Wagner and his Jacksonian
Democratic Club were quite anxiously awaiting the primary outcome as
they struggled to maintain their position of dominance over a city
populated by blacks. Data from the Kansas City Board of Election
indicate the following results from the 1966 Primary Election.
In the 10th District, Henry Ross received 2,309 to
David Crockett’s 1,230 votes. In the 11th District,
Leon Jordan received 2,672 to Warren James’ 686, 13th
District, James Spencer’s 1,711 to Fred Curls’ 1,366,
14th District, Harold Holiday’s 2,894 to Fred Shelton’s
791; 15th District, Phillip Scaglia’s 2,450 to James
Northern’s 1,333, Circuit Clerk, Bruce Watkins’ 36,243
to John McFadded’s 30,071 for county committee, 2nd
Ward, Sylvester “Baby Face” Norris’ 1,884 to Preston
Kelly’s 670, 3rd Ward, Robert Sweeny’s 1,619 to Brewl
Simpson’s 470, Helen B. Baar’s 1,350 to Gloria Hazely’s
608, 14th Ward, Leon Jordan’s 2,020 to Nelson Thomp
son’s 294; Rosemary Lowe’s 1,508 to Dovie Woodbury’s
561, 16th Ward, David Crockett’s 744 :o Ray O’Leary’s
387, Rosalie Mason’s 758 to Maye Graham’s 375, 17th
Ward, Robert Roane’s 1,291 to Walter Carpenter’s 831,
Elinora Reynolds’ 1,264 to Alice Tinson’s 977~64
Of the four candidates who were seeking the County Committee
post, Bruce Watkins acquired more votes than his opponents by a
comfortable margin of 40,111 votes. If there was to be any position
that would further enhance Watkin’s notoriety, the circuit clerk post
would be it. As a circuit clerk, he embarked upon a momentus task of
trying to: (a) establish a better working relationship with attorneys
and their firms throughout Kansas City and the state of Missouri, (b)
65Election Results, 1966 Democratic Primary Election (Kansas
City, Missouri: Kansas City Board of Election Commissioners, 1966), 1.
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deployment of goals to ensure that minorities would be equally repre
sented in all sectors of employment in the entire county; and (c),
making full use of the circuit clerk office to improve public and
human relations by referring people to proper channels to solve their
problems associated with unequal tax assessment, bonds in court cases
and legal problems.
The slate of candidates sponsored by Freedom Incorporated during
the Democratic Primary came on the heels of the victory for public
accommodations. Once Freedom Incorporated demonstrated that it was
a political force to be reckoned with, the white Citizen Association,
a reform minded organization which had helped to oust the corrupt
regime of Tom Pendergast, informed Leon Jordan that they would
support two of Freedom’s candidates for city council from the 3rd
District and 3rd District at—large seats. The 1966 county, municipal
and state elections left Freedom Incorporated in excellent bargaining
position. Freedom accepted the Citizen Association’s offer and
together they decided to run C. Lawrence Blankenship for the 3rd
District at—large seat. In a lackluster campaign, both men were
easily elected over two avowed white racists and Illus Davis, the
Mayor of Kansas City, Missouri, was reelected with the support of the
black vote.
In the period between 1962 and 1968, racially polarized voting
in Kansas City, in particular, and the United States, in general,
actually increased in this era at about the same time that the overt
I 4k
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violence and confrontation of the civil rights movement was on the
decline. When the issue shapes up into a confrontation on a political
contest between whites and blacks competing for elected office in
Kansas City along voting patterns, automatically you begin to see
the kind of ethnic identity remaining strong among white ethnics.
According to Raymond Wolfinger,
as succeeding generations of white ethnic immigrants
are acculturated into the American mainstream, their
ethnic identity, as measured in terms of their pro
pensity to vote, decreases. In looking at a wide
range of evidence, research discovered that just the
opposite was true; that surprisingly the persistence
of white ethnics to vote for ethnic candidates from
their own ethnic group at the polling booth, remained
very strong even fifty, sixty and seventy years after
those ethnic groups had first come to American
shores • 66
As protest marchers were jailed and beatened in their quest for
access to the franchise, the mood in the black community, particularly
in Kansas City, by 1967 was to continue the efficacy of accelerating
the process of community empowerment under the guidance of Freedom In
corporated. The cry of black power by Stokley Carmichael and Martin
Luther King, Jr. ‘s politics of direct action served as a machination
process for allowing the urban poor to strike out against the police,
white merchants, white dominated mass media, local dominated politics,
and discrimination in the delivery of services to the black community
66Voting Rights, Abuse and Other Continuing Problems of Minority
Representation: Conference on Minority Voting Rights in the South
(Georgia: Atlanta Biltmore Hotel) (August 21, 1981), 45.
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by local, state and national agencies.67 Access to the franchise
conducive to the growth and participation of blacks in the electoral
process helped to strengthen their resolve to agitate during the 1968
county election for additional legislative seats.
During the fourth period, known as the Struggle for Access to
County Legislative Seats, Riots and the Urban Fiscal Crisis (l967
1970, the black electorate and Freedom Incorporated embarked upon
a systematic campaign to end the reign of the absentee and planta
tion bosses. This period marked the era of Freedom Incorporated
continuing its strategy of mobilizing and organizing the black
electorate to elect its candidates to county legislative seats in
the August 1968 primary. This mobilizing effort took place during
the time of a tragic and unpredictable set of circumstances. The
killing of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., on April 4, 1968, in Memphis,
Tennessee, set off a chain of events that struck the very fiber and
nerve chords of the American political arena. In its almost two hun
dred years of existence as a nation, anarchy never strode so boldly
in Kansas City as it did in the wake of Dr. King’s assassination.
Grief striken, bitter and vengeful blacks took to the streets to let
white America know it was being held responsible for the killing of
Dr. King.68
67David 0. Sears and John B. McConahay, The Politics of Violence,
The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
68Brisbane, 174.
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Kansas City was by no means exempt from the racial disorder that
spurred the burning of buildings, destroying automobiles and shooting
at police attempting to quell civil disorder in this midwestern city.
These riots, in the words of Dr. King about a year before his death,
were at bottom, the language of the unheard. It is the desperate,
suicidal cry of one who is so fed up with the powerlessness of his
cave existence that he asserts that he would rather be dead than
ignored.69 Both the killing and wounding of black youths who parti
cipated in the racial unrest of 1968 that spread throughout the black
community occurred at a time when Freedom Incorporated and its candi
dates were trying to accelerate the process of community empowerment.
A schematic general overview of the events that took place four months
before the August 1968, primary, to some extent, illustrates the mood
and degree of bitterness and grief that existed during the period.
The violence began on April 9, 196&, after police
fired tear gas into a crowd at City Hall to hear
an address by Mayor Illus W. Davis. The Negroes,
mostly teenagers, had marched to the building to
protest the city’s decision to keep the schools
open on the day of the funeral for Martin Luther
King in contrast to the decision of neighbor
ing Kansas City, Kansas, to close its schools.
The police said they had fired the tear gas
after a Negro threw a bottle at them. The crowd
dispersed and assembled in the East side of Kansas
City, smashing windows, setting fires and looting
stores. By the end of the night, one Negro had
been shot and killed by police while he was loot
ing a liquor store; 57 persons were injured (7 by
by gunfire) and about 270 were arrested. About
75 fires were set, and windows were broken
in some 200 business establishments. The city
69Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Where Do We Go From Here (Chicago:
Johnson Publishing Company, Inc., 1966), 112.
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imposed a 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. curfew and called in
300 to 400 national guardsmen to patrol the streets
and enforce the curfew.
On April 10, the most serious incident of vio
lence occurred in the morning, outside predominantly
black Lincoln High School where students were milling
around waiting for classes to begin. Police urged the
students to go inside the building, but when they ap
parently felt that the students were putting up resis—
tence, they immediately fired tear gas into the crowd.
The students ran into the school and the police follow
lowed and fired tear gas again inside the building.
The school was evacuated and most of the students went
home. Despite the incident, the city remained rela
tively calm most of April 10th and Mayor Davis
announce in the afternoon that the curfew would be
lifted that night. About an hour later, however,
crowds of blacks began roaming through the Eastside
and the situation quickly got out of hand. Rioters
threw molotov cocktails at police and National Guards
men, set about 70 fires, looted stores and harassed
police and firemen with sniper fire. Four Negroes were
shot and killed by unknown persons in a four block
area of sniper fire along Prospect Street. Twenty—two
persons were injured, about half of them by gunfire,
and about 150 persons were arrested most of them for
distruction of property and curfew violations. Police
reported that their command post was under sporadic
fire, and the police academy was severly damaged by
fire. Mayor Davis ordered all police to duty, rein
stated the curfew, closed all taverns and liquor
stores and banned the sale of guns, ammunition and
gasoline in closed containers. The National Guard
force was increased during the day to 3,000 men.
Although the violence fell off considerably by April
11th, Mayor Davis declared a state of emergency and
imposed a dusk to dawn curfew. One Negro was shot
and killed by police in a gun fight; his death raised
the 3—day toll to six. Only five confirmed sniping
incidents and minor arson were reported on April 12
and nobody was injured. Scattered sniping and fire
bombing continued on April 13, but the city moved the
curfew back to 11:00 p.m. On April 14, city officials
announced that order had been restored and that about
2,500 of the National Guardsmen were being sent home.
One battalion of military police and about 100 state
U i~ b ~!tk4~kaarng
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troopers remained on duty in the city. Mayor Davis
lifted the ban on gasoline sales, but not on the sale
of firearms and ammunition.7°
Speeches and community forums were held by Freedom Incorporated,
charging the black electorate with the responsibility of exercising
its authority during the upcoming August 1968, Primary and electing
its candidates to represent them in the state, municipal and county
elections. The organization had hoped to convince the black electo
rate of strengthening its convenant with Freedom Incorporated and let
Freedom’s candidates continue to negotiate on its behalf, and articu
late its concerns and frustration and demands to the political system.
The goal of this effort and that of the 1968 electoral campaign was
to support the candidates backed by the committees for county pro
gress, the election of Dr. Charles Bryan for County Coroner. As a
political organization, Freedom was not only supporting the election
of its candidates in the 2nd, 3rd, 16th and 17th Wards against Louis
Wagner and his candidates, it was also running Harold L. Holliday,
Sr., for a state senatorial seat from the 14th District, against the
incumbent Edgar Keating. Support by Freedom for the election of
Holliday against Keating was both an organized and strategic effort
to tap the mood of the protest movement spreading through the city to
take advantage of black and white demographic shifts in the state’s
population and the passage by the Missouri General Assembley of its
70”Violence Follows Dr. King’s Death,” Civil Rights Digest (New
York: Facts on File Incorporated, 1973), 239.
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reapportionment plan, which created a district that was 55 percent
black. Support by Freedom of the plan and the advent of the black
migration to the city coupled with the mood of the black electorate
to combat police brutality, elimination of impediments for equal
access to the labor force, decent homes and schools for its children,
allowed the organization to campaign and support at least five candi
dates vying for state house seats in 1968.
In the house seat, Freedom supported the incumbent and its
president, Leon Jordan; William Carson in the 14th; Herman Johnson
in the 13th; Leonard S. Hughes, Jr., in the 10th, and Sterling Bryant
in the 15th. In addition to these races, Freedom supported Bruce
Watkins and Catherine Mitchell in the 2nd Ward. In the 3rd Ward,
Freedom supported Tom Neely; Leon Jordan and Rosemary Lowe in the
14th Ward, Davy Crockett and Rosalie Mason for reelection in the
16th Ward and Jess Ward and Carrie Cunningham in the 17th Ward.
The 1968 election represented, however, the continuing power
struggle between whites seeking to continue their management of
the electoral process and the politics of direct action on the
part of blacks to accelerate the process of liberation and community
empowerment. Under the impact of this resulting climate, Louis
Wagner and his Jacksonian Democratic Club, desperate to hang on to
their political power, devised a strategy to run an all black slate for
county offices as a technique for neutralizing the influence and
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power of Freedom Incorporated and the black vote. This alliance
between the Committee for County Progress and Freedom Incorporated
caused Wagner and his organization, who by the way were now calling
themselves “The Regular Democrats,” to employ the black against
black strategy because they needed something to boost the odds in
their favor as part of their machination process of controlling the
black vote. The white daily newspaper, The Kansas City Star, became
very interested in the alliance between Freedom and the Committee
for County Progress and Wagner’s response to it.
Thr County Progress has allied with vote produc
ing organization, Freedom Incorporated, the Negro
political organization that has power in the 14th and
17th Wards, is fighting Wagner in the 2nd and 3rd
Wards and also working in the 15th and 16th Wards.
There is an all Negro ticket filed by Wagner whose
candidates campaign only in the black Wards. The pur
pose of the all—Negro ticket is to neutralize the
Freedom Incorporated vote, if possible.71
As a professional politician, Louis Wagner sensed that the con
stant reporting by the Kansas City Star of the alliance and his neu
tralization effect of running an all Negro ticket, lacked the politi
cal stimuli that he had envisioned. Frustrated by its lack of imme
diate appeal, Wagner and his political bosses went on the offensive
and charged that Freedom Incorporated did not actually understand the
needs of the black community. They argued that the purpose of the
71Kansas City Star, August 1, 1968, p. 4.
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As the 1968 primary approached,
ing the outcome. Debate and counter
terest of the black electorate in
Kansas City Star. As the Kansas City
a part of the struggle between Freedom and Louis
Wagner and his organization is over the fact that
Watkins became a candidate for the Democratic County
Committee from the 2nd Ward against the incumbent,
Sylvester “Baby Face” Norris. Watkins and Freedom are
allied in the county by the Committee for County Pro
gress, the political organization founded by Charles
Curry, presiding judge of the County Court. Sylvester
Norris has been allied previously with Louis Wagner
who heads an old—line faction in the 2nd Ward.73
72Kansas City Times, (August 1, 1968), 3.
73Kansas City Times, (August 5, 1968), 1.
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forged alliance between Freedom Incorporated and the Committee for
County Progress was to allow the committee’s president, Charles
Curry, to control and manipulate the operations of Freedom Incor
porated. At best, these accusations were part of Wagner’s political
strategy of countering and checkpointing Freedom’s charge that ab
sentee and plantation bosses controled the distribution of goods and
services to the black community. To support Wagner’s attack on
Freedom, Warren James, a candidate for the Western Judge post of the
Jackson County Court, said that Louis Wagner, “a white attorney and
founder of the Jacksonian Democratic Club, was more of a friend to
the Negro than the leaders of Freedom Incorporated, a Negro
Club.”72
both sides were anxiously await—
charges heightened both the in—
the campaign and that of the
Star states,
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The political struggle to elect Freedom Incorporated candidates
to office during the 1968 August Primary would be the closest politi
cal war it had fought in its six year struggle for political power
against Louis Wagner and his Jacksonian Democratic Club. Both Freedom
and the black electorate knew that the stakes were extremely high
with the winner taking prestige, glory and power, They needed some
thing which would for all purposes boost the odds in their favor. To
their surprise, the Kansas City Star came out and endorsed Committee
for County Progress because they had long been behind reform in
Jackson County, playing a key role in the destruction of the Pen—
dergast Machine. Therefore, it came as no surprise to professional
and seasoned politicians when it endorsed the entire Freedom Incorpo
rated slate.74 Although the Star endorsed its candidates, Freedom
and its supporters wanted to be sure that it could win. They can
vassed the black community, urging them to support its candidates and
the election of Thomas F. Eagleton, a white candidate for the U.S.
House of Representatives. The organization supported Eagleston’s
election to the U.S. House of Representative because it believed
that for the first time the incumbent, Senator Edward Long, could be
defeated because of the allegations that Long had misused a Senate
investigation committee he headed to keep Jimmy Hoffa out of jail.
Long denied any wrong doings or indirect receipt of a financial
74Kansas City Call (August 1968), p. 1.
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kickback in the amount of $48,000 from Hoffa.75 Another reason why
Freedom supported Eagleston was his support of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and President Lyndon Johnson’s war on poverty programs. Neverthe
less, Louis Wagner opposed Eagleston’s election to Congress because
of philosophical differences with him over of the role of the national
government in the domestic economy of the state of Missouri in order
to protect the political and constitutional rights of blacks living
in Kansas City. Wagner and his allies had hoped to replace Eagleton
with True Davis as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from
the State of Missouri. Supporters of True Davis reportedly went so
far as to offer Freedom Incorporated’s President Leon Jordan the sum
of $40,000 to support Davis. Because of both Richard Boiling and
Thomas Eagleton’s contributions to the black political struggle, Leon
turned down the money and supported Eagieton.76
Geographically, Freedom’s strategy of running a black man in a
state senatorial district and a white man for the U.S. House of Repre
sentatives, however, represented a microcosm of the whole Freedom
Incorporated strategy of entering and winning as many political cam
paigns as plausible in the August 1968 primary. The results of the
primary were as follows: in the Second Ward, Catherine Mitchell
75William Lambert, “Strange Help—Hoffa Campaign of the U.S. Sena
tor from Missouri,” Life (May 26, 1967), 26.
76A Tribute to a Great Leader, 1.
224
lost to Yvonne Norris, 887 to 904, but Bruce Watkins defeated her
husband, “Baby Face” Norris, 1,249 to 782. All the other Freedom
candidates for County Committee won. In the contest between Harold
L. Holliday, Sr., and Edgar Keating for the State Senatorial Post,
Keating defeated Holliday, Sr., 9,055 to 5,353. Although Leon
Jordan, Herman Jackson and William Carson were elected, [Sterling
Bryant won in the 15th District to unseat the incumbent Phillip
Scaglia 1,929 to 8381. In the 10th District, Henry Ross was success
ful in defeating Leonard J. Hughes, Jr., 1,202 to 1,070. And lastly,
Thomas Eagleton was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives and
Dr. Charles Bry was elected Coroner, giving Jackson County two black
county officers and one liberal senator from the State of Missouri.77
Although Freedom Incorporated was not successful politically
in winning every race it entered in its struggle to wrestle power
away from Louis Wagner and his Jacksonian Democratic Club, in its
attempt to provide black political representation, it did establish
itself due to the successful electoral victories of its candidates
in 1962 through 1968 as an influential black politcal precinct organi
zation in Kansas City and Jackson County. John Locke, given all his
particularities, argued that whenever a group or the state purpose
fully endeavors to take away and destroy men’s human existence or, “to
reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into
a state of war with people who are thereupon absolved from any further
77Reverend James D. Tindall, 15.
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obedience.”78 As one of the political voices of the black community,
Freedom was able to follow Locke’s reasoning and by agitating contin
uously for greater voter registration and organizational development
in Kansas City and the metropolitan area. The organization, judged
in light of its successes, has attempted to agitate on behalf of the
black electorate at every opportunity that has manifested itself.
The caliber of this type of representation had for the most part
allowed Freedom Incorporated to continue to provide a valuable service
in channeling and participating through the political process in
the distribution of goods and services to the community at large.79
The emergency of Freedom Incorporated as an urban political
organization between 1962 and 1968 can be viewed as part of the
political process for following blacks themselves into the economy of
the decision making process. The movement for black political em—
powerment and its sustainability in Kansas City during the civil
rights movement has become an increasingly important variable in the
development of black political power. The struggle for social and
political change in Kansas City was sustained due in part to the
grosteque segregation during the 1950’s which was especially insulting
to the black bourgeoisie; the practical successes of the activism;
78John Locke, The Second Treatise of C~overnemnt (Indianapolis:
Bobbs—Merrill, 1952), 124.
79Anthony Orum and Amy Orum, “Negro Politcal Strategy: Coalition
or Independent Power Politics,” Social Science Quarterly (December
1968), p. 5 34.
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the ascendency of protest ideology over accommodations; and the
domestic designs of expanding multinational cooperations festering
under the possibilitiy of maintaining social order with a system as
irrational as racial segregation.8°
By late 1968 and the early 1970’s, both the liberals and con
servatives alike began to speak of an urban crisis resulting from
blacks migrating to the central cities. The local popularization of
the concept, urban crisis, was a result of large numbers of blacks
migrating to Kansas City, which called for more sanitation collection,
police, education and fire programs to be installed by city adminis
trators. The relationship between major migrations and the urban
crisis has been examined by Francis Fox Piven in his essay, “The
Urban Crises: Who Got What, When and Why?” He contends that:
the needs for the black urban poor were not re
cognized for two decades. Cost did not rise until the
mid 1960’s. The expansion of services to the poor
does not account for a large percentage of increased
expenditures mainly organized by previder groups who
reaped the largest share of swollen budgets. These
people are responsible for the expansion of services.
The political use of city services in promoting
allegiance and meeting conflict was a cause of the
urban crisis . . . the urban crisis is a crisis of
demands. The migration of blacks from rural South to
cities poses challenges to the existing political
organization of the cities. When blacks entered the
cities they were confronted by new developments in
80Alex Willingham, “The Impact of Activism on Political Thought
in Black America: Focus on the Sixties” (Prepared for presentation
at the Symposium on Race, Politics and Culture), (Washington, D.C.:
Howard University, 1977), 95.
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city politics; namely, the existence of large associ
ations of public employees, whether teachers, police
men, sanitation men, or the design and operation of
public programs.81
Black migration to cities like Kansas City not only threatened
those who had gotten the benefits of the early services, but existing
political organizatons which controlled the cities in which black
people lived. The migration to Kansas City gave blacks the chance
and the political leverage to influence policy decisions and the
outcome of municipal elections in Kansas City. The unresponsiveness
of white elites to black demands for increased representation and
policy making power illustrates why some groups and commissions have
called for the creation of new political formations, such as Freedom
Incorporatd as a vehicle to improve the quality of political repre
sentation.82 The decade of the l960’s ushered into being the politics
of protest demonstrations and the development of Freedom Incorporated
playing a pivotal role in the organizing of the black electorate to
wrestle political power away from Louis Wagner and his political
organization. Aspirations and political socialization of the black
electorate migration to Kansas City, coupled with the outmigration of
whites to suburbs, contributed to the declining influence of Louis
Wagner and his democratic political machine.
81Francis Fox Piven, “The Urban Crisis: Who Cot What, and Why,”
in John Walton and Donald Corns, Cities and Change (Boston: Allyn
and Bacon, Inc., 1977), 416.
82U.s. National Advisory Commission, Report on Civil Disorder
in the U.S. (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), 283—299.
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Agitation by Freedom Incorporated to recruit workers and candi
dates and mobilize votes in order to obtain the election of black
elected officeholders to make politically relevant decisions for
blacks,83 was very important in their thrust for community empower
ment. The utilization of the black vote by Freedom to elect blacks
to municipal and state governments, which we have witnessed in the
1960’s, enabled the organization to continue its political strategy
in the fifth period known as Coalition Building and Imposition (1970
1973). During this period, Freedom’s agitation for the franchise
represented the acquisition of political power by a black population
that comprised 22.1 percent of the city’s population and the contin
uation, if not the victory,of Freedom’s effort to deliver of emascu—
lating the black electorate from the domination, ideology and control
of white political bosses. This was a period that brought about a
serious challenge to the power and influenece of Freedom Incorporated
and the Committee for County Progress. The Committee found itself
embroiled in a political quagmire when its president announced in May
1970, that he would not seek reelection to his position. Both Freedom
Incorporated and the members of the Committee for County Progress
were completely stunned at Curry’s announcement because of Freedom’s
planning and organizational sessions with the Committee to boost his
reelection support from the black electorate, and the lack of time
83George Metcalf, Up From Within Today’s Black Leaders (New
York: McGraw—Hill, 1971), I—XVI.
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on the part of the Committee to choose a substitute to replace Curry.
While this episode was occiurring, George Lehr, the County Assessor,
and Charles Wheeler, the Western Judge of the County Court, announced
their candidacies to run for Curry’s position.
Competition by Wheeler and Lehr placed the Committee in the posi
tion of having to choose between two of its own members. To further
strain and complicate this issue, the incumbent, Alex Petrovic, the
Eastern Judge of the County Court, announced that he would join
the ranks of Wheeler and Lehr and become a candidate against Joe
Bolger, Judge of the Eastern District, another member of the Commit
tee for County Progress. It seemed that political organization that
had allied itself with Freedom to wrestle political power away from
Louis Wagner could not reach an accord on supporting either candidate.
Thus, a nominating committee was formed by the County Committee for
Progress and charged with the responsibility of deciding on behalf of
the Organization which candidate it should support.
The candidacies of George Lehr and Charles Wheeler placed Louis
Wagner and his Jacksonian Democratic Club in the untenable position
of trying to decide whom it should support and which one of the
alliance candidates would Freedom endorse. This crisis of selecting
a candidate for presiding judge caused the factions now calling them
selves the “Regular Democrats” to realize that the dyadic relationship
between Freedom and the Committee was becoming increasingly strained
diI~
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over the selection process. Recognizing that a political stalemate
existed, the “Democrats” asked Freedom if it would assist them in medi
ating the crisis and forge an alliance with them during the 1970
campaign. Wagner’s attitude facilitated the ceding of political power
to the Committee for County Progress and Freedom Incorporated as a way
to give him a chance to continue to impose its domination on Kansas
City politics and as a political strategy to salvage whatever was left
of its social and political prestige.
It seems that Wagner forged an alliance with Freedom and the Com
mittee for County Progress in response to their successsful electoral
campaign and the use by Freedom of the black vote to facilitate the
entry of the black electorate into the political and decsion making
process. The ceding of political power compelled Louis Wagner to
act in order to meet or placate Freedom Incorporated’s challenges to
its hegemony. The degree to which Louis Wagner perceived an external
threat to their values and interest played a role in its policy toward
Freedom Incorporated. This integrative circulatory process allowed
Freedom and its allies to play a role in the recruitment and parti
cipation of black voters in Kansas City political system. Adaptation
of this form of functional requisite involves the activities that
provide these electorates with the kind of resources and organiza
tions needed to establish a relationship between the social
system and its environment. This relationship sometimes could
Lu
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lead to the supplying of disposable resources which then could be used
as a means to actualize goals of Freedom as a whole or the goals of any
of its supporters or allies.84 To Wagner and his Jacksonian Democra—
tic Club, the ceding of political power to Freedom has been nothing
more than a mere balance of power sharing in its ongoing struggle to
maintain its power. Such a move on the part of Wagner could be ex
pected
to have the benefits of legitimizing, by appearing to
democratize, the imperial linkage helping——thereby to
forestall and escalation of black resistance to plan
tation politics as temporarily coincided, with the
far more muted and negotiable demands of the system’s
petty—bourgeois critics.85
Clearly, this has been an important diiiension of the situation
and factored into Freedom’s decision to accept Wagner’s conciliatory
proposal because it realized that by aligning with Wagner, it could
only, at best, broaden its scope and organizational appeal to the
electorate in the county and Kansas City. Once the alliance was con
summated, Louis Wagner and his Jacksonian Democratic Club and Freedom
decided to endorse the candidacy of George Lehr to fill the presiding
post vacated by Charles Curry. To fill the seat vacated by Charles
Wheeler and Harry Wiggins, the prosecuting attorney, Joe Teasdale,
filed for the right to run for the Western Judge of the County Court.
Teasdale believed that he stood a better chance of beating Harry
84Robert T. Holt, “A Proposed Structural Functional Framework
for Political Science,” The Annals (February 1965), 94—95.
85John S. Saul, The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa (New
York: New York Monthly Review Press, 1979), 3.
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Wiggins by forging an alliance with Charles Wheeler and running as
a member of a team. In May of 1970, the Nominating Committee of the
Committee for County Progress announced that it had decided to endorse
George Lehr, Harry Wiggins and Joe Bolger for public office. In
addition, the Nominating Committee decided, c~ith the full support of
the entire Committee for County Progress, that it, along with Louis
Wagner and his organization, would support the reelection of Bruce
Watkins for the Democratic County Committee post from the 2nd Ward.
During the August primary, Freedom sponsored a slate of eleven
candidates for County Committee and state house district position.
The ticket included Reverend John Precips for the 10th District; Leon
Jordan in the 11th District; Herman Johnson in the 13th District;
Harold Holliday in the 14th District and Sterling Byrant who was run
ning for reelection in the 15th District. In the 2nd, 3rd, 14th,
16th, 17th and 18th Wards, Freedom supported the incumbent county
committee officials seeking reelection. Supporting the reelection
of county officials allowed the organization to expand its political
base and sphere of influence. On July 10, 1970, Leon Jordan,
then President of Freedom, was assassinated in front of his tavern,
the Green Duck, as he was closing the bar up for the night. Eyewit
nesses said a car sped by and a shotgun blast rang out, striking
Leon Jordan in the chest. The assassins then leaped from their car
and shot Jordan as he lay dying on the ground. Jordan, 65, was in
the midst of campaigning for a fifth term in the state legislature.
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two men were apprehended by the Kansas City, Missouri, Metropolitan
Police Department in order to quell community charges that an in
effective police force was not doing its best to find Jordan’s mur
derers. The two men were charged with the murder but were later
released due to insufficient evidence. There are claims that whites
opposed to Freedom’s steady growth and direct challenge to the power
and influence of the plantation bosses were responsible for the
murder. The local branch of the National Association for the Advance
ment of Colored People (N.A.A.C.P), in an attempt to gain information
in the case of the unknown executioners, offered a $10,000 reward for
information leading to their arrest and conviction. The assassins
were never apprehended. The whole State of Missouri was shocked and
surprised by this unexpected turn of events. Both of Missouri’s
United States senators, the governor, the lieutenant governor and
hundreds of leaders from across the state came to the funeral to pay
tribute to Freedom’s fallen president (See Appendix C).
Leon Jordan’s death was a blow to Freedom Incorporated. Some
thought it could not survive this latest political challenge.
Nevertheless, Bruce Watkins succeeded Jordan as president and leader
of Freedom and Harold L. Holliday, Sr., was elected the new Chairman
of the Board. Jordan’s wife, Orchid, filed for his seat in the
House and Howard Maupin filed for his seat on the County Committee.
Results of the Democratic Primary revealed that the candidates
supported by Freedom for the state house, with the exception of
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Reverend John Precips (against Henry Ross) and Sterling Bryant
(against Phillip Scaglia), won their elections. In the race for the
County Committee post, all the Freedom candidates won with the excep
tion of Adell Sykes and Norma Davis, who lost in the 18th Ward. The
biggest surprise of the contest involved Catherine Mitchell and Bruce
Watkins who lost to Sylvester and Yvonne Norris in the 2nd Ward.
During the months of October and November of 1970, a dramatic re
alignment in the power structure of Kansas City and the state of
Missouri took place. The first crack in the power structure took
place in November of 1970 when the voters approved a home rule and a
new charter form of government for Jackson County. This gave the
people of Jackson County the right to run their government without
constantly getting the approval of the state legislature. In the
1930’s with boss Pendergast running the police and City Hall from his
office at 1908 Main Street, the State had taken over effective control
and has never given it back. For example, the legislature, not the
City Council, decides how much Kansas City policemen should be
paid.86 The Jackson County Home Rule Charter placed full responsi
bility for the affairs of this urban area on the shoulders of Jackson
County officials who must answer to their constituents every four
years at the polls. The Charter victory was due in part to the hard
work of Charles Curry, the ex—presiding judge and leader of the
86”Ilus Davis—Mayor of Kansas City,” Congressional Records,
(March 16, 1971), 6649.
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Committee for County Progress. When others turned down the job of
mobilizing the electorate to bring reform to Jackson County through a
homerule charter, Curry personally raised almost $100,000 to finance
an educational campaign to explain the structural makeup of the
charter to the people of Jackson County. 87 Curry made effective use of
his assistants’ style of door to door canvassing and advertising to
get up the large number of signatures required by state law to put
the charter proposal on the ballot.88 Moreover, George Lehr also
participated in the educational and signature campaign to bring about
home rule and a new charter form of government for Jackson County.
Lehr, because he was presiding Judge, would automatically, on January
1, 1973, become the first Chief Executive Officer under the new form
of government. Lehr and his two colleagues, Harry Wiggins the newly
elected Judge of the Western District, and Joe Bolger, Jr., newly
elected Judge of the Eastern District, played a key role in engineer
ing voter approval of the charter and in the transition from the old
charter to the new.89 The fourteen member bi—partisan commission
which wrote the document fused together a practical formula for
blending reform with the political realities of the county. Passage
of the Home Rule Charter gave the electorate the right to run Jackson
87~j.~s~ Congress, House, “A Stunning Charter Victory for Jackson




County by as single strong executive and fifteen member county
legislature that could be elected in Novemeber of 1973.
As a result of the reforms, Jackson County is no longer required
to go to Jefferson City for permission to make changes in its own
form of governmental operations. The new charter decrees that eleven
representatives should be elected from the districts and the remain
ing four should be elected at—large. At least two of the eleven
districts were predominantly black, the 4th and 5th. With the re
sounding victory for open public accommodations, with the election
of Bruce Watkins and other black officeholders, and with the contin
ual registration of black voters, Freedom felt that it had the
sufficient amount of power to run a candidate for the 2nd district
at—large post. It was hoped that by nominating Lee Vertis Swinton,
this time they could be politically success~ul1y. Mrs. Mamie
Hughes was nominated to run in the 4th, Harold “Doc” Holliday, Jr.,
in the 5th; and Lee Vertis Swinton was selected by Freedom to run
for the 2nd District at large seat. The election was governed by
the 2nd provision of the Jackson County Home Rule Charter, which
decreed that nonpartisan elections of major officers and council
members be held. This gave the people of Jackson County the right
to run their government and deprive Mayor Davis, a democrat, of
some political clout with the city’s partisan representatives in
Jefferson City, Missouri and Washington, D.C. It specifies that
• I ~ .•~ ••~•••
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Kansas City, Missouri’s municipal government is to be operated by a
weak mayor, city manager administrative system, diffusing power at
City Hall. The mayor has but one of the thirteen City Council votes;
the council sets policy and hires the manager; the manager executes
policy. The council also allows a determined minority of voters to
force a referendum on any controversal council ordinance. This makes
council leadership more difficult. The object of all this was to
replace patronage politics with business like government and this is
pretty much what has happened.9° When Kansas City, for example,
changed from the Ward System to one in which half the alderman were
elected atlarge (a change which coincide with election of a reform
government), the new regime had to find some way of establishing
contact with the neighborhoods and of giving the city government a
neighborhood appeal that had been exercised by the old ward leaders,
who shared the language, religion, ethnicity, lifestyle and interest
of those electorates migrating to Kansas City, Missouri.9’
The second crack in the power structure arose when Mayor Illus
W. Davis announced in October of 1970 that he would not seek re
election for a third term in the municipal elections to be held
in the Spring of 1971. The 53 year old attorney took office in
90”Meet the Mayor—Kansas City’s Davis: Tribal Leader,” Congres
sional (March 16, 1971), 6649.
91Edward C. Banfield and James 0. Wilson, City Politics (New
York: Vintage Books, 1963), 52.
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1962 when the city government was broke and in a state of para
lysis. Rebuilding staff, gutted between 1959 and 1963 when remnants
the old Pendergast machine regained political power and found new
sources of revenue to operate the city, was Mayor Davis’ top prior
ity. At the time he took office, the Missouri Constitution forced
the city to relie heavily on the property tax while limiting the
amount of the city’s tax levy for operating purposes. Kansas City
was (and still is) at the state ceiling, so property tax revenues
were growing only as fast as the tax base grew, about three percent a
year. Kansas City can not increase revenues by raising property
assessments either, only the county has that power.92
To secure resources to operate Kansas City government, Mayor
Davis carried the fight to adopt an earnings income tax to the Missouri
Legislature and then to the electorate who ratified the levy at the
polls. The purpose of Davis’ earners income tax was to generate
revenue from those people utilizing municipal services employed in
the city, but living in the suburbs. The earnings tax didn’t com
pletely solve the money problem, not with inflation eating away at
city revenues, with residents pressing for increased city services
and the city eager to build a new airport and begin dozens of other
costly projects.93 The ensuing years involved Mayor Davis in agitat
ing for the council to increase taxes or utilize bonds for capital
92”Meet the Mayor,” Congressional Record, 6649.
93Ibid., 6650.
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improvements of the city’s infra—structure. Then, late in 1969, the
mayor and council presented voters with a program to (a) make the tax
structure more broadened and flexible; (b) adopt a new sales tax
(authorized by the legislature after another lobbying effort), a
double earnings tax, but halved real estate and utility tax rates;
(c) expand existing city services and add new ones; and (d) to adopt
a 143 million dollar bond package which would authorize projects
ranging from fire stations to parks and rapid transit.94 The council,
fearing that passage of this program would jeopardize their reelection
bids, decided to vote against the program. A year after the program
failed, the double earnings income tax was passed by the council.95
The nature of urban problems in the mid to early 1970’s thrust
Ilus Davis into a precarious predicament. In quiet times, perhaps
the administrative oriented city manager system could have made a
stronger manager the prime mover in City Hall. But the 1960’s were
not quiet times. Riots in Kansas City before and after the assassi
nation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the continuing revenue
crisis and difficult choices it posed, i.e., public accomodation,
open housing, voting rights, civil rights, were issues that were
considered very important to the black electorate. Mayor Davis,
despite his lone council vote, decided to tackle these issues. His
941b1d.
95”Illus Davis — A Distinguished Mayor,” Congressional Record,
(October 13, 1974), 36414.
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efforts to pass the public accommodations ordinance embroiled him
in a heated campaign with his foes opposed to the passage of the
ordinance. They were led by a group of white tavern owners, who were
joined in their support by a vociferious conservative organization.96
The issue was so controversial that Mayor Davis began to speak out
against the hatred and the bigoted position of these tavern owners
and their supporters. He became an avid supporter of fair housing
and public accommodations even though some of his advisers warned him
that he was committing political suicide.97
Historically, under the leadership of Mayor Davis, Kansas City,
Missouri, was the first major city in the United States, under the
leadership of Mayor Davis, to pass a public accommodations ordinance.
Through it all, the mayor has, despite the limitations of a city
charter called this type of instituional structure,
anti—urban because it required Kansas City to work
hard to do some relatively simple things. For
example, in some states a city council can simply
authorize the sale of a special assessment bond to
extend a sewer or pave a street. In Kansas City,
the council must win a two—thirds vote in a city
wide election. More important is the fact that the
constitution of the state of Missouri requires a four




bond and a two third vote to authorize a general ob
ligation bond.98
Under the leadership of Mayor Davis, the people of Kansas City
voted over $200,000 in bonds for physical improvements to the city,
including the development of an airport. In 1971, Mayor Davis
decided that the time had arrived for him to resign his official
position as Mayor of Kansas City, Missouri. Labor, age, time and his
dedication to the city over the past years encouraged him to step
aside. In its remarks on Davis’ resignation, the Kansas City Call
wrote:
Besides being an outstanding mayor in the field of
race relations, Ilus Davis was a standout in many
respects. Davis has more than done his part and it
is understandable that he wants now to turn the reins
over to someone else. . . . We know that people can
not and should not stay in office indefinitely, but
we are sorry that Mayor Ilus W. Davis has decided not
to run again in the coming Spring City election.
In the meantime, with Davis out of the running the
field is thrown wide open and there will be dozens of
men vying for the top spot in our city government.
Although many names have been mentioned, one
strong candidate is immediately in sight. It will
be interesting to see how the city campaign shapes
up once the November 8 election is out of the
way.
Two months following the resignation of Davis, the County
Committee met in December 1970, and elected Bruce Watkins, Chair—
____ 36414.
99”The City to Lose a Good Mayor,” Kansas City Call (October
9, 1970), 1.
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man of the Jackson County Democratic Committee. He gained a position
on the committee to represent Freedom and the black electorate by
switching his residence to the 14th Ward, and allowing Howard Maupin,
who had been elected to fill Leon Jordan’s positon, to resign, there
by giving his seat to Bruce Watkins.
The development of Freedom Incorporated and the election of Bruce
Watkins to public office marked the continuing transformation of the
political system into a loose bi—polar arrangement in which organiza
tions other than Louis Wagner and his Jacksonian Democratic Club
achieved independent status, which enables them to influence the
selection and election in 1971 of candidates for mayor, city council,
county and state representatives. Dr. Charles Wheeler, who had lost
his contest for Western Judge against George ehr, announced his can
dicacy for the chief executive post of the city. Wheeler’s opponent
was Dutton Brookfield, the Citizen Association backed candidate and
a member of the Republican party from Jackson County. Over the years,
the Citizen Association has allied itself closely with the political
establishment. Candidates running for state or municipal elections
were supported by the white daily newspaper, the Kansas City Star.
The Star supported Dutton Brookfield because of the history of the
Citizen Association’s role in the destruction of the Pendergast
Machine,100
100Tracey Thomas and Walt Bodine, Right Here in River City
(New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1976), 52.
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Charles Wheeler, on the other hand, was supported by the Demo
cratic Good Government Association (D.G.G.A.), a white conservative
political club located on the Northeast section of Kansas City,
Misouri, known as the Country Club District. The D,G.G.A., during
the mayoralty campaign, reprinted a clipping from the Kansas City
Star which was an endorsement of Dutton Brookfield by the former
mayor, and passed it out door to door in threee northeastern Wards
of Kansas City, Missouri. Because of the northeastern area’s love—
hate relationship with the Kansas City Star101 and Citizen Associa
tion, the D.G.G.A. political strategists took advantage of this di
lemma and altered the appearance of their campaign literature by
placing a bold red stamp across the face of the endorsement with the
words,
if you like Kansas City’s Ilus Davis, you sure will
love Dutton Brookfield. Brookfield’s supporters
countered the employment of this strategy by repro
ducing the D.G.G.A.’s sample ballot used by his
poii workers on the day of the election by replacing
Brookfield’s picture with that of Charles Wheeler.
The ballot was then distributed by Brookfield’s
supporters at the polling place.”102
It was hoped that through this process they could reduce the amount





Dr. Wheeler campaigned extensively with the support of the D.G.G.A.
throughout the black community and country club districts. These
electorates usually cast their votes independently of the party and
its politics. During the Primary and General elections, voters
turned out to support Citizen Association candidates; support for
school bond issues, and for general obligatory capital improvement
projects have generally been consistent. Statistically, this area
occupies only 20 percent of the number of city wards and produces an
estimated 33 percent of the total vote.’03
Dr. Charles Wheeler’s candidacy for mayor in the 1971 municipal
elections occurred during the time when the Missouri House of Repre
sentatives was reapportioned. This reapportionment plan was designed
in such a way that three black state representatives found themselves
competing against each other to represent the voters of the 25th
district. In the 11th district, Orchid Jordan, Henry Ross and Herman
Jordan were supported by Freedom to run for the state senate seat,
which Archie Welch, Jr. ran for the 9th state senatorial post. In
conjunction with these candidates, the organization supported Doretta
Henderson for the 23rd district; Harold Holliday, 26th district;
Phillip Curls, 28th district; James Spencer, 30th district and Leo
McKamey for the 36th district.
1031bid., 53.
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Additionally, the organization supported the following candi
dates for County Committee posts: Sherman McClellan and Dorothy
Brooks for the 2nd Ward; Tom Neely and Dorothy Dudley for the 3rd
Ward; Bruce Watkins and Rosemary Lowe for the 14th Ward; James Wilson
and Rosalie Mason, 16th Ward; Jess Ward and Rosa Williams, 17th Ward;
and Preston and Ernestine Kelly, 19th Ward. During this political
contest, every candidate backed by Freedom was victorious in their
electoral bid with the exception of Sherman McClellan and Dorothy
Brooks, who were defeated by the Norrises in the 2nd Ward. Even the
Jacksonian Democratic Club candidate Henry Ross was defeated, losing
to Orchid Jordan, 1,500 to 971. Migration of the traditional voters
from the area to the outer areas of Kansas City and the support of
more services to the area by Freedom candidates contributed to the
declining voter support of Henry Ross. The reluctance of the Jack
sonian Democratic Club to support both Archie Welch and Herman
Johnson contributed to their defeat in their senate races. Henry
ROSS? support of the white candidates against Welch and Johnson
effectively split the vote of the black electorate and thereby con
tributed also to the losing of their senate races. Voter registra
tion drives in Kansas City orchestrated by Freedom Incorporated to
increase the number of new black voters and their participation in
the political process contributed to the election of eleven out
of twelve of its candidates to the County Committee posts. Adell
Sykes was the only unsuccessful candidate backed by Freedom for
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a County Committee seat. She was seeking to represent the people of
the 18th Ward 104
In 1973, Charles Kelley, a former police chief of the Kansas
City, Missouri Police Department, was nominated by President Gerald
Ford to become the Director of the FBI when J. Edgar Hoover died.’05
During the time of Kelley’s Senate confirmation hearings, Bruce
Watkins appeared to testify against Kelley. According to Watkins,
Clarence M. Kelley probably exemplifies:
as much as anyone else, the stolid, amoral con
servatism that seems to constitute the ranks of
‘police’ officialdom of this country today. There is
no question as to his loyalty, perseverance and
faithfulness to those pristine principles that demand
this adherence. There do exist numerous questions
to his humanity. What I really mean is Clarence M.
Kelley is the perfect ‘Big Brother’ police official
and the real tragedy is that he is merely symptomatic
of a condition that permeates the whole country; that
is, the poor, the b1ack~ are universally denied
equality before the iaw.hJ6
Despite Watkins’ appearance, Clarence Kelley was indeed con
firmed by the Senate to become the Director of the FBI. The
ability on the part of Freedom Incorporated and its leaders to chal—
lenge the selection of Kelley as director of the FBI signaled a beginn
ing movement on the part of the organization to play an ever—increasing
and significant role in national politics. Clarence Kelley’s succes
sor was Chief Joseph D. McNamara, a tough little Irish cop with ten
years experience in Harlem and a Ph.D. from John F. Kennedy School of




Government. During his first month on duty in Kansas City, he was
faced with a community—police crisis involving the shooting by an
officer of an unarmed black youth caught stealing watches from a
vacant house. He was forced to revise the city’s gun policy immedi
ately. This resulted in a morale problem among police officers.’07
The ability of Freedom Incorporated and its leaders to challenge
the selection of Kelley as director of the FBI and the use of deadly
force by the police enhanced its position and influence throughout
Kansas City, Missouri.
The sixth period (1974—1979), Cleavage Within Black Political
Authority, was the coming together of Joanne Collins, a black repub
lican, and the powerful Citizen’s Association to prevent Freedom
Incorporated from delivering the black vote to elect its candidates
to public office and garner city—wide support for its candidates.
Competition for political office can be changed to cooperation when
the dialectical interest of groups and organizations coincide,’08
as in the alliance between Freedom Incorporated and the Jacksonian
Democratic Club in a city—wide ticket led by the popular incumbent,
Mayor Dr. Charles Wheeler. Zealous supporters of Mrs. Mamie Hughes
distributed flyers throughout the black community labeling Joanne
Collins as the great white hope and charging her with being an Uncle
107Kay Lawson, The Comparative Study of Political Parties (New
York: St. Martin Press, 1976), 55.
108Thomas and Bodine, 53.
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Tom for the all white Citizen Association. The great white hope
candidate countered before the day of election by charging that her
opponent was not a member of the black race.’°9 The movement on the
part of Freedom to elect Mamie Hughes was part of its consequential
political strategy during this period to ensure that Charles Hazley,
Bruce Watkins, Charles Wheeler and of course, Mamie Hughes won their
reelections in their respective districts. Although Wheeler was
reelected and Charles Hazley won reelection in the third district
race and Bruce Watkins was elected to the fifth district city council
seat, Mamie Hughes the dynamic county legislator lost her city
council race to Joanne Collins, the incumbent from the 3rd district
at—large. Mrs. Mamie Hughes electoral lost to Joanne Collins marked
the first time since the organization was founded that it had
lost a municipal election. The support that the Citizen’s Associa
tion got from the white electorate living north of the river and in
the southern part of the city allowed it to elect Collins to office
by overcoming the strength of Freedom Incorporated’s support it
received from the six predominantly black wards that they controlled.
SUCCESS/FAILURES
In the four years of its existence, the black electorate has
elected two blacks to city council seats, three state representatives,
one municipal judge, one member of the School Board and four county
109”Look at the Face,’1 Kansas City Call, (July 29, 1966), 1.
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committee men and women. Blacks have also been appointed to various
boards and commissions, including a member of the Police Commission,
two members of the General Hospital Board, three members of the Human
Relations Commission, seven members of the Poverty Board, one member
of the City Plan Commission, one member of the Auditorium Board and
a member of the Missouri Civil Rights Commission.’1°
Although Freedom Incorporated was able to utilize the support
received from the black electorate to elect its candidates to office
over the years, the organization suffered additional setbacks between
1976 and 1978 in its attempt to establish complete control of the black
community by blacks. In 1976, Freedom Incorporated was rebuked in
its efforts to select Mickle Hughes to challenge State Representa
tive Phillip Scaglia in the 30th District, Harold Holliday against
the incumbent Henry Panethiere in the eleventh senatorial district
and Virgil Troutwine, a white, to challenge Mary Gant in the ninth
senatorial district. All of the Freedom candidates for the State
Senate seats were defeated in their attempts to unseat the last of
the old Pendergast Machine factional incumbents. The untimely defeat
of Harold Holliday during the 1976 Democratic Primary in his second
bid for a state senate seat, by Henry Panethiere was of particular
significance, given these white ward political bosses used Henry
Ross, the former black state representd tp split the black vote.
During the election, Holliday received 5,247 votes compared to
110Tindall,15—20.
iii a i a~
250
the 1,921 votes that Henry Ross received. If Ross had not entered
the race, Holliday probably could have acquired those votes given
that he only lost to Panthiere by 176 votes! Freedom Incorporated
and its supporter felt that if Henry Ross had abstained from parti
cipating in the electoral campaign, Harold Holiday might have been
quite successful in his bid to become the first black state senator
from the eleventh District.
In the gubernatoral race, Freedom chose to support William
Cason, a State Senator, over Joseph Teasdale, a former Jackson
County Prosecutor who had handed down extremely high bails to blacks
for misdemeanors during the 1968 riots in Kansas City. Teasdale
upset Cason and beat the Republican incumbent governor in a narrow
election. Outraged by the level of support that Freedom gave his
opponent, Teasdale retaliated by not appointing its nominees to the
metropolitan area or city boards. After some peacemaking efforts on
the part of Freedom, Teasdale later appointed candidates endorsed by
the organization to the board of the Area Transportation Authority
and the State Housing Development Commission. “Despite whatever
rifts the organization may have had with Missouri’s governor, the
black community had little, if any, influence in state government
until 1977.e~111
1~-’Jeanne Allyson Fox, “in Kansas City, Missouri,” Black
Enterprise (March 1978), 45.
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With the election and subsequent re—election of Charles Wheeler
to the majoralty post, politicians in the county supported Wheeler,
because his election provided them access to the office of the Mayor,
his administration and the county legislation during the 1978 elec
tion. It was at this time that Freedom Incorporated lost the Second
District at—large county legislature position even though as the
dominant black poliical organization it was able to continually re
elect all four of their state representatives and maintain control
over the six predominantly black wards in Kansas City, Missouri.
Perhaps, the lost by Harold Holliday was particularly embarrassing
because he was defeated by another black by the name of Leonard S.
Hughes, III, for the third District Magistrate Judgeship. Chance
and circumstances allowed the organization to further entrench itself
in mobilizing and registering the black electorate to support losing
candidates in the at—large county races for County Sheriff and Execu
tive Officer, thereby diluting its role and effectiveness as a de
cisive balance of force in Jackson County politics.
The loss of the Second District at—large, county legislature
position and the subsequent election and reelection of Joanne Collins
to the Third District at—large seat in 1979 proved that the organiza
tion’s candidates could still be defeated and that it still could not
win every race it entered. Although Freedom was able to establish
itself as a precinct organization in Jackson County capable of de
livering the vote of the black electorate as a single unit, which by
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1979 constitued an estimated 17.2 percent of the county’s population,
but its voting power was relatively small in comparison to the county
vote, which was at least 38 percent.112
112 U.S. Bureau of Census, County and City Data Book (Wash
ington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, 1977), 270.
CHAPTER V
BLACK POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT DURING THE MAYORAL AND CITY
COUNCIL PRIMARY ELECTION OF 1979
The party or organization is the distinctive institu
tion of the modern polity . . . the function
is to organize participation, to aggregate interests,
to serve as the link between social forces and the
government. 1
Among the major contributing factors to the tension and con
flict prevading contemporary American society has been the quest of
blacks in Kansas City, Missouri, and nationally, who constitute a
large segment of the poverty. During the later 1970’s, this quest
was articulated through a revitalized political movement toward
achieving black political autonomy and control over governmental
bodies and institutions through the electoral process. As a result
of this movement and a growing understanding of power relationships,2
in Kansas City, Missouri, a new dimension of black struggle emerged
in the spring of 1979. This chapter will examine the role of Freedom
Incorporated during the mayoral and city council election of 1979.
1Samuel J. Aldersveld, Political Parties in American Society
(New York: Basic Books, 1982), 5.
2William E. Nelson, Jr., Electing Black Mayors: Political Action




The late Bruce Watkins, then president of Freedom Incorporated, was
asked by his board of directors to run for the post of mayor in
Kansas City. The organization felt that it had sufficient power to
elect a black as mayor because of its political successes in the past
and because the organization has over the years been able to elect
candidates to public office with the support it received from the
black electorate in the six predominately black wards. It was hoped
that the selection and election of Watkins would give the black
electorate positions of bargaining strength and political control
over its neighborhoods. We can assume that this type or style of
elite leadership selection by Freedom Incorporated to fill the
mayoralty post was intended to continue its goal of managing the
political process in the black community whereby candidates for
public office were chosen and then endorsed by the electorate instead
of vice versa. Thus, the choice of Watkins can not be considered
representative of the complete spectrum of the black electorate, but
instead as representative of the AfroAmerican elite.3 Leonard Cole,
in his book, Blacks in Power, has also pointed out that when organiza
tions choose representatives of the black community, generally they
are not representative of the black electorate in terms of age, edu—
3David McBride and Monroe H. Little, “Afro—American Elite, 1930—
1940: A Historical and Statistical Profile,” Phylon: The Atlanta Uni
versity Review of Race and Culture, 62 (June 1981).
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cation, occupation or ideology.4 Even though Freedom Incorporated
decided to run Watkins for mayor of Kansas City, Missouri, at no time
did it believe that the ability to deliver a set number of votes
could in fact be translated into the actual winning of an electoral
contest. However, it did believed as research conducted by Ronald R.
Matthews and James W. Prothro have shown, that given a social system in
which blacks are given the opportunity to register for elections and
they perceive their role as meaningful and important,5 they will
become politically mobilized more in areas where “they have the
greatest stake in structural transformation or reform of the politi
cal process.”6
After the 1978 elections, the leadership of Freedom Incorporated
conceptualized that the movement on the part of the organization to
agitate for the right of the black electorate to participate in the
political system as elected officials was losing its power. A
considerable amount of time and energy was expended by this profes
sional class of ministers, teachers, political activist, labor leaders
and businessmen who formed the vibrant core of Freedom Incorporated in
4Leonard A. Cole, Black in Power: A Comparative Study of Black
and White Elected Officials (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univer
sity Press, 1976) 94.
5Johnny Daniel, “Negro Political Behavior and Community Political
and Socio—economic Structural Factors,” Social Forces (March 1969),
227—279.
6john Saul, The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), 300.
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devising a plan that would make the organization stronger, while at
the same time, increasing the number of black registered voters.7
This bourgeois economic group, as Du Bois called such groups in his
writings, are trained in their professions and remain primarily
dependent on the traditional patronage of the Afro—American community
for support of their goals and agendas.8 Leonard Cole and others
have told us in their research that we must become more aware of the
role that elites play in their capacity as leaders to mediate between
the urban poor and the large society to articulate the aspirations of
the poor. They state that
If the capacity of the urban poor to play an active
role in the process of politicizing their grievances
were to be understated by these elites, the movement
for social change could further become confused.9
The strategy that evolves from the planning sessions sponsored
by these elites had at least two primary objectives; namely, (a) to
maintain present municipal, legislative and county committee seats;
and (b) the selection of candidates for mayor with a campaign strategy
which would be organized and developed in such a way that the response
to it would automatically attract labor, manpower, financing, media
coverage, and the black community to rally to its support. Such an
emotional campaign must take on as its point of departure similar
characteristics of the campaign by the organization to pass the




1964 Public Accommodation Ordinance in Kansas City, Missouri. The
leadership hoped that the opportunity to elect a black mayor would
spur interest in the electoral process and thus, provide Freedom
Incorporated with the opportunity to retain its status as a precinct
organization capable of getting blacks elected and appointed to
public office.’° Moreover, it also believed that in order for the
organization to mobilize black electorates to play an ever increasing
role in municipal, state, county and national elections, the leader
ship and organization must not become content with its past electoral
victories. It must continue to utilize its power, adapt to new
situations as they arise and maintain a close bond with its
constituency base. As such, Freedom Incorporated projected the
organization as playing an active role in year to year community
functions whenever the opportunity presented itself. Such a strategy
and goal was geared toward enhancing its position and influence at
the state level by working closely with civil rights organizations,
such as NAACP, SCLC, and the Urban League, and to attract white
support for its candidates in the wards where the organization has
traditionally been unsuccessful in electing its candidates. In
addition to these activities, Freedom Incorporated tried to enhance
its position in Kansas City by running candidates in a variety of
races to give voters a choice other than the two regular organizations.
10Tracy Thomas and Walt Bodine, Right Here in River City (New
York: Doubleday and Co., 1976), 56.
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In a sense, their concern was centered around the question of
building a grass root political organization in Kansas City, “capable
of doing for Negro people what other political groups with different
philosophies and purposes are unable to do.”’ The leadership, also,
felt that the opportunity to elect Bruce Watkins as mayor of Kansas
City would, at best, allow the black electorate to govern its politi
cal life, make its own decisions, while at the same time demonstrate
to the plantation bosses and the absentee owners,’2 that if
given the chance the black electorate could, through Freedom Incorpo
rated, provide alternative channels of social mobility for those
otherwise excluded from the more conventional avenues for personal
advancement. 13
Prior to the enactment of the Voting Rights Act and the decline
of Jim Pendergast’s and Louis Wagner’s political organization, the
primary role of the black electorate was not to run its candidates
for mayor or city council, but to support and endorse the candidates
of the machines. However, as the desegregation and voting movement
of the Civil Rights struggle began to focus national attention on
11Kansas City Call (August 7, 1964), 4.
‘2lbjd., 10.
~-3Robert K. Merton, “The Latent Function of the Machine,” in
Urban Government, revised edition, edited by Edward Benfield (New
York: The Free press, 1969), 258.
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the rights of blacks to use public facilities and to participate in
the Kansas City, Missouri, political system, the black electorate
began to mobilize itself to support the mayoralty candidacy of Bruce
Watkins. During the 1979 mayoralty campaign, there were at least
five candidates running for the post of mayor competing against
Watkins. The incumbent Mayor Charles Wheeler sought an unprecedented
third term, something no mayor has ever done in this metropoli
tian city.
Councilmen Richard Berkley, Joe Pelofsky, a black mathematics
teacher named James Lloyd, John McDonald, president of the Taxpayers
Defense League, were all vying in competition for the mayor’s post.
As a candidate for mayor, Lloyd told the black weekly newspaper,
Kansas City Call, that he would win the primary by securing at least
90 per cent of the white and black votes. Lloyd was a part—time
elevator operator for the Tension Envelope Company, which was owned
by the family of his mayoral opponent, Richard Berkley. Berkley
repeatedly denied the accusation by Joel Pelofsky and others that
he encouraged Lloyd to run as part of his political strategy to split
the black vote. To refute the charge, Lloyd held a press conference
declaring that his decision to run for mayor was based on his con
victions and belief that Kansas City needed ministers to provide the
political direction and moral leadership for the city by running for
political office. Unlike the support it gave Watkins, the Ministerial
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Alliance decided not to endorse his candidacy. He became incensed at
their lack of support and accused them of:
wanting him to withdraw from the race .
I assumed because they think black persons will vote
for me because I’m black. But in an American demo
cratic society, no one should be eliminated from the
campaign because of their race. 14
Strategically, Lloyd’s strongest support came from the parents of
approximately 20 students or five percent of the 1500 student body
where he taught; Steve Peterman, Lloyd’s campaign manager and Della
Brown of the Concerned Parents Association. Lloyd’s employee Richard
Berkley, was himself becoming the focus of Pelofsky’s strategy and
efforts at refocusing attention on his close ties with the Wheeler
administration. Pelofsky, a long—time democrat accused Mayor Charles
Wheeler and Richard Berkley, Mayor pro—tern, of treating Kansas City’s
North residents as stepchildren who pay the largest chunk of taxes
for basic services, but get the least in return. According to Pelof—
sky, the only claim to fame Kansas City’s North of the river has, is
that it’s the place where they take the city’s official temperature
readings. Since its always cooler here:
I guess the mayor must think nobody’s going to
give him any heat for following a do nothing plan for
this half of Kansas City, Missouri. At the present
time, the mayor boast 1/2 of the city’s land area, the
only record of strong population growth inside the
city limits, excellent schools and neighborhoods that
are vital and growing . . . but the Wheeler/Berkley
14”Lloyd Believes He’ll Pull 90 per cent of the Mayoral Votes,”
Kansas City Call (March 1, 1979), 17.
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administration does not notice. To understand Kansas
City, north of the river, a mayor’s got to do more
than just drive through it on his way back and forth
from the airport.
Reiterating his promise to end the emergency uti
lity tax ‘in one whack” within the next year, and pro
mising to alter the city charter to allow for more ef
ficient local investment of the city’s money ‘which
will bring $1.5 million annually . . . the mayor tries
to convince his opponents to do as he wishes by intim
idation,’ the family—oriented Pelofsky said, ‘but I’ve
learned through my involvement as a lawyer involved in
labor negotiations that they won’t work. We have too
many arguments and not nearly enough mutually agree
able solutions. We may not have the fancy budgets of
Wheeler or Berkley but we can make up for that. With
our people and your help we are going to win this race
for Kansas City. 15
The fact of the matter is the city budget has
trippled during t he Wheeler/Berkley era while the
population has declined. Don’t tell me we can’t cut
the budget. When your family has to cut back while
the city wastes your tax dollars, it’s wrong. I
won’t put up with waste. And I mean business.16
To ensure that the black community would take a more direct and
active role as responsible voters in electing Bruce Watkins as mayor
of Kansas City, efforts were undertaken to organize, develop cam
paign banners, and get neighborhood groups to get people involved.
Procedurally, there were a number of techniques employed by Freedom
Incorporated to support Bruce. The initial effort involved voter
registration drives and campaign rallies throughout the city. A
‘5Joe Pelofsky, “Hits Wheeler — Berkley Era, Kansas City Call
(February 1979), 5.
16Joe Pelofsky, “The Realist. My Kind of Mayor,” Kansas City
Call (March 1979), 5.
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corollary involved the development of voter identification symbols
and images to attract the voter. Thirdly, Freedom Incorporated and
its supporters developed a campaign banner and circulated it through
out the city as precursor for attracting public support of Bruce
Watkins’ candidacy. And fourthly, Freedom Incorporated ran full page
advertisments in the local newspaper displaying the banner as part of
its election strategy to attract those blacks and whites living in
the city and the surrounding metropolitan areas. The banner read:
“Bruce Watkins/Takes a Stand for You/Mayor.” However, at the same
time the mayoral election was going on, political candidates were
campaigning to replace Watkins from the third district and to elect a
black from the fifth district and third district—atlarge. Emanuel
Cleaver, a black minister and an early supporter of the organization,
ran from the fifth district; Icelean Clark for the third district
at—large and Charles 1{azley were selected by the organization to run
for re—election to Watkin’s city council seat from the 3rd district.
Subsequently, thereafter, the Center for City Ministerial Alli
ance Political Action Committee, under the direction of Dr. Howard
Gloyd, endorsed Icelean Clark for city councilwoman at—large from
the third district. Gloyd and Alliance, in addition to supporting
Mrs. Clark, endorsed Bruce Watkins for mayor, Charles Hazley for re—
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election as district councilman for the third, and the Rev. Emanuel
Cleaver as district councilman from the fifth district.’7
The Citizen Association candidate for the third district seat
was a black man by the name of Clinton Adams, a young lawyer and
former city prosecutor. Adams decided to run against Hazley because
Hazley “works for his own personal friends and cronies instead of
acting in the best interest of the entire community.” Adams said
that the incumbent, Charles Hazley, did nothing while they closed
several neighborhood fire stations in the third district. Of the 12
fire stations closed citywide . . . five were located in the third
district. As a result of this closing, there is a higher response
time for fire alarm calls and emergency vehicle calls. Another
reason for a change:
is the coucilmatic past . . . . The present
councilman has lost contact and touch with his con
stituency. Hazley’s recent handling of the cable TV
affair is a good example. Adams, who is opposed to
Kensington Place housing development, spear—headed by
Councilman Hazley, said, ‘1.6 million of community
development funds is invested in Kensington Place to
build $100,000 palaces for the elite. The funds could
have and should have been used to benefit the vast
majority of working people in the district.’
If I am elected to the city council . . . I
would be available and accessible to all residents of
the district by opening an office in the district and
holding regular meetings with the people. 18
17Kansas City Call, (February 1979), 5.
~-8”Clinton Adams Tells Why He Want to Unseat Hazley,” Kansas
City Call, (February 1979), 17.
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With this support, Freedom Incorporated began an all out drive
to assure the election of Bruce Watkins by registering the black elec
torate and by developing a campaign strategy, whereby Charles Hazley,
Emanuel Cleaver and Iceland Clark would each join ranks with the
organization to spearhead Bruce Watkin’s drive for the mayoral post.
In his previous effort to campaign for public office in Jackson
County, these candidates passed out campaign literature and made phone
calls on his behalf to voters of Jackson County encouraging them to
support his candidacy for circuit court clerk. During the municipal
elections, all of the candidates endorsed by Freedom Incorporated ran
on the banner, “Your Freedom Incorporated Community Team.”19 The
banner was displayed on campaign literature and distributed through
out Kansas City and the metropolitan areas along with the pictures
of Emanuel Cleaver, Bruce Watkins, Charles Hazley and Icelean Clark
asking for both financial and organizational support. Included in
their campaign literature were the words, “come on, we can do it,”
excerpted from a speech given by the late Leon Jordan. The organi
zation hoped that the words by Jordan could best express the impor
tance of encouraging the black electorate to elect its decision—
makers to public office.
National speakers such as Senator Thomas Eagleton of Missouri,
Mayor Thomas Bradley of Los Angeles, California, and other Democratic
‘9Kansas City Call, (March 1, 1979), 5.
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Party members were invited by Freedom to come to Kansas City, Mis
souri, to support Bruce Watkins. In addition to this approach, Free
dom created a neighborhood youth organization known as “Youth for
Uncle Bruce.” It was comprised of some sixty—five or more persons
with the primary purpose of canvassing literature and encouraging
people to vote. The door—to—door technique was utilized because of
its distinct characteristics. The first variation was that of infor
mation gathering, a process by which the organization was able to
determine party status and registration of the voter. It also
involved identification of voter preferences and views as to issues
and candidates, thus providing an important input in overall strategy
planning for the campaign. Secondly, the variation of hit and run
is a process whereby brief contact with the voter, perhaps merely to
leave some campaign literature was conducted. And thirdly, in—depth
issue forums were held. Voter education through presentations on
aspects of the issues or candidacy on which the campaign is based was
carefully researched.2°
As a result of Freedom’s Youth for Bruce door—to—door community
canvassing, the black electorate began to volunteer its time and
efforts to assist the organization in its voter registration drive.
To help in getting the voters to register, the local black radio
20James Brown and Philip H. Seib, The Art of Politics: Electoral
Strategies and Campaign Management (Dallas, Texas: Alfred Publishing
Company, 1975), 74-75.
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station, KPRS, gave continual support and expertise in urging the
people to get involved. In this community call to action, the Women
for the Watkins Committee, the Kansas City Call newspaper, Educators
for Bruce, and a host of other groups and associations became actively
involved in the Watkins for mayor campaign. These groups decided to
help Bruce in part, because of his effort as a city councilman to end
police brutality, to provide employment opportunities for the jobless
and to sponsor ordinances in the city council to assist the elderly
to pay their utility bills. Nevertheless, all of the time put in by
the groups for Watkin’s victory during the primary would be in vain
if he did not become one of the two candidates to receive a large
percentage of the votes. This was a requirement needed to enter the
general election. The headline, “Primary Victory — How Sweet It Is,”
in the black newspaper, Kansas City Call summed up the response of
Bruce Watkins and the black community anxiously awaiting the outcome
of the election.21
As a result of Watkins capturing the democratic nomination in the
primary, he became the party’s candidate for the upcoming general
election. Votes cast for Watkins’ mayoral campaign came from all 294
precincts south of the Missouri River, followed by those encompassing
the 26 polling places in Clay County and 8 polling places in Platte
21”Primary Victory — How Sweet It Is,” Kansas City Call, (March
1979), 4.
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County, north of the Missouri River. 22 Statistically, Watkins
received 23,863 votes enabling him to become the Democratic nominee,
while his Republican opponent received an estimated 22,897 votes.
Of the 23,863 votes that Watkins received, 50 per cent or 17,424 votes
came from the six wards in Kansas City, Missouri, which are predom
inately black. Moreover, the remaining four contenders also got a
substantial amount of electorial votes. Joe Pelofsky received 18,760;
Charles Wheeler, the incumbent mayor received 18,536; John t4cDonough
received 2,204; and the black mathematics instructor came in last
place with 1,027.
The 1979 primary elections left Freedom Incorporated in an excel
lent bargaining position for the upcoming general election. In addi
tion, Watkins’ victory represented an attempt on the part of Freedom
Incorporated and the black electorate to become a greater and more
powerful force in Kansas City’s and Missouri’s political system. In
order for the organization to get Watkins elected and continue to
play anever increasing and significant role in Kansas City politics,
the leadership had to give an inordinate amount of its time in assess
ing why Watkins’ challengers, Berkley, Wheeler and Pelofsky were able
to extract an estimated 704 votes from six predominantly black wards
during the primary. These kinds of demographic facts have been
the subject of research by Johnny Daniels in his quest to develop an
22Kansas City, Missouri, Results of the August Primary in 1980
(Kansas City, Missouri: Board of Elections, 1980), 1—2.
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understanding why people in the black community support white and
black candidates for public office or appointed offices. At the
social psychological level, according to Daniels, such variables
as black consciousness, separatist orientation, mistrust of whites
and perceptions of black supporters of the major parties as Uncle
Tom’s facilitate the support by black community personnel of the
instruments of political change.23 Those who believe in the feelings
of political inefficacy and those who believe in integration are seen
by Daniels as factors within the black community that inhibit the
structural and social psychological development of the black indepen
dent political parties.
To neutralize black support for Bruce Watkins and the prestige
and influence of Freedom Incorporated as an effective black, grass
roots political organization, the republican candidate Richard Berkley
ran as a liberal Republican appealing to moderate whites; while at
the same time, as a condition for their support, promising the black
electorates as a condition for appointments to key policy making
positions in his adminstration. He met with representatives from the
black community on January 10, 1979, to explain his philosophical
goals and ideas about the delivery of city services to people living
in Kansas City, Missouri, before the Republican primary:
23Johnny Daniels, “The Development of an Independent Black Poli
tical Party Structural and Social Psychological Considerations,”
Social Forces (March 1969), 7.
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I want to assure the citizens of the inner city that
as mayor, I will push for improved city services.
Affirmative action programs must be reviewed to en
sure that all persons are treated fairly, not only at
the entry level of employment but also in the promo
tional and supervisory levels. Boards and commissions
that are appointed directly in the main by the mayor
must be at all times in keeping with the spirit of
all affirmative action guidelines.24
With the appointment and election of blacks as senators and
house representatives in Missouri, Freedom Incorporated felt that
it had sufficient amount of support from the black electorate during
the general election to elect Bruce Watkins mayor of Kansas City,
Missouri. Although the organization had been quite successful in
influencing the outcome of elections in Kansas City and Jackson County
in the past, it realized that the stakes were high and that it was
definitely going to be a tough political battle for Watkins. As Free
dom Incorporated began to campaign and mobilize the black electorate
to support Watkins, both print and broadcasting began to ask Watkins
whether or not he in fact had the necessary qualifications to become
a mayor of Kansas City and whether the city as a whole was ready for
a black man to become its chief executive?
During the general election, the leadership of Freedom Incorpo
rated decided that in order for Watkins to be successful in his elec—
tonal contest, the organization must first develop a comprehensive
strategy, which would allow for the recruitment, financing and labor
24”Dick Berkley Meets with Black Groups,” Kansas City Call,
(January 1979), 1.
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support from those white and black voters living in the city and
the metropolitan area. Secondly, it was hoped by Freedom Incorporated
that in order for it and Watkins to play an ever increasing and signi
ficant role in Kansas City’s political system, the leadership must
broaden its political base of operations by bargaining with its white
allies for political support. As the Democratic nominee, Watkins had
hoped to persuade fellow democrats in the city and the county, that
if the political and social ills of the city were to be corrected,
then the correction must be brought about by intelligent white and
black leadership working hand in hand to provide a better community
for all. 25 Utilizing personal charisma, limited funds and a host of
personal media exposure both inside print and broadcasting, Watkins
set about on an impossible task, getting elected mayor. Even though
he had received endorsements and political advice from the mayor of
Los Angeles, the unexpected was yet to occur. The morning after the
primary on February 27, 1979, Walter Mondale, Vice President of the
United States, made a personal call to Watkins to congratulate him
on his primary victory. Mondale promised to do his best to help
Watkins before the general election. A few hours later, President
Jimmy Carter, telephoned Watkins at KMBC, a local television station,
while he was in the process of tapping an interview with his chal—
25Edward T. Clayton, The Negro Politican (Chicago: Johnson Pub
lishing Company, Incorporated, 1964), 188.
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lenger. President Carter assured Watkins of his support in his
quest for the top city seat.
As national and local speakers of the democratic party began to
come to assist their fellow Democrat, local newspapers, the Repub
lican nominee and new stories cried foul. They took exception to
outsiders interferring in their affairs. It was their view that the
Democratic candidate was injecting partisan politics into the city
mayoral race. This angered some local minisiters. One minister, in
particular, was Dr. Howard Gloyd, Pastor of Tabernacle A.M.E. Church
in Kansas City, Missouri. Dr. Gloyd addressed a letter to the pub
lisher and editorial staff of the white daily and evening newspapers,
Kansas City Star and Kansas City Times in response to the criticism
of Bruce Watkins. In addition to being a pastor of the Gregory
Tabernacle A.M.E. Church, he was also political chairman of the
Center City Ministerial Alliance and political action chairperson for
the A.M.E. Ministerial Alliance. The substance of his letter read as
follows:
Gentlemen. We have received with alarm the editorial
comment coming from your newspaper regarding the in
jection of partisan politics into the city mayorality
race. Your editorial and many new stories brand Bruce
Watkins as the sole candidate attempting to benefit
from his party affiliation. This is unfair, and your
own news stories prove the point. We have no way of
knowing every partisan matter which has been utilized
by Mr. Berkley, nor can we recount everything that
you have put in the paper. However . . . the following
items have occurred: Georgeanne Hedges, Republican
Convention Volunteer coordinator and local Danforth
aide, has been reported to us to be on the Citizen
Association Board of Directors. . . . We understand
• it jib, ak, ,hà liii, ~-
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that also, the local Republican party (including Mr.
Ridpath and his absentee operations ) has geared up to
aid Mr. Berkley. (See Appendix C.)
Even though this debate went on and on, as local residents echoed
the prevailing sentiment of the newspapers, it did not impede the
normal activities of the election. As the atomsphere was surrounded
with charges and counter charges of unethical claims, two prevailing
questions lingered in the minds of the Watkins headquarters and its
supporters. Firstly, how would this effect the campaign? Secondly,
now that the former mayor was not in the general election and the
other major contenders were also out, who would they support. The
resolution to this uncertain drama had begun to unfold when Charles
Wheeler, realizing he would not become Kansas City’s mayor for an
unprecedent third time, decided to support Bruce Watkins. The defeat
of Wheeler was a shock to political analysts who contended in earlier
days that he would probably be in a run—off with Watkins. Neverthe
less, in the days to follow, Wheeler’s endorsement would be followed
by that of Joe Pelofsky. To many political scientists, the stage was
set for a melange of political activity that reflected some of the
familiar scenes presented during the primary victory. Door—to—door
campaigns, hand shaking, debates with the Republican nominee, charges
and counter charges of illegalities. The most pervasive question of
all was whether the 17,424 votes which came from the predominately
six black wards would remain constant, increase or decrease during
the general election. Although, during the primary, 17,424 voters
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went to the polls from these wards to participate in the municipal
elections; or period some 30,000 registered voters from these same
wards stayed at home. According to official registered voter tallies
at the Kansas City Board of Election Commission, a total of 48,690
persons were registered to vote in the six predominantly black wards.
Table IV on page 274 shows how the voters in the six predominately
black wards cast votes for mayor. In the month before the primary,
Freedom Incorporated began an all out drive to defeat a right to work
amendment placed on the November 1978 ballot by registering new black
voters and getting out the black vote on election day. The visibility
and alleged importance of the labor union’s26 financial participation
in the Watkins election as part of its tradeoff or payback for the
support of the black community to defeat Missouri’s right to work
amendment was expected to enhance the chance of his victory. Local
newspapers viewed the election as the next “mayor will be a black or
a Republican — a choice inconsistent with the political and racial
make—up of the town.”27 Some members of the local Democratic party
began to organize a campaign to dump the Democratic nominee by decid
ing join the Republican party nominee. It seems very sad, as hard
as Watkins worked for the party’s nomination that he would encounter
26”And How the Race Shapes Up,” Kansas City Star (February
1979), 15C.
27Robert Lineberry and Ira Sharkansky, Urban Politics and Public




HOW THE VOTE WENT FOR CANDIDATES IN KANSAS CITY’S
BLACK WARDS FOR MAYOR
Ward Berkley Watkins Total
2 405 3,697 4,102
3 415 4,513 4,928
14 123 5,078 5,201
16 221 5,549 5,770
18 1,386 4,201 5,587
TOTAL 2,550 23,038 25,588
Source: “How Vote Went for Mayor in those Wards,” Kansas City Call
(April 5, 1979), 4.
275
tactics like these from his fellow party members. The dumping of a
Democratic candidate is not new to Missouri’s politics. As early as
1839, the Whig Party in Missouri opposed the Jacksonian Democrats by
forming political party organizations.28 The pattern and degree of
whites shutting blacks out of the political process have historical
overtones and reflect their inherent:
belief in separation of the races in all phases of our
society. It is their belief that the separation of
the races is necessary for the peace and tranquility
of all the people . . . and the continuing ~ood rela
tionship which has existed over the years.2
These kinds of problems were not the only concerns of Watkins. In
fact, he was primarily concerned with whether or not he could overcome
the deflection of party members while at the same time attract support
from conservative white voters living on Kansas City’s northeast and
eastside who, traditionally, were opposed to busing by the national
government and the spending of local, state and federal dollars for
the construction of low to moderate income subsidized housing in
their communities. Agitation on the part of Freedom Incorporated to
garner city—wide support for Bruce Watkins during the mayoral election
was a challenge to its effectiveness as a black, grass—roots, politi
cal organization.
28The Whig Party in Missouri (Kansas City, Missouri: University
of Missouri Press, 1967), 3.
29Stokley Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The
Politics of Liberation in America (New York: Random House, Inc.
1967), 93.
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As the 1979 general election approached, Freedom Incorporated
and the Citizen Association campaigned extensively throughout the
city. By election day, the campaign was at its peak and both politi
cal organizations anxious awaiting the outcome.
CHAPTER VI
THE ADVENT OF BLACK POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI:
AN EXAMINATION OF BLACK POLITICAL ACTIVITY, 1970—1980
This chapter will attempt to conduct a descriptive analysis of
black political activity in Kansas City, Missouri, from 1979—1980.
This examination focuses on the electoral process in Kansas City,
Missouri, as well as voter registration and efforts by the black
electorate and Freedom Incorporated during the general election of
1979 to elect Bruce Watkins as mayor of Kansas City, Missouri. The
primary consequence of his election is that it attempted to provide
the black electorate with a professional leadership class responsi
bile for the articulation of social and economic changes in the
black community. 1
Since historically, the black electorate in Kansas City, Mis
souri, had been excluded from the decision and policy making process,
the nature and structure of politics under black political authority
were unknown.2 Changes in the nature of the strategy for obtaining
‘David McBride and Monroe H. Little, “The Afro American Elite,
1930—1940: A Historical and Statistical Profile,” Phylon (June 1981),
106.
2Mack H. Jones, “Black Political Empowerment in Atlanta: Myth and
Reality,” Annals AAPSS 439 (September 1978), 105.
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community empowerment in Kansas City from protest to electoral poli
tics have become the subject of social science inquiry with which
black political thought has been concerned, namely: What would be the
goals of this new black leadership class and how would the white and
black electorate react to their election?3 These are major and impor
tant questions about the black political experience, and are commonly
asked by black community activists about the nature of the political
process in Kansas City, Missouri. Moreover, would the election of
this black leadership class to municipal office be able to transform
the social and economic conditions of the black electorate, “without
being unduly deferential to the interest of white political elite”.4
Furthermore,
Would the black leadership class develope during the
period of paternalistic politics retain its status as
black political leaders? Would new black leaders with
different priorities emerge? Would such leader have
the support of black rank and file.?5
In Kansas City, Missouri, this black leadership class gave atten
tion to the electoral process when Bruce Watkins became a candidate for
the mayor of Kansas City, Missouri. At the outset of the campaign,
Watkins and Freedom Incorporated held firm the view that the election
of a black as mayor would be very difficult. The election of a black





because it would need not only to attract the support from the black
electorate but at least 35 to 40 per cent of the white vote. During
the mayoral campaign, the all white Progressive Democratic Club
endorsed Joe Pelofsky by a vote of 21 to 9. They also endorsed Bruce
Watkins with six votes and abstained from giving Richard Berkley and
Mayor Charles Wheeler any votes. As the campaign progressed, the
white electorate became impressed with the ability of Bruce Watkins
to articulate and refocus public attention on the need to improve
the quality of city services and his public declaration during the
campaign that “he (Watkins) will be mayor for all the people who just
happens to be black.”6 White support for Watkins candidacy came
also, from the 30 member board of directors that governed the all
white Citizen Association. During the campaign, the organization
endorsed Berkley with 18 votes, Watkins 5, Wheeler 4 and Poelosky with
1 vote. The consistency on the part of Freedom Incorporated to
attract white support to Watkins’ mayorality candidacy “ is viewed
as being an indication of the kind of support based on his merits
rather than the support bargained for by persons with interests in
councilmanic races.”7
During the final months of the campaign, the black community
began to question whether it was necessary for Freedom Incorporated
6”It’s time for Black Community to take a Stand Behind Watkins,”
Kansas City Call (February 1979), 2.
7”Progressive Demos’ Votes Indicate there’s White Support for
Watkins,” Kansas City Call (March 1979), 1.
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to give such an inordinate amount of attention to the recruitment of
whites to support Watkins. Criticism by the black electorate of
Freedom Incorporated’s political strategy led the Kansas City Call to
write the following editorial.
despite differences among candidates for the
city council, black citizens all over the Kansas City
and all political persuasion . . . are saying that
Watkins is spending more time wooing the white vote
than he is in campaigning in the black community.
While this is not true, it should be. Watkins should
not have to campaign in the black areas as hard as
he does in the general community. Bruce Watkins is a
part of the black community, and has been a leader
in our midst for over 15 years. He has been an out
standing spokesman for his people. He knows when his
folks hurt and he knows what makes them unhappy. He
also knows what it takes to please them —— fair and
equal treatment —— and this is what Freedom In
corporated and he have been fighting for all of these
years • 8
Nevertheless, as the votes began to come in during the general
election and it became apparent that Berkley had won, the mood of
Bruce Watkins’ supporters began to shift from hope to disappointment;
Richard Berkley, the Citizen Association candidate emerged victorious
by defeating Bruce Watkins 73,356 to 52,798. A difference of 20,560
votes. Although nearly 27,949 blacks and about 25,000 white citizens
did go to the polls and vote for Watkins, this was 6,000 less than
the actual white votes he received outside the black community in the
81t’s Time for Black Community to Take a Stand Behind Watkins,”
Kansas City Call (February 1979), 2.
9”How Vote Went for Mayor in those Wards,” Kansas City Call
(April 4, 1979), 4.
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primary. The number of white votes needed and expected did not
materilize. Instead of the 30 to 40 per cent needed, Watkins received
about 20 per cent of the white vote. Democratic organizations, upon
which Watkins had depended for a substantial number of white votes,
and the organized labor groups which had pledged their
support to Watkins in exchange for the solid support
which the black community gave to the campaign to
defeat the ‘Right to Work’ amendment last fall did not
come to Watkins’ assistance when he needed it most.9
The defeat of Bruce Watkins represented a political wound in the
black community that would take time to heal. Nevertheless, Freedom
Incorporated was able to successfully maintain control of the third
and fifth district council seats with the election of Cleaver and
Hazley. Charles Hazley was able to defeat his opponent, Clinton Adams
by a vote margin of 10,491 to 4,496. Similarly, the Rev. Cleaver
was successful in his primary election bid by getting some 7,077 votes
in a crowded field of some seven candidates. Bill Richardson, whom he
faced in the general election, was the closes contender with some 2,946
votes in the primary. Rev. Cleaver tallied some 11,758 votes as
opposed to 8,300 for Richardson, a white official.1°
Although Hazley and Cleaver won, Freedom failed forthrightly in
its strategy to defeat Joanne Collins, the Citizen Association’s third
911ow Vote Went for Mayor in those Wards,” Kansas City Call
(April 4, 1979), 4.
10”Members of the Kansas City, Missouri City Council,” Kansas
City Call (March 27, 1980), 1.
d LhL~
282
district at—large candidate for city council. Mrs. Collins, who
was the incumbent, beat her challenger, Mrs. Icelean Clark by a 68,531
to 39,354 vote margin. Even though Freedom Incorporated got support
for the six predominantly black wards, neither Clark nor Freedom In
corporated could withstand the white support Joanne Collins and the
Citizen Association received in the metropolitan areas.
Despite the failure on the part of the organization to elect
Watkins, Iceland Clark and to defeat Collins, it was able to mobilize
the black electorate to support its candidates for public office.
After the general election, political analysts began to ask at least
two related questions concerning Watkins’ defeat: (1) to what extent
did the voters question Watkins’ qualifications? and (2) to what
extent did labor and race have an effect on Watkins’ loosing the
election?
Despite Watkins’ and Freedom Incorporated’s ability to attract
support from top Democratic Party leaders such as the governor, sena
tors, state and city representatives, the traditional Democratic voter
did not want both a Democratic and a black man as mayor, so they opted
for a Republican who was white. And secondly, according to an article
in the Kansas City Call newspaper, labor was politically in debt to
Watkins since the black community’s 7 to 1 defeat of the November 1978,
Right to Work Amendment. As a result, labor endorsed the only candi
date who supported the drive for a law which labor felt would have
economically strangled the labor union.
I~h~
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The union printed the labor ballots endorsing Watkins
for mayor. But poil workers were seen sitting in
their cars, and one worker said he left the ballots at
home. Leland Cox, head of the United Auto Workers, was
unavailable for comment. Political strategists agree
that a more harmonious relation between the Black and
white communities would have been reflected if the
margin of the vote had been closer.1’
The views expressed by the above statement highlight the most
striking racial attitudes of the 1970’s involving a mayoral con
test. 12 However, in a newspaper article, Lucile Bluford of the
Kansas City Call, quoted Watkins reflecting on his political defeat:
I am not ready to concede that this is a racist town,
but there are a lot of people here who openly said on
election day, and earlier, that ‘I am not voting for
the ~ There is still more racial prejudice here
than many of us had thought, but we are not ready to
label our town as racist because there are too many of
goodwill here, many of whom voted for Bruce Watkins in
Tuesday’s city election.13
Bluford recalls how during the balloting in the Northest area (which
is usually a stronghold for Democrats and anti—Citizen Association
candidates) ballot passers heard voter after voter make racial remarks
about Bruce Watkins:
They made it clear that they would not vote for a
Black man. They voted instead for the Citizen candi—
11-Kansas City Call (April 5, 1979), 1—2.
12William F. Mullen, “Community Control and Black Political Par
ticipation,” in Terrence E. Cook and Patrick Morgan, Participatory
Democracy (New York: Canfield Press, 1971), 256.
13Kansas City Call (April 5, 1979), 2.
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date, Richard Berkley, a Republican, who won the
mayor’s race by a strong majority. In addition to
open remarks of racial animosity, telephone calls
were made to top Democratic leaders who had pledged
their support to Bruce Watkins. A leading Democrat
said on election night that he ‘thought we had passed
that stage’ when hatred was so blantantly expressed
because of a person’s race. Ugly remarks were made by
telephone following the appearance of television com
mercials on behalf of Watkins made by Charles Curry,
widely known and highly respected Democratic leader
who went ‘all the way with Watkins’. In addition to
remarks at the poils and hate telephone calls, obnox
ious literature was passed in some parts of the city
in an effort to slur Watkins. 14
The statement by Bluford conceptualizes the important role that
environmental factors play in the election of candidates to public
office. Environmental variables such as age, sex, race, money and
geographical boundaries contributed to the defeat of Watkins. The
20,000 or more votes that separated Watkins and Berkley inherently
represented the basic difference between the black and white com
munity. However, on the other hand, if the election had been close,
then the question of race would have been a single variable for em—
piricst to examine the outcome of the mayoral contest. Neither
Watkins nor the mayor—elect differed with the reporting by Bluford
that race was a major variable that led to Berkley’s victory, a view
in which Bruce Watkins concurred. At the Hilton Plaza Inn in Kansas





this is still a mid—western, conservative town. I have
known for quite a while that I would not be bringing
the kind of news you have been waiting to hear. The
fact is, as the polls were about to close I had mis
givings about winning this election. But I could not
let you know then how things might come out. I have
been trying to get up the kind of courage I knew
I would need to face your disappointment. Maybe I
have made some mistakes in judgement. Maybe I did
not fight hard enough, but God knows I gave it all
I had. You have worked so hard and had so much
faith in me. . . . This kind of support can not be
bought. . . . We all know how little money we had to
run this campaign, so the effort has been the people’s
effort. 15
Later, he went on to say that:
the support given me on Tuesday will continue to
be the spark that works on behalf of the community.
The election shows us that we have to work to overcome
racial attitudes and financial capabilities.16
Studies have been written by scholars on blacks seeking public
offices. These studies agree with Watkins when he says that racial
attitudes were a factor in his defeat. These attitudes cut across
class status, sex, religion, and age. In the article, “Black Politi
cal Participation”, William Mullen gives a scholarly view of the
racial attitudes involving black contenders in mayoral elections. He
states that recent political campaigns in the North and South:
have illustrated one of the major liabilities
which Blacks face in seeking to control political de
cisions affecting their lives, and that is the mani
festation of white racism in the polling booths. Evi




of whites willing to vote for a Black candidate.
Edward Brooks, former sentator of Massachusetts is, of
course, a major exception although he is dismissed by
many Black militants as a Negro representative of the
white power structure.
Both Gary and Newark have Black majorities. In
none of these cities did the Black candidate secure
more than a small percentage of white votes in his
victory. White racism is revealed in the fact that it
is not considered by most to be anything but normal
for whites to continue to dominate a city’s politics
until Blacks have a city—wide majority , even though
they may represent the largest single group in the
city. 17
The black community saw the defeat of Bruce Watkins as an attempt
to redirect its focus to capture political office at the state level
as well as in the municipal government structure. A task Freedom
Incorporated realized in its successful effort to elect Charles Haz
ley from the third district and Rev. Emanuel Cleaver who succeeded
Bruce Watkins from the fifth district to the bipartisan 12 person
city council. The defeat of Watkins during the general election to
the Citizen Association candidate, Richard Berkley, allowed Kansas
City, Missouri to elect its first Republican mayor since 1924.18
Subsequently, after the city council was sworn in, Mayor Tom
Bradley of Los Angeles, California, Ollie Gates, treasurer of Watkins
campaign, and more than 500 former Kansas Citians living in Los Angeles
‘7William F. Mullen, 256.
1-8”New Mayor and City Council Sworn in Kansas City, Missouri,”
Kansas City Call (April 1979), 5.
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attended a reception honoring Watkins for running for mayor and for
his career as a public servant.’9
Less than three months after Watkins loss his mayoral bid,
councilman Art Ansel criticized Bruce Watkins and Charles Hazley for
spending $38 million of model cities money that failed to improve
the quality of life in the black community. Councilman Arts Ansel
mailed to his constitutents a copy of the following press release
expressing his disapproval of Hazley’s and Watkins’ support for fund
ing urban development projects in the black community.
Councilman Hazley was ‘absolutely horrified’ and Coun
cilman and mayoral candidate Watkins felt the Council
man Serviss ‘did us all an injustice’ when he very
wisely informed 28 agencies that the city would be re
luctant to increase appropriations to the Emergency
Assistance Corporation above the $365,000 approved on
May 4.
It is not being insensitive to tell the poor that
they must do everything they can to conserve our elec
tric power and gas usage. It is not being insensitive
to urge people to take advantage of all opportunities
to insulate their homes. It is not insensitive to
remind these 28 agencies that they must make certain
that only the deserving get assistance.
It is being insensitive to encourage these agencies
to remind their legislators that welfare is really the
business of the state.
This is the same kind of thinking that voted
$200,000 public money for a carwash that is eight
months late in opening and which will be in competi
tion with an existing privately—owned, taxpaying car
wash nearby. This is the same thinking that voted for
‘9”Kansas Citians in L. A. Fete Watkins,” Kansas City Call
(April 1979), 5.
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a $300,000 roller rink again in competition with an
existing, privately—owned rink. (This one never act
ually came off for other reasons, however.)
This is the same thinking that bought the building
of a failed bank being liquidated by the FDIC —— a
building which Public Works said was poorly construct
ed to begin with. Yes this is the same fuzzy thinking
that appropriated $38 million of Model Cities money
and for which there is so little to show.
In spite of these tiresome wild statements, be
assured that your Council, including Joe Serviss, is
not insensitive to the plight of needy citizens. All
of us want to help the deserving needy. On the other
hand, we need to remind all these, agencies that the
public coffers are not a bottomless pit and that we
must do everything we can to help ourselves before we
ask for help from others.2°
Watkins and Hazley dismissed Ansel charges as bogus post election
hype. These charges by Ansel signalled the beginning of a long and
bitter struggle between Freedom Incorporated and its former supporters
for control of politics in Jackson County and Kansas City, Missouri.
There were many cleavages within black political leadership and Free
dom Incorporated. Positions taken outside that of Freedom were looked
upon as anti—black community or anti—Freedom. To members of the organ—
zation, the more important consideration is not what policies or pro
cedures were being opposed but where they are opposed. To some extent,
dissent expressed and organized within Freedom Incorporated can be
much more disruptive that factionalism articulated outside it.
Nevertheless, over the years, Freedom has continued to agitate for
20”Councilman Art Asel Throws Curve at Watkins and Hazley,”
Kansas City Call (June, 1976), 1.
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better jobs, schools and housing within the six predominantly black
wards. It continues to play, as the dominant black political organi
zation in Kansas City, Missouri, a role in helping get blacks get
elected and appointed to public office.
This philosophical tug of war, which has dominated the politics
of the black community and pitted black religious and civic leaders
and the all white Citizen Association against Freedom Incorporated,
continues to be a potent opinion shaper when it comes to the body
politic.2’ Opposition by community leaders and the Citizen Associa
tion, from time to time, have been unsuccessful. Aggressiveness is
part of their political strategy and Freedom’s leadership has master
ed the most basic tenet of political surivival. The belief or assump
tion that the black community as a monolitic force has one large
deliverable vote is not documented. The black community “has no more
votes in concert on given issues than does the white community.”22
An example of successful representation by factionalism articu
lated outside of Freedom Incorporated was the support of a sales tax
by Jackson County legislator, Patricia Cowan Scaggs. The purpose of
this regressive tax was to pay for the construction of juvenile jails
and library facilities. Mrs. Scaggs and the Citizen Association sup
ported the passage of the sales tax referendum even though Freedom
21Tracy Thomas and Walter Bodine, Right Here in River City (New




Incorporated and other civic associations opposed it on the grounds
that the poor and the elderly would be hit the hardest by the tax.
Watkins and Freedom Incorporated made speeches before social clubs
and church groups, urging all to vote against the sale tax. As a
result of this effort, the sale tax was subsequently defeated. Ironi
cally, even though Freedom campaigned to defeat the sales tax, it
nevertheless endorsed along with the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference (S.C.L.C.) the passage of four capital improvement bonds
to repair neighborhood streets and sidewalk improvements. Freedom
and S.C.L.C. backed the passage of these bonds because they, “would
not increase property taxes and because they believed the city’s
affirmative action program will assure the black community a fair
share of the thousands of new jobs to be generated by the improve
ment.”23 Both S.C.L.C. and Freedom Incorporated organized a committee
to mobilize the electorate to support the bond and took out advertise
ments in the Kansas City Call newspaper which read, “Four Propositions
the Black Community Can’t Afford to Pass Up.” The four bond issues
appearing as propositions supported the need to employ thousands of
people to carry out flood control; to provide safer streets through
widening of major thoroughfares; to improve neighborhood streets and
sidewalks throughout the city; and to provide vital flood control and
storm drainage improvements to protect lives, property and jobs. No
matter where the voterd live in Kansas City, his neighborhood would
23”SCLC Endorses 4 City Bonds on August Ballot,” Kansas City
Call (August 1978), 9.
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benefit from four capital improvement bonds on the August 8, 1979
ballot and at no tax increase.24 The four propositions passed with
the support of the black community, SCLC, and other neighborhood
groups and associations.
During the August 8, 1980 primary, Patricia Scaggs attempted to
run against one of Freedom’s candidates for the 23rd district. During
the campaign, Freedom entered into an alliance with its adversary,
People In Politics, a black, grassroots organization for several
reasons. First, Freedom Incorporated and its leadership believed
that the Citizen Association Committee support of Patricia Cowan
Scaggs against Allen Wheat for the 23rd district was part of its
plan to once again regain their political control over Kansas City
and keep the black electorate chained to boss leadership and politi
cal slavery.25 Secondly, it realized that this union could only make
the organization strong and potent enough to destroy her candidacy.
And finally, as previously mentioned, when Richard Talbert, a member
of Freedom Incorporated decided that the time had come for him to
resign his city council seat due to personal reasons, the city coun
cil using its power of appointment selected Joanne Collins as his
successor. Collins was selected because of the Citizen Association
24”Invest in Your Neighborhood Vote Yes on Pro—Positions One
Thru Four on Aug. 8th”, Committee for 1 thru 4, Kansas City, Mis
souri, 1979.




effort to defeat Freedom’s candidate, Michael Meyers; thereby denying
for the first time since 1963, the organizations control of the third
district council seat. This political maneuvering infuriated Freedom
Incorporated and it decided to ask the incumbent Jackson County
legislator, Mamie Hughes to run against Joanne Collins because of her
participation in community affairs and her name recognition. People
in Politics, and other supporters of Mamie Hughes distributed flyers
throughout the black community labelling Joanne Collins as the great
white hope and charging her with being an Uncle Tom for the all
white Citizen Association Committee. People in Politics is a black
political organization which competed against Freedom Incorporated
and Citizen Association to elect and appoint its candidates to public
office. The way in which these groups joined forces to defeat Patricia
Scaggs could be conceptualized as an attempt by Freedom Incorporated
to ensure that only the candidates it endorsed would be allowed to
speak on behalf of, and represent the black electorate in Kansas
City’s political system as officeholders. The way in which Freedom
Incorporated and People in Politics joined forces to defeat Patricia
Scaggs produced strains within the black community in their quest to
defeat her and continue to manage the selection of blacks for appointed
and elected office. According to Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba in
1965:
There are many sources of strains within our culture;
sets of beliefs that are incompatible with other ac
ceptable standards, beliefs; sets of beliefs held by
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one segment of society and not another, or uninanage—
able strains between belief and reality. These basic
beliefs have now become the object of direct concern
and attempted manipulations by political groups and
elites in their request to dominate the structure of
decision—making. 26
Patricia Cowan Scaggs was labeled not only a “ Benedict Arnold” by
Freedom Incorporated and People in Politics for working with an
adversary of Freedom Incorporated to support the sales tax against
the interest of blacks: but they began to raise questions about
whether she could represent the district on a full time basis and
take care of her two small children at home. Patricia Cowan Scaggs
responded to statements by Freedom Incorporated and People in Poli
tics by charging that Freedom Incorporated used employees of the
Impact Development Corporation, a federally funded agency, to distri
bute campaign literature door to door in the black community. Legally,
the United States Department of Labor prohibits the involvement of
CETA employees in political activities during working hours. 27 Charges
levied by Patricia Cowan Scaggs that there was a link between Freedom
Incorporated and Impact Development resulted in Impact moving to
another location for the sake of appearance. Mrs. Scaggs questioned
why after all this time did the agency have a Freedom Incorporated
26Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Politi
cal Development (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University, Pub.,
Co., 1965), 520—522.
27”Impact Development Inc. to Move Metropolitan Center for
Appearance Sake,” Kansas City Call (August 1980), 1A.
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sign displayed over the building which housed its offices and why
did the Freedom Incorporated ballots for the August 5th primary
election list its address at the Impact location? The charges, upon
being investigated by the U.S. Labor Department, were found to be
unfounded.28 When the results of the primary were concluded, the
charges raised by Mrs. Scaggs failed to make a difference. She was
defeated by 29,000 votes. The actual vote was 52,000 to 23,000.
Agitation on the part of the black electorate to use Freedom In
corporated, voter registration drives and electoral politics to
address the problems of poverty, unemployment, and housing decay
during the period of 1980’s were some of the methods used by the
black electorate to transmit its concerns to the political system.29
Convincing evidence of this strategy was present in the 1980 primary
elections, when Freedom Incorporated was able to increase the number
of black officeholdrs at the state level from four to seven by defeat
ing white incumbents in the twenty—third and thirty second district,
and by mobilizing the black electorate to support its candidate
against long time nemesis, Philip Scaglia in the 30th district.
Scaglia, the incumbent seeking Democratic renomination for state
Senator, represented a district that was 80 per cent black. For years,
28Ibid.
29Kansas City, Missouri Advisory Commission on Human Relations,
An Overview of Minority History in Employment, Housing, Public Accom
modation and Affirmative Action Training Guides for Kansas City,
Missouri (1980), 10.
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the black electorate had been trying to elect a new state legislator
to represent the district because Phillip Scaglia (and his family):
does not live in the 30th district and is a part time
representative of sorts. Phillip Scaglia has a voting
address in the district, but his wife and family lives
in the area of Glen Arbor Road, miles away from the
district he purports to represent.3°
To maintain a degree of symbolic representation in the district,
Scaglia had his telephone placed on call—forwarding so that his
telephone calls to his residence could be transferred from his resi
dence in the 30th district to his home outside the area, as a techni
que for monitoring events in the district and for communicating with
his constituents. Several times Scaglia was challenged in court on
the grounds that he did not live in the district he represented, but
he was able to prove a technical residence in the district.3’
The high emotional caliber of the campaign led a resident of the
30th district to make the following remarks about Scalgia’s form of
representation:
Phillip Scaglia was judged in Jefferson City to be one
of the 10 worst representatives out of 163. Black
folks who comprise better than 80% of the 30th dis
trict have let this man whose only solutions to teen
age delinquency were making certain youth crimes pay
adult penalties and beefing up the police force.32
30”Bill Covington Has Good Chance to Beat Scaglia in 30th Dis—
trict,” Kansas City Call (August 1979), 10.
31Louis Blue, “Primary Brings Sweet Victory to Freedom Incorpo
rated,” Kansas City Call (August 1980), 2.
32”Irate Citizens Says Scaglia is Embarrassing to District,”
Kansas City Call (August 1980), 2.
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Scaglia has been able to hold on to his seat as a member of Mis
souri House of Representative because of factional political fighting
among the black electorate, which divided their vote. In years past,
blacks in the 30th district voted for Scaglia as a matter of habit.33
Freedom Incorporated supported a black woman, Mary G. Bland to run
against Phillip Scaglia to represent the black electorate in the 30th
district. Implementing an organizational strategy whenever necessary
to ensure the election and appointment of Bland is consistent with
its goal of, “enhancing Freedom Incorporated visibility in the black
community; the positive image of the organization in the community
and to highlight the historical signficance and contributions of the
organization”,34 to the development and survival of the black commu
nity through the political process. Networking, coalitioning, and
cooperating with other groups and organizations during the 1980
primary allowed Freedom Incorporated not only to support a candidate
for the 30th district, but to support the candidacy of Lee Swinton
against Mary Cant in the 9th and C. B. Mooney against Henry Ponetiere
for the 11th district as the first black state senators.
On July 19, 1980 the Missouri Black Leadership Conference held a
community forum and invited Swinton, Mooney, Bland, Coving, James
2 33”Primary Brings Sweet Victory,” Kansas City Call (March 1979),
34Archie Welch and others, Freedom Incorporated: Organization




Tindal, along with those candidates vying for governor and Jackson
County Prosecuting Attorney to state their views on issues involving
their campaigns, and their programs for delivering governmental
services to the black Community.35
Lee Swinton, attorney, former Jackson County legislator and
former president of the N.A.AC.P. decided to run for election to the
Missouri State Senate because of his determination and desire to serve
the interest of the black electorate. As a member of the county legis
lature for six years, Swinton was chairman of the finance committee and
served as liaison between the legislature and the Hospital Hill Corpo
ration during the construction of Truman Medical Center. As a county
legislator for six years, he sponsored the Yarta Study which resulted
in pay raises for county employees. During his tenure as president
of Kansas City’s N.A.A.C.P., he was responsible for bring about the
employment of many blacks in such plants as Bendix, and Western
Electric, and he helped to design and administer the Kansas City plan
whose aim is to include minorities in skilled crafts of the construc
tion industry.36 In 1975, Swinton was a vocal proponent and ardent
supporter of the one—half cent sales tax for Kansas City Public
Schools. When the anti—education forces challenged the tax in court,
Swinton was part of a team of lawyers who defended this pattern and
form of funding. As a result of this efforts, the one half cent sales
35”Candidates to Appear at Community Forum,” Kansas City Call
(July 1980), 1A.
36Lee Swinton for State Senate,” Kansas City Call (July 1980),
1, 12.
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tax brings over $9,000,000 to Kansas City School System and has been
endorsed by the voters at least three times in 1975, 1977 and l978.~~
The support that Swinton gave the black community over the years
enabled the Executive Committee of Freedom Incorporated and its Board
of Directors to endorse him. Freedom Incorporated decided to support
the candidacy of Swinton because this leadership class believed that
he would provided the “best representation available to the dis
trict.”38 The selection of Swinton for Missouri’s 9th district Senate
seat by Freedom was part of its continual effort to telling the black
electorate who its leaders would be and to mend fences with Swinton
and the organization, and elect him as the first black state senator.
According to a Freedom Incorporated press release:
while there had been differences between Freedom and
Mr. Swinton in the past, the over—riding oneness of
purpose which we share with Mr. Swinton has prevailed.
We take this opportunity to give notice that we can
not, will not and dare not allow our community scraps
to be used by forces external to our community that we
so dearly love and live in. Unity has been a primary
agenda item of Freedom, Inc., since Leon Jordan, Bruce
Watkins and other founders gave it life. Unity con
tinues to be our prevailing them today. . . . It is
the unanimous opinion of the Freedom, Inc., board that
Mr. Swinton’s . . . long and laudable history of com
munity involvement and leadership merits him the sup
port of our organization and that of the commuity at
large.39
37”The Future of Education in Kansas City,” Kansas City Call
(July 1980), 3.
38”Lee Swinton Endorsed by Freedom Inc. For 9th District Sena
tor,” Kansas City Call (July 1980), 1.
39Ibid.
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The endorsement and support of Swinton by Freedom Incorporated
and the growth of the black electorate in Kansas City, Missouri’s
9th district, for the first time placed the black electorate in an
excellent condition to elect a black as state senator. Phil B. Curls,
President of Freedom Incorporated and the Rev. Emauel Cleaver, Chair
man of the Board of Directors, assisted Swinton in the development of
this political strategy, in order to achieve the following goals.
First, the use of Freedom Incorporated as a vehicle for the recruit
ment of the black electorate to support Swinton through its campaign
of voter education and registration in Kansas City, Missouri, which
in 1980 constituted 27.30 % of the total population compared to its
white counterpart which was 70.03%.40 Although the growth rate of
whites to blacks in Kansas City was disproportionate, the registra
tion rate of blacks was much higher than whites in the 9th district.
There were 10,000 more black registered voters than whites in 1980.
According to the Kansas City, Missouri Election Board in 1980, there
are 5,264 black registered voters in ward 3, ward 16 has 795; 17 has
7,965 and ward 18 has 6,816 for a total of 28,000 compared with 18,046
voters mostly whites in wards 11, 12, 13, 15, and 24.41
The final objective of the federation focused upon the need to
mobilize the black electoarate within Kansas City, Missouri to in—
40Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1983), 740.
Vote Needed to Reach Primary Goals,” Kansas City Call
(August 1980), 1.
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crease the level of representatives in the Missouri Senate. To rea
lize this objective, Freedom Incorporated endorsed the candidacy of
C. B. Mooney against Henry Ponethiere for State Senator for the 11th
district. This effort led to the mailing out of campaign literature
to the voters of the 9th and 11 districts describing Mooney’s and
Swinton’s contribution to the community and the manning by volunteer
workers of a bank of telephone calling registered voters and enlisting
their support on primary day. The challenge by Swinton and Mooney to
represent the black electorate as State representative with the support
of Freedom Incorporated, stimulated the black electorate to become
more amenable to voter registration and education campaigns and there
by increased its possibility of acquiring community empowerment. In
effect, the 1980 primary election reinforced black political empower
ment since it helped to convince the black voters of Kansas City that:
they could have an impact on the political process.
Once the political process had an effect on the
day to day lives of black citizens they had a posi
tive incentive to continue their participation. Elec
toral success encouraged greater attention to elec
toral activity than has been the case in previous
decades when black political activity was primarily
protest orientated and took place outside of electoral
politics because of its racial exclusive character.42
In the days leading to the August 1980 primary, public service
announcements over the black radio station, KPRS and articles in
42John E. Jacobs, The State of Black America 1984 (Washington,
D.C.: National Urban League, Inc., 1984), 70.
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Kansas City Call reminded the black electorate that it had the power
and ability to
nominate two black candidates for state senators in
the Democratic primary and the possibility of electing
seven black members to the Missouri House of Repre
sentatives. The key to the election of a black senator
from the 9th and 11th district is a big voter turn
out.43
Voter registration drives, public services announcements and campaign
rallies throughout Kansas City allowed the black community to support
the candidates backed by Freedom Incorporated. These efforts paid
off in the August 8, 1980 primary with Lee Vertis Swinton defeating
the incumbent Senator Mary L. Cant for the Democratic nomination
for Missouri State Senator from the 9th District and three black
candidates for the Missouri House defeating the incumbent repre
sentatives from 23rd, 30th and 32nd districts. Swinton defeated
the incumbent Senator Cant, 5,942 votes to 5,906. He was able
to pile up his biggest bloc of votes in the 16th, 17th and 18th wards
while Senator Cant carried wards 11, 112, 13 and 15 in the northeast
section with big majorities. Swinton carried the third ward 770 to
444•44
Rev. James Tjndall defeated his three opponents and became the
democratic nominee for state representative from the 23rd district.
Rev. James Tindall won a four way race by defeating Alice Comez,
43”Big Vote Needed,” Kansas City Call (August 1980), 2.
44”Swjnton Defeats Mary Gant: Blacks Wint Three New House Seats
for Total of Seven,” Kansas City Call (August 1980), 1.
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John Sanchez, Jr., and the incumbent Paul C. Rojas. Rev. Tindall
received 840 votes; Alice Gomez received 518; Paul C. Rojas, 485
and John Sanchez, Jr., 227. Gomez, Rojas and Sanchez were defeated
in their efforts to represent the 23rd district of Missouri House of
Representatives because these three effectively split the Mexican—
American vote,and this resulted in the election of a candidate backed
by Freedom Incorporated. The election of Tindall followed on the
heels of Mary Bland’s upset victory over Phillip Scaglia in the 30th
district. Bland was able to defeat her opponent with a 439 — vote
margin. She received 1,823 votes to Scaglia’s 1,384. Political
observers and white residents of the 30th legislative district were
shocked at Scaglia’s defeat. One resident commented, that “blacks
are always divided. We were shocked that they stuck together this
time.”45 The only Freedom candidate who was defeated was C. B. Mooney.
Mooney, candidate for state senator from the 11th district was
defeated by the incumbent Senator Henry A. Pathethiere 4,328 to
5,521, a margin of 1,193 votes.46 Both Bland and Rev. Tindall had no
Republican opposition in November 1980, so their seats in the legisla
ture were assured.
Support by People in Politics, Committee for County Progress,
Missouri Citizens for Constitutional Democracy, Progressive Demo




Call and Star newspapers and ERA Coalition, enabled Freedom Incorpo
rated to elect a state senator from the 9th district, two city coun
cilmen, seven state representatives, two county legislators, two
seats on the Kansas City Board of Education, a trustee of the Metro
politan Community College Board and sufficient political clout to
drive the white ward political bosses out of the black community.
The defeat of white incumbents in the twenty—third, thirty second,
and thirtieth districts is a testimony on the part of the black
electorate and black political groups, “that they have learned to
work together for community goals instead of fighting among them
selves.”47 Even though the black electorate rallied around the
candidacy of Swinton, Watkins and other candidates backed by Freedom
Incorporated, it could not defeat Joanne Collins, the only black
elected official associated with the all white Citizen Association





This descriptive study was initiated in an attempt to analyze
and describe the factors contributing to the development of Freedom
Incorporated and the rise of black political empowerment in Kansas
City, Missouri. It was also initiated because of the need to examine
the view held by social scientists who assume that fundamental changes
in the social, political and economic status of the black electorate,
can be achieved by providing them with equal access to formal politi
cal and governmental authority.
Although the literature on black political activity during and
after the decline of segregation and the Pendergast machine in Kansas
City concentrated on using the ethnic pluralist model for interpret
ing black political behavior, these studies, for the most part,
failed to facilititate our understanding of black politics in the
Midwest. In discussing the impact and role of the black political
organizations in improving the social and economic status of blacks
in Kansas City, this study will attempt to analyze the impact of
electoral changes in Kansas City’s political system and social and
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economic problems on the ability of Freedom Incorporated to, “increase
the black community’s share of existing services and benefits,” In
the past, social scientists have utilized these indicators for measur
ing the effects of black political organizations’ delivering the black
vote and electing their candidates; their ability to overcome the
strength of white political organizations competing to maintain their
position of dominance over the political process; their ability to
play a decisive role in forging unity between the various factions
within the movement for social change and their ability to deliver
the vote and garner city wide support for its programs.
As mentioned earlier, this study attempted to analyze and des
cribe the impact that Freedom Incorporated had in altering the social
and economic conditions of the black electorate in Kansas City, Mis
souri. Although the focus of this study is primarily limited to Kansas
City in particular, it is hoped that the findings of the study can be
useful in helping us to understand the nature of black political
activity in the Midwest.
Data regarding the movement of the black electorate, housing,
education, health care, employment and voting population characteris
tics were analyzed to determine the extent to which voting and office—
holding are in fact condition for
1Mack Jones, “Black Politics from Civil Rights to Benign
Neglect” in Harry Johnson, Negotiating the Mainstream (San Francis—
co: Chandler Pub. C0., 1972).
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reordering the priorities of various governing
bodies on which black officeholders serve and per
suading them to seek novel solutions to outstanding
problems which are particularly salient in black
communities, and to garner for the the black com
munity a more equitable distribution of existing
services and benefits provided by government within—
present priorities.2
Although social scientists have utilized these indicators for
examining systematically initiatives of black officeholders to reorder
the socio—economic status of blacks, this study concluded that elec
toral politics has brought about only tangible changes between the
quality of services in black and white communities.3
Nevertheless, some studies have suggested that black political
empowerment has been definitely positive as an effective tool for
solving the problems of the black community in Kansas City.4 However,
our study tends to support those social scientists who suggest that
voting and the election of blacks to public office has contributed
to only a few gradual and remedial changes in the social and economic
conditions of blacks. William H. Boone, Hanes Walton, Jr. and Mack
Jones has shown this process to be the case for blacks whenever they
acquire some degree of political power.5
2lbjd
3lbid., 182—183.
4Robert T. Perry, Black Legislators (San Francisco, California:
R and E Research Associates, 1976), 59.
5william H. Boone and Hanes Walton, Jr., “A Demographic Over
view of Black Political Parties,” Journal of Black Studies (September
1974), 94.
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Data presented in this study are chosen to focus specifically
upon several reasons why black political empowerment will achieve
very few positive results for the black electorate in Kansas City,
Missouri. For the most part, efforts by Freedom Incorporated to pro
vide street lighting, drainage, roads, building and repairing schools,
employment, health care and housing are conditioned upon the suppport
they received outside of the perimeter of electoral politics. Second
ly, blacks have been elected to public office in a city where the
black electorate is forced to live unemployed or underpaid in dilapi
dated and substandard housing in an area where they receive inadequate
municipal services.
This research study attempted to show that in spite of the
election of blacks to public office in Kansas City, Missouri, from
the early 1960’s to the late 1970’s, their success in reordering the
conditions of black life, “has been negligible at best.”6
Nevertheless, this study attempted to show that black elected
officeholders showed sensitivity to the cause, needs and problems of
blacks by offering solutions to short term socioeconomic problems.
It also showed that black elected officeholders, with the support of
Freedom Incorporated and the black electorate, were able to improve
the distribution of municipal services to the black community. While
they played this pivotal role, they have yet to accomplish the goal
6Jones, 182.
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of electing blacks to public office in proportion to their population
numbers or to elect a black as mayor.
The study reveals that Freedom Incorporated has played a major
role in improving the quality of black life in Kansas City. However,
the election and selection of candidates by Freedom Incorporated to
run for public office is intended to continue the goal of managing the
the political process in the black community, whereby, candidates
for public office are chosen by an elite leadership to represent the
black electorate.
While most of the initiatives by Freedom Incorporated have been
designed to provide a more equitable distribution of municipal ser
vices to the black community, the leadership of Freedom Incorporated
has been quite effective in improving the quality of life for blacks
in Kansas City. To measure the political effectiveness of Freedom
Incorporated, the following indicators were utilized in this study:
(a) the ability of Freedom Incorporated to end discrimination in the
public and private sector; (b) the ability of Freedom Incorporated to
improve the election of blacks to public office; Cc) the ability of
Freedom Incorporated to obtain employment and economic development
projects for the black community; (d) the ability of Freedom Incorpo
rated to improve housing, obtain street lights and improve health
care; and (e) the ability of Freedom Incorporated to improve the
distribution of goods and services to the black community.
il! ~ I
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Notwithstanding these successes of Freedom Incorporated and the
black electorate, they have not been able to control economic insti
tutions in their community or prevent unemployment, drugs and crime
from impacting on the black electorate. Thus, efforts to solve the
socio—economic problems of the black electorate through the political
process created an unusual amount of expectations and promises that
neither Freedom Incorporated nor its candidates could keep. In spite
of the election of blacks to public office in Kansas City, Missouri,
the economic plight of blacks there continues to worsen.




SIZE OF THE BLACK POPULATION IN 115 COUNTIES OF THE STATE OF
MISSOURI — 1970
TOTAL URBAN BLACKS
STATE 4,676,501 70.1 479,746
COUNTIES
Adair 22,472 68.4 0.0
Andrews 11,913 27.9 0.0
Atchinson 9,240 27.2 0.0
Audrain 25,362 58.9 0.0
Barry 19,597 21.2 0.0
Barton 10,431 36.0 0.0
Bates 15,468 25.8 0.0
Benton 9,695 00.0 0.0
Bolliriger 8,820 00.0 0.0
Boone 80,911 77.8 4,299
Butler 33,915 49.7 2,059
Buchanan 86,915 87.6 2,441
Caldwell 8,351 00.0 0.0




TABLE V —— Continued
COUNTIES TOTAL URBAN BLACKS
Camden 13,315 00.1 0.0
Cape Giradeau 49,350 4.6 1,429
Carroll 12,566 38.4 0.0
Carter 3,878 0.0 0.0
Cass 39,448 44.7 446
Cedar 9,424 33.1 0.0
Chariton 11,084 00.0 697
Christian 15,124 0.0 0.0
Clark 8,260 0.0 4
Clay 123,322 90.2 971
Clifton 12,462 26.5 0.0
Cole 46,228 69.8 3,041
Cooper 14,732 50.4 1,085
Crawford 14,828 6.9 0.0
Dade 6,850 00.0 0.0
Dallas 10,054 00.0 0.0
Daviess 8,420 00.0 0.0
Dekaib 7,305 6.1 0.0
Dent 11,475 36.8 0.0
Douglass 9,268 27.0 0.0
Dunklins 33,742 44.7 1,570
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TABLE V —— Continued
COUNTIES TOTAL URBAN BLACK
Franklin 55,116 43.3 540
Gasconade 11,878 23.6 0.0
Gentry 8,060 00.0 0.0
Greene 152,929 79.3 2,432
Grundy 11,819 51.3 0.0
Harrison 10,257 29.5 0.0
Henry 18,451 56.0 226
Hickory 4,481 0.0 0.0
Holt 6,654 0.0 11
Howard 10,561 33.3 998
Howell 23,521 29.3 0.0
Iron 9,529 00.0 0.0
Jackson 654,558 96.7 112,852
Jasper 79,852 68.7 945
Jefferson 105,248 16.8 845
Johnson 34,172 52.6 1,358
Knox 5,692 00.0 0.0
Laclede 19,944 43.2 0.0
Lafayette 25,626 47.9 881
Lawrence 24,585 39.2 0.0
Lewis 10,993 24.4 469
d idil Ii ~ ili~ ~ i ~
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TABLE V —— Continued
COUNTIES TOTAL URBAN BLACKS
Lincoln 18,041 14.1 611
Lin 15,125 53.6 00.0
Livingston 15,368 60.5 00.0
McDonald 12,357 00.0 0.0
Macon 15,432 34.7 0.0
Madison 8,641 48.2 0.0
Manes 6,851 00.0 0.0
Marion 28,121 76.5 1,374
Mercer 4,910 00.0 0.0
Miller 15,026 23.5 0.0
Mississippi 16,647 49.0 3,507
Moniteau 10,742 28.3 0.0
Monroe 9,542 0.0 414
Montgomery 11,000 00.0 0.0
Morgan 10,068 00.0 0.0
New Madrid 23,420 27.5 4,473
Newton 32,901 29.7 0.0
Nodaway 22,467 43.8 0.0
Oregon 9,180 0.0 0.0
Osage 10,994 00.0 0.0
Ozark 6,226 00.0 0.0
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TABLE V —— Continued
COUNTIES TOTAL URBAN BLACKS
Pemiscot 26,373 40.5 7,203
Perry 14,393 35.8 0.0
Pettis 34,137 66.9 1,436
Phelps 29,481 54.9 0.0
Pike 16,928 44.6 1,189
Platte 32,081 43.0 0.0
Polk 15,415 30.9 0.0
Pulaski 53,781 69.2 4,107
Putnam 5,916 00.0 0.0
Balls 7,764 2.7 0.0
Randolph 22,434 58.5 1,404
Ray 17,599 28.7 0.0
Reynolds 6,106 00.0 0.0
Ripley 9,803 00.0 0.0
St. Charles 92,954 48.5 1,163
St. Clair 7,667 00.0 0.0
St. Francois 36,818 48.1 0.0
St. Louis 351,353 95.8 45,579
St. Louis City 622,236 100.0 254,268
St. Geneview 12,867 34.7 00.00
Saline 24,633 58.5 1,258
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TABLE V —— Continued
Counties TOTAL URBAN BLACKS
Schuyler 4,665 00.0 00.0
Scotland 5,499 00.0 00.0
Scott 33,250 51.8 2,777
Shannon 7,196 00.0 00.0
Shelby 7,906 00.0 00.0
Stoddard 25,771 23.4 1,069
Stone 9,921 00.0 00.0
Sullivan 9,921 00.0 00.0
Taney 13,023 00.0 00.0
Texas 18,320 00.0 00.0
Vernon 19,065 51.9 00.0
Warren 9,699 00.0 414
Washington 15,086 00.8 00.0
Wayne 8,546 00.0 00.0
Webster 15,562 19.0 00.0
Worth 3,359 00.0 00.0
Wright 13,667 25.9 00.0
Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, County and City Data Book (Washing




Political Action Chairman of Center
City Ministerial Alliance
Political Action Chairman for the
A.M.E. Ministerial Alliance
Kansas City, MO. 64106
February 29, 1979
Kansas City Star
Kansas City, Missouri 64106
“Gentlemen:”
“We have reviewed with alarm the editorial comment coming from
your newspaper regarding the injection of partisan politics into the
city mayoralty race. Your editorial and many news stories brand
Bruce Watkins as the sole candidates attempting to benefit from his
party affiliation. This is unfair. and your own news stories prove
the point.”
“We have no way of knowing every partisan matter which has been
utilized by Mr. Berkley, nor can we recount everything that you have
put in the paper. However. . . . the following items occurred:
“1. Mr. Berkley paid press—agent. Jerry Jette has repeated
commented from Mr. Jette are of a partisan nature?
“2. There have been numerous mentions in the Star of Republican
club endosement of the Jackson County Young Republican Club: and that
of Mr. Berkley. Do you feel that these organizations are partisan
and that mention of them by the Berkley camp represents partisan rhe
toric. ?“
“3. Kit Bond, former Missouri governor, has been with Mr. Berk—
ley since the day he filed (again your own newspaper mention this)
and this support endured through at least the election night party
when Mr. Bond was a prominent figure in the festivities. Is Mr. Bond
being mentioned by the Berkley camp and your newspaper because he is
a prominent Republican (and therefore a partisan reference) or be
cause there may in his case, some significant reasons for him to be
mentioned?
“4. William Phelps, current lieutenant Governor, has also re
peatedly been, mentioned in connection with the Berkley campaign. In
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this morning’s newspaper, Page Bi, we see that Mr. Phelps intends to
announce his plans today for 1980. We assume that will be a Republi
can candidate for statewide office. Is that a partisan race?
“5. John Connoly’s” chief campaigner” (Kansas City Times, 2B,
March 8) is Eddie Mahe, and he has been paid $3,000 by Mr. Berkley
has also repeatedly been for consultation on his campaign. Mr. Mahe
also serve as Executive Director of the Republican National Committee
from 1972—1976, according to your newspaper report. Is Mr. Mane con
sidered a non—partisan figure?
“6. Pat Miller has apparently been a longstanding worker in the
Berkley campaign on a fulitime basis. We understand that she comes
from Republican Governor Ray’s staff in Iowa.
“7. Ceorgeanne Hedges, Republican Convention volunteer coordi
nator and local Danforth aid, has been reported to us to be of the
Citizens Association Board of Directors, and in that capacity was
supportive of Berkley’s nomination by that organization.
“8. We are not sure about the exact name, hut we understand Neal
Newhouse has come from his Washington, D.C. office of the Republican
National Committee to work on Mr. Berkley’s campaign during these
final weeks. Do you feel that the Republican National Committee is
nonpartisan?
“9. We understand that the local Republican party (including Mr.
Ridpath and his absentee operation) has geared up to aid Mr. Berkley.
Are they partisan?
“As we initially stated, we could not know all of the partisan
activities which have taken place on behalf of Mr. Berkley. Most of
our information comes from your newspaper articles, and therefore full
information may not have been reported, depending upon the thorough
ness of your reporting staff.
“In any event it is quite obvious that there is strong public
and private support from a variety of partisan sources. Did you
wonder why Dick Berkley thought this was okay? Probably he read the
charter and saw that its only limitation was that the ballot could
not contain reference to party. With that in mind, he sought all
manner of partisan support and utilized that to its greatest extent
to make the runoff election.
“The truly amazing thing that has happended is that your edito
rial board has conveniently forgoteen all of the above items, some
major and son minor, and chose to attack only Bruce Watkins who be
latedly received some partisan support after the primary election.
I. II~
320
We would like to suggest that the editorial board review the news
articles in its own newspaper and then give a balance opinion of
partisan politics in the city election.
A little history might be in order regarding Bruce’s partisan
support. He ran primarily with the backing of the people of his
community, including a group of ministers, who have greatly appre
ciated Bruce’s commitment and work during a very active political
life. In the primary, he had two major Democratic opponents, and so
it was not until after the race had narrowed down to two people that
Bruce was successful in obtaining any major partisan support.
“Frankly, it appears to us that Bruce Watkins with late partisan
support is a bad person to the Kans City Star, while Mr. Barkley may
do anything he desires, and the Kansas City Star will close its eyes
to such facts. We hope this is not what is occurring, but we see
little evidence to the contrary. Please consider being fair.”
Repect fully,
Dr. Howard S. Gloyd
Political Action Chairman of
Center City Ministerial Alliance;






EULOGY TO LEON M. JORDAN
Orcbi4 Governor Hearstes, Senator Symingtos md flew2: of Lees Jordan:
To most politkiar~J, on most occassows, she opportunity to gsa’s a speech is both easy and Isisrahie.
Speechmaking is as macb apart .f she life of a poliskiaw as “Number, pLease” is So a t.ltpbosts operator.
lam a politician, bat I find this occasie., this eulogy, neither easy sor S,swgbk. Tb. reason is obvious.
Lao. fordais was any friand. Leo. was oar friend. The death of a friend is atreamatsc experience, shockingly
,iggrsvatel m ibis sstsssag whest that death was prc.a’ohed wantonly. . . brutally . . . sens.lesJly.
I repeat, once agaws, I am .epalitki.m-~rsd Leo. Jorlaii was a politician.
Despita use list7 co.m,tation that word carries to some, to Leo. Jordan—and to me—the slits “poll.
ida.” ranks is quality with the We ‘jsdga, or “isisistar,” or “doctor.”
To Leon Jerd.ma, a politician was one who workad for, with, and aloaisgside people.
People. . . not buildings. People.. . not ieønsnne&5. People.. . sot bydro.elsc$rie dams.
Laos’s business tam people—a few powerfal, wamy powerless.. . a fete prosporous, many penniless...
.i few prideful, my pitiless.
Whatever their financial status, whatever them hackgrotmd. So Leo. people—au people—were n’satsreS
.~f God and thus entitLed to the bask respect that os. creature of God owes to another.
Of course, the people Laos heew the best were his people—black people. He kiaew—as everyone here
t~dey itsows—that despite the great l.gisRetwe gains of reseat years is terms of racial equality, this nailon is
sill! deeply divided by a racial ~basm.
He knew that the legislative victories of fab housing, public accomr’ol&iOu and equal employment,
pporturity merely ettahlisbed the legal framework Jo begin to change men’s mi~ls and man’s hearts.
He knew that America was bus the b.grnniag of a long, toensented struggle to square its avowed
principle of “0.. Nation, Under God, l.dlvkibk, With Liberty md Justice for AU” with is: Sey.to-Sey peat.
us, of discrisninatiest.
A fra’ weeks .g~, I went by the Green Duck S. visit with Lao.. We went into she back room which Laos
Cr.. be. nn,eginaliveiy calimi his .fflee.
Orchid was up is the little left area doing the bookkee~iag. Leo. and I were seated below. He told me
t, sit ow the only chair—after all, I west U. S. Semator-..tbaiiki in Large mwasre to Leon Jordan—and be
ow a bow tunnel on its side.
V,tea here, Tom,” be sold me, “some of you white peo~ls talk about race. W,ll~ tat me tell you—
.‘~er. is a race. That race is th. race that all of us are iw—bleck people, brown people, yellow people, white
people. That race is the race of life.
‘The trouble is,” Leon went Os, “that for so many years you white people wouldn’t let us blacks even
:rt to the starting line so that we coal1 get into th. race.
“We stow have som, laws that say we can get Jo she starting line.
‘To.’, as long as I live r am gacing to try to see to It that my people eons pate i the race of life.
“We’ve got Jo ran. We’s’, gat to be os the go. We’ve got to be part of the act ion.”
These. mx best I recall them, were Leon’s thoughts that sight weeks ego the Green Duck. These wer~
the a.~.gLq, of a concerned, ,es.i~ve, vital and dedicated wan. These are the tbo.gbis which hey. to raot.
vats those of us who live is. order to giv, future and co.tlnuad meaning to the life of Leo. Jordan.
At another time, in another city, another black maw expressed it in yet another way: “Let freedom ring
from every bill and molehill of Missisii(spi,” said Martin Luther ICing. “From every mountainside, let
f,eedom ring.
“And when we allow freedom to ring’ when we tat is ring from every vifleg., from every hamlet, frost
.uery state and every city, te. will be able to speed up that day when all of God’s children, Black mess anal
White mess. Jews and Gentiles. Prostestgnts and Catholics, will be aisle to join bandi and sing is the words
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